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A B ST R A C T
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE
THEORIES
Rhys ap Gwilym
In this thesis I consider the extent to which macroeconomic theory and policy 
evaluation should be based upon behavioural models of human decision making.
I review the literature on decision making, and contrast it with the rational 
paradigm on which economic modelling is traditionally predicated. I also review 
that part of the macroeconomic literature which is based, explicitly or implicitly, 
on behavioural theories.
I develop a model of behavioural decision making in which investors base their 
portfolio decision on a choice between two simple heuristical forecasting rules. By 
simulating the model, I conclude that it can account for the observed history of the 
FTSE All-Share Index. By comparing this result with the ability of rational expec­
tations models to account for historical asset prices, I conclude that behavioural 
theories of decision making do have a useful role in explaining macroeconomic time 
series.
Given that sub-rationality is important in helping to explain the macroecon­
omy, the question then arises as to whether there is scope for policy to correct 
for the misallocation of resources tha t is caused by this irrationality. I introduce 
the heuristical decision making model into a wider dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model of the entire economy. This allows me to assess whether using 
monetary policy to target asset price misalignments can enhance welfare. I find 
that in my particular model, a counter-intuitive ‘running with the wind’ monetary 
policy could enhance welfare. This result is clearly specific to the specification 
of decision making that I use, and runs counter to other intuitive arguments in 
favour of a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy. I, therefore, conclude that a system­
atic monetary policy response to asset mis-pricing is unlikely to enhance welfare.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The question at the heart of this thesis is to what extent the field of macroeco­
nomics should incorporate the theory tha t is being developed within the contem­
porary behavioural finance literature.
The importance of the psychological underpinnings of economic decision mak­
ing has been a recurrent theme in macroeconomic literature. From Keynes’ General 
Theory [60] in 1936 to Akerlof’s Nobel prize lecture [4] in 2001, the most eminent 
of economists have highlighted the importance of behavioural issues to macroeco­
nomic study.
However, despite their recurrence in macroeconomic literature, behavioural 
considerations have never taken centre stage. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this.
One reason is the difficulty of axiomising non-rational behaviour. It is the ease 
with which rationality can be defined, and the tractability with which it can be 
applied, that has made it such a popular assumption in macroeconomic modelling.
1
2Other conceptions of decision making have regularly been criticised as ad hoc and 
lacking rigorous foundations.
Another reason is that, even if irrationality is essential in describing individual 
behaviour, it may well prove unimportant at the aggregate level. This could be 
the case if the irrational aspects of behaviour were random and uncorrelated, so 
that they cancelled out on aggregate. It could also be the case if irrationality were 
confined to a portion of the population, and its effects could be arbitraged away 
by rational agents. In such a world one individual’s irrationality would provide an 
opportunity for other individuals to profit by intervening in ways which promote 
efficiency.
Even where behavioural themes have been discussed in the macroeconomic 
literature, much of this has been of an ad hoc nature. It has rarely been directly 
informed by insights from research in psychology.
The main questions that I address in this thesis are, firstly, whether there 
exist behavioural models that can explain macroeconomic data in a more complete 
way than the rational paradigm. Secondly, if departures from rationality are an 
important explanatory factor, what implications does this have for macroeconomic 
policy?
3I begin this thesis by considering the mass of research that identifies the ways 
in which people actually make decisions. This research in cognitive psychology 
provides the basis on which economists might build their models. We shall see 
that although there is no overwhelming consensus on the nature of decision making, 
there is general agreement that people are not truly rational in the traditional sense 
that their decision making is based on a fully informed optimisation. The debate, 
rather, is concerned with the nature and extent of the departures from rationality 
that people display.
I continue in chapter 2 to examine how different views on the nature of decision 
making have informed economic modelling. This includes a review of the behav­
ioural finance literature, the area of economics which has been most informed by 
psychology. Although macroeconomics has been less directly linked with contem­
porary advances in psychology, many developments in the field have been informed 
by reflections on human behaviour. I conclude chapter 2 with a review of the main 
theories in macroeconomics that have been formed on the foundations of behav­
ioural considerations.
In chapter 3, I develop a model of asset prices under behavioural assumptions. 
The rational expectations, efficient markets paradigm has thrown up many well 
known puzzles when it comes to asset price dynamics. Rational models struggle 
to explain the equity premium, the volatility of asset prices, the high kurtosis of
4stock returns, and a number of other features. Many behavioural researchers have 
argued that these anomalies can be explained by sub-rational behaviour. I test 
whether a simple, heuristical model of asset price determination can account for 
all of the time series properties that are apparent in asset price data. As we shall 
see, I find that I cannot reject my behavioural model as being the basis for real 
world asset price dynamics.
If sub-rational decision making is an important characteristic of financial mar­
kets, then there may well be room for welfare enhancing intervention in those 
markets. Irrational behaviour represents an additional source of risk in financial 
markets (often referred to as noise trader risk) and if interventions can be designed 
that mitigate or eliminate this risk, then efficiency will be enhanced. In chap­
ter 4, I develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. 
However, I populate the model with agents who base their decision making on the 
sub-optimal rules suggested in chapter 3. I use this model to assess whether mon­
etary policy can be used to correct for behavioural biases. I find that the complex 
and discontinuous nature of these biases makes it unreasonable to expect that a 
systematic policy is able to moderate their effects.
In chapter 5, I provide a summary of my findings, and consider their implica­
tions for further research.
CHAPTER 2
Econom ic D ecision  M aking
Economics is the study of the allocation of scarce resources. It examines how 
consumers and firms interact with each other to determine that allocation. Clearly, 
we cannot get very far in analysing these interactions (the market) if we have no 
underlying theory of the behaviour and motivation of the individuals involved. 
Decision making theory, therefore, is one of the foundations on which all economic 
theory must be based.
The challenge for macroeconomists is to explain the behaviour of entire economies. 
Essentially, it is the challenge of aggregating the decisions of all the agents in the 
economy. Decision making is thus at the heart of macroeconomics, albeit aug­
mented by the complexities of aggregation.
Models of decision making have always attempted to fulfil two different roles -  
to describe and to prescribe the decision making process. Descriptive, or positive, 
models attem pt to give us an insight into how human beings actually arrive at a
5
6decision outcome, whilst normative models focus on prescribing a set of behav­
iours against which we can judge actual behaviour. Psychologists are naturally 
concerned with both sides of this duality -  they want to be able to explain actual 
behaviour as fully as possible, whilst at the same time having a standard against 
which to compare that behaviour.
As economists, we require a theory of decision making which can be used as 
the basis for our economic modelling. As such, we require a theory which can 
be integrated into a larger model of behaviours and interactions, and therefore a 
theory which can be reduced to a simple axiomisation is our ultimate goal. For 
this reason, economists have generally shown greater interest in normative models 
of behaviour which, by their nature as a prescriptive set of rules, can always be 
presented simply.
However, economists are overwhelmingly concerned with explaining the world 
as it is. This is so that they can prescribe relevant policy, or forecast future 
events. The world as it might or should be may provide an interesting and relevant 
comparison for the world as it is, but is not the central concern of economics. For 
this reason, positive models of decision making are likely to provide a more sound 
basis for economic modelling. The problem confronting economists, therefore, is
7to model decision making in a tractable way without simplifying away many of the 
important aspects of how real people make decisions.
In this chapter, I will begin by considering the two main paradigms of decision 
making theory; rationality and the heuristics and biases literature. I will review 
the axiomisation of these two competing theories and examine how they have been 
incorporated into economic modelling generally. I will conclude by considering 
the specific ways in which decision making theory, and deviations from rationality, 
have influenced the development of macroeconomics.
2.1. R ationality
Normative models of human decision making are synonymous with the concept 
of rationality. It is the measure against which we assess the appropriateness of 
human decisions. In this section, I will begin by exploring the concept of rationality 
before considering how it has been incorporated into economic modeling. I will 
then reflect on some of the most fundamental objections to the rational paradigm.
2.1.1. T he Concept o f R ationality
According to Aristotle1, rationality is the crucial characteristic that distinguishes 
human beings from other animals. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines 
rationality as “a feature of cognitive agents that they exhibit when they adopt 
beliefs on the basis of appropriate reasons” [53].
We can contrast rationality with either non-rationality or irrationality. An 
agent is non-rational when it is incapable of reasoning; a rock, a tree or, in Aristo­
tle’s opinion, a dog. On the other hand, an agent who is capable of being rational 
but who regularly violates the principles of rational assessment is referred to as 
irrational.
We can differentiate beliefs or judgments on a similar basis. Beliefs that are
contrary to the dictates of reason are irrational. However, an entire class of beliefs
1,1 we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the 
exercise of the soul’s faculties and activities in association with rational principle" Nicomachean 
Ethics Book I, Ch. 7 [8]
9exists that can be neither rational nor irrational because the beliefs are matters of 
taste and are not an appropriate subject of reason. These are usually referred to 
as preferences, and can be considered as non-rational.
So far, we only have the vaguest of notions. If rationality lies simply in the 
ability to provide reason, cause or justification for our beliefs and our actions, then 
it seems difficult to label anything as irrational. It is rare that we can provide no 
explanation of our behaviour, but few would argue that this is enough to make our 
behaviour rational. W hat we require is some form of measure of reasonableness. 
As the definition in the Oxford Companion states, reasons must be ‘appropriate’.
2.1.1.1. R easonab leness. Reason is often considered as the internal coherence 
of the beliefs that underpin our actions. Indeed, this idea is central to Savage’s 
concept of subjective probability, which I discuss later in this chapter. However, 
the link that is sometimes made between consistency of action and coherence of 
belief is a fallacious one. If I am inconsistent in my choice of action when faced 
with identical situations, this may be because my beliefs are incoherent, but it 
may equally be that my beliefs remain unchanged and that I have a preference for 
variety. The fact that I wear a pair of shorts one day and a pair of long trousers on 
another equally warm day may be a sign of irrationality, that I choose my clothing 
randomly, or it may be that I enjoy the variety. Consistency seems to provide an 
incomplete account of what is reasonable.
10
Logic is often suggested as a gauge of reason, and indeed it does provide a 
benchmark for reasonable belief in some circumstances. It is clearly irrational to 
believe at once that the world is round, R , and that it is not round, ->R. Logic 
tells us that (R  A ->R) is a contradiction. However, logic’s realm is narrow. It 
is concerned primarily with the field of certainty and demonstrative proof, whilst 
the majority of human life takes place in the realm of the merely probable. Logic 
can certainly help us to define what is reasonable, but it cannot provide the whole 
story.
Once again, Aristotle’s works provide us with a good focus for our considera­
tion of reasonableness. In his Nichomachean Ethics, he provides us with a conse- 
quentialist account of what is reasonable. An action is reasonable, and therefore 
rational, only if the agent does it in order to promote his ‘eudaimonia’. A belief 
is reasonable only to the extent tha t it causes the agent to act reasonably. Eudai­
monia is commonly translated as ‘happiness’, but literally means ‘having a good 
guardian spirit’, and in Plato and Aristotle’s works is often associated with virtue. 
The most appropriate translation is probably something like ‘human flourishing’.
Such a measure of reasonableness appears to be effective in modern usage. It 
is usual for us to contrast rational actions with those which are carried out in the 
name of emotion, faith, authority, or by arbitrary choice. In each of these cases I 
act either without carrying out an appropriate assessment of the consequences or 
in spite of the results of such an assessment.
11
Similarly, we contrast rational beliefs with those which are arrived at through 
emotion, faith, authority, or by arbitrary choice. Rational beliefs may be arrived 
at by accumulating relevant evidence or by providing a formal proof.
As I have already argued, formal proofs only apply to a narrow field. Formal 
logic and mathematics provide the clearest examples of where demonstrative proofs 
give rise to rigorous rules for deciding whether a proposition should be believed.
Most of human life, however, belongs to the realm of the probable, and as 
such the theory of probability has emerged as a guide to the reasonableness of the 
inferences and decisions that we make. Crucially, this entails that agents act in 
accordance with Bayesian rules of inference when assessing uncertain outcomes.
2 .1.1.2. B ayesian  inference. Bayes’ theorem is crucial in informing decision 
making because it allows prior probabilities to be updated repeatedly in the light 
of new evidence to provide posterior probabilities. This is the essence of Bayesian 
inference, that prior probabilities can be modified in the fight of data or empir­
ical evidence in accordance with Bayes’ theorem to yield posterior probabilities, 
which may then be used as prior probabilities for further updating in the fight of 
subsequent data.
Bayes’ theorem is easily proved from Bayes’ rule, which in turn follows immedi­
ately from the fourth of Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability. Kolmogorov’s fourth 
axiom states that the probability of a conjunction of two events is equal to the
12
probability of the first event conditional upon the second occurring, multiplied by 
the unconditional probability of the second event:
Pt(H  A D) = Px{H | D). Pt(D)
Bayes’ rule follows immediately:
and, hence, Bayes’ theorem:
Pt(D | H)
Pr(H | D) = Pr(H). Pr (D)
In other words, the conditional probability of an event H given an event D can 
be expressed as the product of the prior probability and a likelihood ratio. More 
generally, Bayes’ theorem can be expressed as:
Pr(H„ | D) = Pr(Hn) ,  Pr(D 1 Hn)Y.i {? * m .V r {D \H i)\ 
where Hn is one of a set Hi of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events.
2.1.1.3. A definition o f rationality. It is appropriate to conclude here with 
as formal a definition of rationality as possible. As we have seen, rationality is 
best viewed as a consequentialist concept. A rational agent acts as he does in
13
order to achieve some outcome. In Aristotle’s prescription, he seeks to optimise 
his eudaimonia. I shall leave the examination of the definition of eudaimonia to 
later, save to note that its modern conception as ‘utility’ is of crucial importance 
to our discussion, and that all such conceptions are of a subjective, self-regarding 
function. Furthermore, Bayes’ theorem makes clear the importance of the updating 
of probability judgments in the light of new information.
In short, we can define rational man as a self-regarding optimiser who makes 
full use of available information.
2.1.2. A xiom ising R atio n a lity : S u b jec tive  E x p ec ted  U tility  T h eo ry
2.1.2.1. E x p ec ted  V alue. The problem of inductive inference has been a promi­
nent topic in philosophical discourse at least since Aristotle. However, a formal, 
mathematical investigation of the problem only emerged at the end of the seven­
teenth century, when Pascal and Fermat exchanged letters about gambling prob­
lems. The first attem pt at a unified theory of probability appeared in the form 
of Jacob Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi (1713 [21]). The initial yardstick for rea­
sonableness in decision making was to choose the alternative, or prospect, that 
maximises expected value:
expected value o f  prospect = Xj.TTj
14
where n l is the probability and x t the value of the ith certain outcome occurring.
This “principle of mathematical expectation” is well illustrated by Pascal’s fa­
mous ‘wager’ (Pascal 1660/1961 [74]). If God exists, a believer will enjoy everlast­
ing happiness in the afterlife. We must weigh this outcome against the short-lived 
worldly pleasures that may be gained by non-believers. Pascal reasoned that as 
long as there is some finite possibility of God existing, however small, the expected 
value of the believer’s payoff will outweigh the expected value of the non-believer’s 
payoff. Rational self-interest dictates that we should forego the certain but finite 
worldly pleasures for the uncertain but infinite heavenly pleasures.
The definition of reasonableness in terms of expected value was soon exposed 
as inadequate on the basis of its incompatibility with the intuition of the majority 
of people, educated or not. The most famous conflict is the St Petersburg paradox, 
first publicised by Nicholas Bernoulli. The St Petersburg game is played by tossing 
a fair coin as many times as is necessary until it comes up heads. The game yields 
a prize equal to £2n, where n is the total number of tosses made. In other words, 
if a head comes up on the first toss the prize is equal to £ 2 l = £ 2 ; if it takes two 
tosses to get a head the prize is £ 2 2 =  T4; if it takes three attempts the prize will 
be £8; and so on. Clearly, the probability of a head appearing on the first toss 
is the probability of needing to make a second toss and then getting a head is 
|  x 1 =  1; the probability of getting a head on the third attem pt is and so on. 
By multiplying the value of each possible outcome by its probability and summing 
over all the outcomes, we find tha t the expected value of playing the St Petersburg
15
game is infinite:
£ > . * ,  =  ( 2 x 5)  + ( 4 x i )  + ( 8 x § )  + ( 1 6 x ^ ) + -
= oo
According to the “principle of mathematical expectation” it would be reasonable 
to pay any finite sum to play this game because the expected payout is infinite. 
Clearly, this result is counter-intuitive. Indeed, as Hacking (1980 [51]) claims, few 
of us would pay even £25 to enter such a game, let alone any finite sum.
2.1.2.2. The concept o f utility. Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954 [20]) introduced 
the concept of utility as an explanation of this divergence between rational theory 
and the prescription of apparent good sense. Bernoulli observed that the practice 
of calculating expected values implies that “no characteristic of the persons them­
selves ought to be taken into consideration; only those matters should be weighed 
carefully that pertain to the terms of the risk” . However, he recognised that whilst 
he would advise a rich man to pay 9, 000 ducats to buy a lottery ticket which paid 
out 20,000 ducats with a probability of 50%, he would equally advise a pauper to 
sell the same lottery ticket for 9, 000 ducats. He surmises that the reason for this 
is that there is a divergence between the monetary value of the lottery ticket and 
its subjective value, or utility, to each of the individuals: “the price of the item is
16
dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the utility, however, 
is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making the estimate”.
Bernoulli proposed changing the theory of decision making, suggesting that 
the yardstick for determining the reasonableness of a decision was in its propensity 
to maximise expected utility rather than expected value. Central to Bernoulli’s 
notion of utility is the concept of diminishing marginal utility. As can be seen 
from the utility function in figure 2.1, successive increases in wealth do not yield 
proportional increases in utility. As an individual’s wealth increases from x\ to £ 2 , 
their level of utility rises from u(x  1 ) to u(x2). However, if the same individual’s 
wealth increases by the same amount again, this time from £ 2  to £ 3 , then their 
utifity will only increase from u(x2) to u(x3), a much smaller amount than with 
the original increase. It is the concavity of the utility function that gives rise to 
this diminishing marginal utility of wealth. It is this characteristic of the utility 
function which also implies risk aversion. As can be seen clearly from figure 2.1, 
u(x2) is greater than ^u(x  1 ) +  \u(x%) even though x 2 is equal to ( \x \  +  §£3 )- In 
other words, the individual would prefer the certainty of x 2 to a risky prospect 
which has the same expected value.
Bernoulli in fact proposed the logarithmic utility function that is still popular 
today, and which is not a dissimilar shape to that in figure 2.1. Given natural 
log utility, we can easily explain the St Petersburg paradox. Table 2.1 shows 
that, whilst the expected value of the St Petersburg payoff is infinite, the utility 
associated with the bigger prizes decays quickly and so the expected utility for
17
Figure 2.1. A basic utility function 
utility
wealth
an individual with a natural log utility function would be 1.39. This is the same 
utility level as the individual will associate with the certainty of £4  (In 4 =  1.39). 
In other words, an individual with a natural log utility function would not pay 
more than £4  to play the St Petersburg game. This may well seem a reasonable 
stake for a risk averse individual, given that there is still a 50% chance of making 
a loss and only a 25% chance of making a profit.
It is important to note, however, tha t with a log utility function the St Pe­
tersburg paradox can be amended to produce a random act with infinite expected 
utility that, again, no one would really prefer to the status quo. Savage (1954 [82]) 
provides the following less elaborate but equally counter-intuitive example. A man 
with initial wealth of £1 million and whose utility is simply the natural log of his 
wealth would be indifferent about flipping a fair coin that would decide whether 
his wealth increased to £100 million or fell to £10,000. Even though log utility may
18
Table 2.1. A solution to the St Petersburg paradox
Number of Probability, Prize, Utility,
tosses TTt Xi u (x^ =  In (^i) X i - T T i u  ( Xi )  .7Ti
1 12 2 0.69 1 0.35
2 14 4 1.39 1 0.35
3 18 8 2.08 1 0.22
4 116 16 2.77 1 0.17
5 132 32 3.47 1 0.11
6 164 64 4.16 1 0.06
7 1128 128 4.85 1 0.04
8 1256 256 5.55 1 0.02
9 1512 512 6.24 1 0.01
10 11024 1024 6.93 1 0.01
Expected Value =  ^2xi. 7U OO
Expected Utility = ^2 u ( x i )  -7Ti 1.39
be a good approximation to the shape of a utility function for moderate ranges of 
wealth, a utility function must have an upper and a lower bound if it is to avoid 
criticisms of the type inherent in the St Petersburg paradox.
2.1.2.3. The form alisation o f  expected  utility theory. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944 [95]) formalised and axiomised the theory of expected utility. 
They showed that an individual whose preferences satisfy certain well-accepted
19
axioms would choose between different prospects as though maximising expected 
utility.
The first axiom of expected utility theory is the ordering axiom, which requires 
that the individual should have a preference ordering over the set of all conceivable 
prospects. Furthermore, that ordering should be complete, reflexive and transitive.
The second axiom, the continuity axiom, requires that for any three prospects 
p, q and r  such that p is preferred to q and q is preferred to r (p >- q >- r), then 
there must be some compound prospect of p and r  in some probabilities A and 
(1 — A) such that it is indifferent to q.
Finally, the independence axiom states that the evaluation of a prospect is 
not affected if some element in it is replaced by another element with which it 
is indifferent. In choosing between prospects, agents decide on the basis of what 
distinguishes them and not on the basis of what they have in common.
If these three axioms hold then von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944 [95]) 
show that it is possible to assign to every prospect p a real-valued utility index 
u{p) such that the utility index u(.) represents the individual’s preference order­
ing. Furthermore, if prospect p yields consequences Xi, x2...xn with probabilities 
7Ti, 7r2...7rn, then u(p) = 7Ti.u(xi) +  n 2.u(x2) +  ... +  7rn.u(xn).
For simplicity, I will consider the set of prospects where there are three pure 
consequences xi, x2, x3 such tha t Xi -< x2 -< x3. A typical prospect may be written 
as (tti,7r2,7t3) where 7Ti,7t2 and 7r3 are the probabilities of x i ,x 2 and x3 in the 
prospect. Since 7r2 =  (1 — 7Ti — 7r3) we may suppress 7r2 and thus represent the
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prospects in (7Ti , 7T3) space, as in figure 2.2. The utility index for any prospect 
(7Ti,7r3) is given by:
u ( 7 T i ,  7r 3 )  =  7Ti.u(xi) +  ( 1  -  7Ti -  7T3 )  ,u(x2) +  7T3.u(x3)
There must be a set of prospects which generate the same expected utility, say 
u*. These prospects form an indifference curve in (7Ti ,7t3) space with equation:
u* =  7Ti.tt(:ri) +  (1 -  7Ti — 7r3) .u(x2) +  n3.u(x3)
By rearranging:
7Tl  [ u ( X i )  -  u(x2)\ +  7T3  [u ( x 3 ) -  U { X 2 )] =  U* -  u(x2)
If we differentiate 7r3 with respect to 7r1} we get:
dn3 _  u(x2) -  u (x i) 
diti u(x3) -  u(x2)
We can see that the gradient of the indifference curve is independent of u* and, 
therefore, that under von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms the family of in­
difference curves that an individual associates with any set of pure consequences 
must be linear and parallel. In the triangle in figure 2.2, showing the set of con­
ceivable prospects in (7Ti,7r3) space, the parallel lines are indifference curves with
the arrow showing the direction of preference (pure consequence x 3 is preferable 
to pure consequence X \  by assumption).
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Figure 2.2. Preferences under SEU
direction of 
preference
'• 1
2.1.2.4. S u b jec tive  p robab ility . Savage (1954 [82]) provides the complete ax- 
iomisation of subjective expected utility theory (SEU). He introduces the concept 
of subjective probability into von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory, which al­
lows the theory to be applied to situations in which there is no objectively known 
probability. He shows that under certain axioms, preferences can be represented 
by the expectation of a utility function, this time weighted by the individual’s 
subjective probability assessment.
22
2.1.3. C ritic ism s o f th e  R a tio n a l P a rad ig m
2.1.3.1. T h e  A llais paradox . The implications of von Neumann and Morgen­
stern’s theory is that we can construct a utility function by observing preferences 
locally because if we know the shape of the indifference curves locally then we know 
the shape of all the indifference curves. Hence, if we know an individual’s prefer­
ence between p and q in figure 2.2, we know his preference between r and s must 
be the same because rs is parallel to pq. This implication of SEU theory was first 
highlighted by Maurice Allais (1953 [7]), and has become popularly known as the 
Allais paradox because it conflicts with empirical studies of people’s preferences.
Allais (1953 [7]) illustrates his point with the following pair of questions:
(1) Would you prefer prospect A or prospect B?
Prospect A: the certainty of receiving 100 million francs 
Prospect B: 10% chance of winning 500 million 
89% chance of winning 100 million 
1% chance of winning nothing
(2) Would you prefer prospect C or prospect D?
Prospect C: 11% chance of winning 100 million 
89% chance of winning nothing 
Prospect D: 10% chance of winning 500 million 
90% chance of winning nothing
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We can represent Allais’ prospects in the same manner as figure 2.2, where X\ 
is zero francs, x 2 is 100 million francs and x 3 is 500 million francs. These pure 
consequences adhere to our assumed preference ordering, x\ -< x 2 -< X3 . We can 
then represent the prospects in (7Ti,7r3) space as follows:
Prospect A: (0.00,0.00)
Prospect B: (0.01,0.10)
Prospect C: (0.89,0.00)
Prospect D: (0.90,0.10)
These prospects axe shown in figure 2.3. Clearly, the lines AB and CD are 
parallel, and so according to SEU theory, if A is preferred to B then C must be 
preferred D and vice versa. In empirical studies, however, people generally prefer 
A to B, but prefer D to C. Kahneman and Tversky (1979 [56]) report the results 
of a variation on the above choice problem. In a trial involving 72 respondents, 
82% expressed a preference for prospect A over prospect B whilst 83% expressed 
a preference for prospect D over prospect C. Clearly, such empirical results bring 
into question the theory expounded above.
Savage (1954 [82]) argues tha t examples such as the one cited above have great 
intuitive appeal, but that the standard reaction is simply an irrational response. He 
admits that his immediate response to Allais’ problem was to express preference for 
prospects A and D. However, he argues that on closer inspection he is compelled 
to reverse his choice in respect of the second question, and that this amounts
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Figure 2.3. The Allais paradox
500 m
100m A C Zero
to the correction of an error. He rephrases the same problem as a lottery with 
a hundred numbered tickets and with prizes as shown in table 2.2. If a ticket 
numbered between 12 and 100 is drawn then it does not matter, in either case, 
which prospect is chosen. Focusing, therefore, merely on the outcomes if one of the 
tickets numbered between 1 and 11 is drawn, it is apparent that the same decision 
needs to be made in either situation (1) or situation (2). The decision in both 
situations is whether to take an outright gift of 100 million francs or to take a ten 
to one on chance of winning 500 million francs. Savage concludes that he would 
prefer the sure thing to the gamble, and hence prefers A to B and C to D.
Savage’s analysis here is a clear defence of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
independence axiom. He considers lottery tickets 12 to 100 in isolation and; having
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Table 2.2. Savage’s analysis of the Allais paradox
Ti
1
cket Numt 
2-11
>er
12-100
(1) Prospect A 100m 100m 100m
Prospect B 0 500m 100m
(2) Prospect C 100m 100m 0
Prospect D 0 500m 0
disregarded them because they do not provide a basis for distinguishing between 
competing prospects; he then considers tickets 1 to 11 in isolation.
The independence axiom entails that if prospect p* is preferred to prospect p, 
then the mixture [ap* +  (1 — a)p**] is preferred to [ap +  (1 — a)p**] f°r all o; > 0 
and p**, and it is this that ensures the linearity of the indifference curves. This 
property can be interpreted as follows:
“In terms of the ultimate probabilities over the outcomes {xi, x 2 -..xn}, 
choosing between the mixtures [ap* +  (1 — a)p**] and [ap+ (1 — a)p**] 
is the same as being offered a coin with a probability of (1 — <a) of 
landing tails, in which case you will obtain the lottery p**, and being 
asked before the flip whether you would rather have p* or p in the 
event of a head. Now either the coin will land tails, in which case 
your choice won’t have mattered, or else it will land heads, in which 
case you are ‘in effect’ back to a choice between p* or p, and it is only 
‘rational’ to make the same choice as you would before” (Machina 
1987 [66])
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Figure 2.4. The ‘common consequence effect’
500 m
c100 m A Zero
Clearly, the argument here is that there can be no complementarities between 
the different probability mixtures in the prospects.
Machina (1987 [66]) argues that the empirical evidence is not easy to dismiss 
and that we need to reassess the theory rather than reassess our initial reaction to 
Allais’ problem. He argues that, just as with goods, there can be complementarities 
in the probability mixtures of prospects. The ‘common consequence effect’ entails 
that the better off an individual would be from winning 100 million francs in 
prospect A, the more risk averse they become over the gamble in prospect B. In 
other words, as one moves up and left in the triangle, in figure 2.3, towards one’s 
preferred point, risk aversion increases, and the indifference curves become steeper.
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By dropping the independence axiom, we can get non-linearity in the indifference 
curves, as in figure 2.4, and this would explain the Allais paradox.
Quite why we might have complementarities in the probability mixtures of 
prospects remains to be explained. I will leave this to the discussion of the heuris­
tics and biases paradigm below.
2.1.3.2. R ab in . Matthew Rabin (2000 [75]) provides a more contemporary cri­
tique of subjective expected utility theory. He shows that if we posit a utility 
function which is strictly increasing and weakly concave across all values of wealth, 
then observed levels of risk aversion over bets with small stakes imply unrealisti- 
cally large risk aversion over bets with large stakes. As an example, he shows that 
if we know that a risk-averse person turns down an evens bet of losing $100 or 
gaining $105, then SEU theory implies that the same individual will turn down an 
evens bet of losing $4,000 or gaining $635,000. This is clearly incompatible with 
observed behaviour. The intuition for this property of SEU theory is that turning 
down a small stakes bet with positive expected value means that the marginal util­
ity of money must diminish very quickly for small changes in wealth. When this 
diminution is iterated over large changes in wealth, it gives rise to an unrealistically 
high rate at which the value of money deteriorates.
28
2.1.3.3. T h e  E llsberg  paradox . Our discussion so far has focused on anomalies 
between observed behaviour and the normative SEU model in situations where the 
possible outcomes are well defined. The alternative prospects which Allais offered 
his subjects all had well specified probability distributions of outcomes. The Ells­
berg paradox draws a distinction between circumstances in which the probability 
distribution of outcomes is known (risky outcomes) and those circumstances in 
which the distribution is poorly defined or unknown (uncertain outcomes).
Uncertainty can be thought of as a second dimension of risk. If we are asked 
to draw a card from what we know to be a conventional pack of playing cards, we 
do not know what colour the card will be but we do know with certainty that the 
probability of red is \  and the probability of black is \ . However, if we are asked 
to draw a card from a bunch of playing cards which someone else has put together, 
we do not know how many of each colour is in the bunch and so do not know the 
exact distribution of possible outcomes. In this case we must form a subjective 
distribution of possible outcomes which will depend on our beliefs about various 
parameters, such as the tastes of the individual who selected the bunch. According 
to Ellsberg (1961 [34]), we are not only averse to the risk inherent in choosing a 
card from a distribution, but we are also averse to the extra dimension of risk 
inherent when we do not know for certain the distribution of possible outcomes. 
Barberis and Thaler (2002 [14]) refer to this as ambiguity aversion.
Ellsberg (1961 [34]) describes the following experiment. Suppose that there 
are two urns. Urn 2 contains a total of 100 balls, 50 red and 50 blue. Urn 1 also
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contains 100 balls, again a mix of red and blue, but the subject does not know 
the proportion of each. Subjects are then asked to choose one of the following two 
prospects, each of which involves a possible payment of £100, depending on the 
colour of a ball drawn at random from the relevant urn:
Prospect A: a ball is drawn from Urn 1, you win £100 if red, nothing if blue
Prospect B: a ball is drawn from Urn 2, you win £100 if red, nothing if blue
Subjects are then asked to choose between following two prospects:
Prospect C: a ball is drawn from Urn 1, you win £100 if blue, nothing if red
Prospect D: a ball is drawn from Urn 2, you win £100 if blue, nothing if red
Prospect B is typically preferred to A, while D is preferred to C. These choices are 
inconsistent with SEU. The choice of B implies a subjective probability that fewer 
than 50% of the balls in Urn 1 are red, while the choice of D implies the opposite. 
The experiment suggests that people dislike uncertain outcomes more than they 
dislike straightforward risky outcomes where the distribution of possible outcomes 
is known.
2.1.3.4. Summary. Subjective expected utility theory is the seminal axiomisa- 
tion of rationality. It provides a simple framework on which to base decision 
making. The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and Rabin’s critique provide serious 
objections to the use of SEU theory as a positive theory of human decision making.
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However, there is a general consensus that it still provides the most appropriate 
normative measure against which decisions may be assessed.
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2.2. B ounded  R atio n a lity , H euris tics  an d  B iases
Allais and Ellsberg’s criticisms of SEU are based on perceived weaknesses in the 
axiomisation of that theory and its resultant failure to describe people’s preferences 
for risky prospects. Here, we consider a different type of objection, one that is 
aimed at the root of rational theory. The theories of bounded rationality and of 
the heuristics and biases paradigm do not merely question the specification of SEU; 
they deny the idea that decision making is aimed at any form of optimisation.
2.2.1. B ou n d ed  ra tio n a lity
The phrase ‘bounded rationality’ was first introduced by Herbert A. Simon in 
the mid-1950s, and the theory was initially associated with the field of artificial 
intelligence. Simon (1956 [85]) notes that “however adaptive the behaviour of 
organisms in learning and choice situations, this adaptiveness falls far short of 
the ideal of ‘maximisation’ postulated in economic theory. Organisms adapt well 
enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, ‘optimise’” .
Models of bounded rationality take into account the limitations of knowledge 
and computational capacity in human decision making. They take into account 
how actual decision making processes influence the decisions that are reached. 
They do not reject the concept of rationality entirely in that they continue to 
view agents as having goals which they are motivated to fulfil. However, the
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optimising behaviour associated with full rationality is rejected as too expensive 
computationally and in terms of the resources of knowledge required.
Simon (1987 [86]) contrasts boundedly rational models with subjective ex­
pected utility theory (SEU) in three ways. Firstly, SEU theory holds that choices 
are made from amongst a given set of alternatives. Boundedly rational models, 
on the other hand, recognise that in reality the search for different possible alter­
natives is costly. Therefore, these models must postulate processes for generating 
these alternatives. Secondly, SEU theory assumes that each of the possible alter­
natives has a subjectively known probability distribution of outcomes. Theories 
of bounded rationality deny the innate knowledge of these distributions, and so 
they must introduce procedures for estimating them or strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty that do not assume knowledge of probabilities. Finally, SEU theory 
holds that agents make choices in such a way as to maximise the expected value of 
their utility function, which is given a priori. Bounded rationality, however, holds 
that optimisation is too demanding of knowledge and computational capacity to be 
an effective tool for choice. Hence, theories of bounded rationality must postulate 
an alternative choice mechanism and this often involves a satisficing strategy.
2.2.2. Kahnem an and T versky’s H euristics and Biases
A more concerted challenge to the idea that rationality provided an effective model 
of human decision making was established by a series of papers published in the
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early 1970s by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They argued that rather 
than following rational rnles, people use straightforward rules of thumb, heuristics, 
in assessing frequencies and probabilities. Furthermore, they argued that these 
heuristics lead to systematic biases in decision making when compared to the 
normative (rational) model.
Their seminal paper (Tversky and Kahneman 1974 [91]) draws attention to 
three heuristics which they claim can explain human decision making under un­
certainty. These heuristics, and the biases to which they give rise, are discussed 
below.
2.2.2.1. R ep resen ta tiv en ess . People order probability and similarity in exactly 
the same way. In assessing the probability that an individual belongs to a particular 
group, people assess the degree to which the individual is representative (or similar 
to the stereotype) of that group.
Kahneman and Tversky illustrate this effect with the use of a description of 
an individual: "Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with 
little interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he 
has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail". According to the 
representativeness heuristic, people will assess the probability of Steve belonging 
to a particular occupational group from among a list of possibilities according to
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how similar Steve is to their stereotypical image of the relevant occupation. This 
leads to a number of biases:
(1) Insensitivity to prior probability of outcome. The base rate frequency of 
outcomes has no effect on representativeness but does affect probability. In 
the above example, people will judge Steve as more likely to be a librarian 
than a salesman because his description is more similar to the stereotype 
of a librarian, even though the number of salesmen in the population in 
general far exceeds the number of librarians. Similarity is not contingent 
upon prior probability, but posterior probability is.
(2) Insensitivity to sample size. People assess the probability of a sample re­
sult by the similarity of this result to the corresponding population para­
meter, and hence ignore the size of the sample. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972 [54]) report the results of an experiment where subjects were asked 
to assess the probability of a random sample of men having an average 
height of over six foot. Subjects assigned the same value to samples of 
1000, 100 and 10 men, even though probability theory tells us that this is 
incorrect.
(3) Misconceptions of chance. People expect that a sequence of events gen­
erated by a random process will represent the essential characteristics of 
that process even when the sequence is short. For example, when a coin 
is tossed six times people expect the outcome to represent the unbiased 
nature of the coin. Hence, people regard H — T  — H  — T  — T  — H  as
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a more likely sequence than H  — H  — H  — T  — T  — T  , which does not 
‘look random’ and so does not represent the fairness of the coin as well as 
the first sequence (Kahneman and Tversky 1972 [54]).
(4) Insensitivity to predictability. When people make predictions about a fu­
ture outcome based on a current description, they will base the prediction 
on the representativeness of the description regardless of the predictability 
of the future event. Hence, predictions about a remote future criterion axe 
as variable as the evaluation of the current information. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973 [55]) describe a study in which subjects were presented 
with several descriptions of student teachers giving practice lessons. They 
were then asked to firstly evaluate the quality of a lesson and secondly to 
predict the standing of the student teacher five years hence. The judg­
ments made in each case were almost identical, even though probability 
theory would suggest that performance in one class now should not be a 
very good predictor of performance five years ahead.
(5) The illusion of validity. The internal consistency of a pattern of inputs 
is a major determinant of one’s confidence in predictions based on these 
inputs. However, consistent patterns are most often observed when the 
inputs are highly correlated, and therefore redundant.
(6) Misconceptions of regression. People do not develop correct intuitions 
about regression towards the mean. It is incompatible with the belief
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that the predicted outcome should be maximally representative of the 
input, and therefore just as extreme.
2.2.2.2. A vailability . People assess the frequency of a class or the probability of 
an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. 
This leads to a number of biases:
(1) Bias due to the retrievability of instances. A class whose instances are 
easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency 
whose instances are less easily retrieved. For example, Tversky and Kah­
neman (1973 [89]) report an experiment in which subjects heard a list of 
people’s names and were then asked to judge whether the list contained 
more male or female names. In some lists, the men were more famous 
than the women and in other lists this was reversed. In each case, the 
subjects wrongly judged that the sex which had the more famous names 
was the more numerous.
(2) Bias due to the effectiveness of a search set. Different tasks elicit differ­
ent search sets and some searches are much easier than others. For exam­
ple, because it is easier to search for words which have the letter r at the 
beginning of the word (e.g. road) than to search for words which have the 
letter r as the third letter (e.g. cart), most people erroneously judge that
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there are more words of the first type than of the second type (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973 [89]).
(3) Biases of imaginability. Some outcomes are more easily imagined than 
others. For example, it is much easier to imagine two people from a group 
of ten than it is to imagine eight people from the group of ten. Of course, 
it is possible to combine two from ten in exactly the same number of ways 
as it is to combine eight from ten (each permutation of two leaves you 
with a unique combination of people left over). However, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973 [89]) report that when subjects were asked to estimate 
the number of permutations, the median estimate of the number of com­
binations of two people was 70, whilst that for eight people was 20 (the 
correct answer in each case is 45). In the same way it is easy to explain 
people’s aversion to ‘adventurous activities’, because the ease with which 
disasters are imagined need not reflect their actual likelihood.
(4) Illusory correlation. The judgment of the frequency with which two events 
co-occur may be biased by an associative bond between them.
2.2.2.3. A d ju s tm en t an d  ancho ring . People make estimates by starting from 
an initial value and then adjusting. Different starting points, possibly suggested 
by the formulation of the problem, might therefore lead to different estimates. The 
following biases are associated with the adjustment and anchoring heuristic:
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(1) Insufficient adjustment. Adjustments are typically insufficient. Two groups 
of school pupils were asked to estimate a numerical expression within five 
seconds. One group was asked to estimate: 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x l .
Another group estimated: I x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 .  The median
estimate for the first group was 2,250 and that for the second group was 
512. The correct answer is 40,320 (Tversky and Kahneman 1974 [91]).
(2) Biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events. People tend 
to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and to underestimate 
the probability of disjunctive events. The probability of the elementary 
event provides a natural starting point for the estimation of either and, 
since adjustment is typically insufficient, the final estimates remain too 
close to the probabilities of the elementary events in both cases.
2.2.3. Axiom ising Heuristics: Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics literature provides an interesting insight into 
how human beings make judgments and, consequently, decisions. However, it 
provides a purely descriptive account of how individuals do so. It does suggest 
common biases which afflict all of us, but these are generally vague and ill-defined.
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Prospect theory represents Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979 [56]) attempt to 
provide a formal, axiomised model of human decision making2. Prospect theory 
is still unequivocally a descriptive model, but it attempts to better define the 
commonality in the biases that are predicted by their previous work, and provide 
a unified theory of decision making. Their criticisms of SEU theory are all based on 
empirical studies and, hence, it is the behaviour which they have observed during 
these studies that they are focused on explaining. Providing a normative model 
which prescribes how decisions should be made is not their purpose here:
“in order to accommodate the effects [observed], we axe compelled 
to assume that values are attached to changes rather than to final 
states, and that decision weights do not coincide with stated proba­
bilities. These departures from expected utility theory must lead to 
normatively unacceptable consequences.” (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979 [56])
They distinguish two distinct stages in the decision making process. The first 
is an editing phase which reformulates the options so as to simplify the subsequent 
evaluation phase.
2.2.3.1. The editing phase. The editing phase consists in the application of the 
following operations:
2Some of the core ideas inherent in prospect theory (notably, the existence of a reference point) 
had been presented much earlier by Markowitz (1952 [67]). However, prospect theory has come 
to overshadow this work, and is now synonimous with the idea of ‘non-expected utility theory’.
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(1) Coding. This essentially consists in locating a reference point against 
which gains and losses can be defined. Usually this will correspond with 
the individual’s current asset position, but it may be affected by the way 
in which offered prospects are framed. For example, where one of the 
prospects involves a certain gain, this may be amalgamated with current 
assets to determine the reference point.
(2) Combination. Prospects may be simplified by combining the probabilities 
of identical outcomes. For example, if a prospect involves winning £100 
if a coin lands heads within two tosses, the 0.5 probability of winning on 
the first toss and 0.25 probability of winning on the second toss can be 
combined to give a simpler prospect of a 0.75 probability of winning £100.
(3) Segregation. Prospects may be simplified by segregating a riskless com­
ponent from the risky component. For example, a prospect where there is 
an 80% chance of winning £300 and a 20% chance of winning £200 may 
be separated into a sure gain of £200 and an 80% chance of winning £100.
(4) Cancellation. When the offered prospects have components in common, 
these may be discarded. For example, a choice between the following 
prospects:
Prospect A: win £100 if a die lands 1,2 or 3; lose £100 if 4 or 5; win 
£200 if 6
Prospect B: win £100 if a die lands 1,2 or 3; nothing if 4 or 5; win 
£50 if 6
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can be simplified by ignoring the common outcome-probability pairs to: 
Prospect A: 33.3% chance of losing £100; 16.7% chance of winning 
£200
Prospect B: 16.7% chance of winning £50
5. Simplification. Probabilities or outcomes may be rounded to simplify 
evaluation. For example the prospect of winning £101 with a probability 
of 0.49 may be treated as the prospect of winning £100 with probability
0.50.
6. Detection of dominance. The available prospects are checked to find any 
which are strictly dominated by another and they are then dropped with­
out further evaluation.
Some of the editing operations conflict with others and, hence, the same set of 
original prospects may result in varying sets of edited prospects. For example, in 
the case of the following prospects:
Prospect A: 20% chance of winning £100; 49% chance of winning £199
Prospect B: 15% chance of winning £100; 51% chance of winning £201
prospect A will appear to dominate prospect B if the second constituent of each 
is simplified to a 50% chance of winning £200. The order in which operations are 
applied will be crucial in determining the final set of edited prospects. Therefore, 
the context in which the original prospects are offered may affect the final choice
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by influencing the ordering of operations. This is the all important concept of 
framing.
2.2.3.2. T h e  evaluation  phase . After the editing phase, the decision maker 
moves on to evaluate the simplified set of prospects, and to choose the one of 
greatest value (Kahneman and Tversky talk of the ‘value’ of an edited prospect, 
and derive a ‘value’ function. I will remain consistent with their semantics in 
this section. However, it is important to recognise that Kahneman and Tversky’s 
‘value’ function is very different to the traditional notion of expected (monetary) 
value).
The expected (monetary) value of a prospect is simply the sum of the products 
of the possible outcomes and their probabilities:
EV = y > .7 r t
SEU theory defines expected utility as being non-linear in the values of each out­
come:
EU = ^ 2 U •7Fi
Prospect theory treats the overall value of a prospect as non-linear not only in the 
values of each outcome, but also as non-linear in the associated probabilities. The 
value of a prospect is the sum of the products of functions of the possible outcomes
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and their probabilities:
V = ^ 2  v (xi) -w M
The value function: The v (.) function associates with each monetary value, Xi, 
a subjective value, v (xi). This is similar to the utility function in SEU theory, but 
differs in two significant ways. The first is that the monetary value, Xi, is generally 
regarded in SEU theory as the final asset position of the individual. In prospect 
theory, outcomes are defined relative to a reference point, r, determined during 
the editing phase. Therefore, in order to remain consistent in our terminology, I 
should really define the value function as a function of changes in wealth relative 
to the reference point, v (xi — r ).
The second difference is that Kahneman and Tversky prescribe a specific shape 
to the value function. They propose a concave function for gains, as with SEU 
theory. For losses, however, they propose that the value function is convex. To ex­
plain this they draw an analogy with discriminating between temperatures. Whilst 
it is relatively easy to discriminate between a change of 3° and a change of 6° in 
room temperature, it is much more difficult to discriminate between a change of 
13° and a change of 16°. This is true regardless of whether the change in question 
is an increase or a decrease. If we apply this same principle to the assessment of 
monetary values, then the difference between a gain of £100 and a gain of £200 will
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Figure 2.5. Kahneman and Tversky’s value function
va lue
losses gains
appear greater than the difference between a gain of £1100 and a gain of £1200. 
This clearly implies the risk averse behaviour that expected utility theorists have 
always prescribed. However, if the difference between a loss of £100 and a loss 
of £200 similarly appears greater than the difference between a loss of £1100 and 
a loss of £1200, then this implies risk seeking behaviour where the choice is be­
tween two losses. Such a function, as illustrated in figure 2.5, is consistent with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical evidence.
The function is shown as steeper for losses than for gains because, again, em­
pirical evidence suggests that losses loom larger than gains. People find symmetric 
bets (for example a 50% chance of winning £10 and 50% chance of losing £10) 
unattractive, and they find them more unattractive the greater the stake.
45
The weighting function: The w (.) function associates with each probability, n*, 
a decision weight, w (71-*), which reflects the effect of the given probability on the 
overall value of the prospect, w (71^) is an increasing function of nt with w (0) =  0 
and w (1) =  1 (i.e. impossible outcomes are ignored and the function is normalised 
so that w (7Tj) is the ratio of the weight associated with the probability 7r* and the 
weight associated with certainty).
Based, again, on empirical observation, Kahneman and Tversky conclude that 
very low probabilities axe overweighted. This would help explain why people might 
prefer a lottery ticket with very poor odds of paying out to the expected value of 
the ticket, and why people will buy fair insurance for events with a tiny probability 
of happening.
Although w (ni) > 7Tj for low probabilities, for all 0 < 7^ < 1, [w (7^) +  w (1 — 7^)] <
1. This property is called subcertainty and can help explain the Allais paradox. 
Expressing the Allais paradox in terms of prospect theory, we get:
v (100) > v (500) .w(0.1) +  v (100) .w (0.89) 
and v (100) .w (0.11) < v (500) .it;(0.1)
Therefore:
v (100). [1 — w (0.89)] > v (500) .ic(0.1) 
and v (500) .u;(0.1) > v (100) .w (0.11)
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Figure 2.6. Kahneman and Tversky’s weighting function
Stated probability, Ki 10
Therefore:
v (100). [1 -  w (0.89)] > v (100) .w (0.11)
Therefore, it must be that
1 > w (0.89) +  w (0.11)
Figure 2.6 illustrates a weighting function that fulfils all of the properties dis­
cussed.
2.2.3.3. Empirical assessm ent. In their updated version of prospect theory, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992 [94]) provide parameters that describe the rep­
resentative decision maker. Following much empirical testing, they propose the
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following value function:
v (Xi — r) = (Xi — r )0'88 fo r  Xi > r
=  —2.25 (Xi — r)0'88 for  Xi < r
where 2.25 is the coefficient of loss aversion, and 0.88 is the coefficient of risk 
aversion.
2.2.4. Criticism s o f the Heuristics Paradigm
The heuristics paradigm began to receive significant criticism at the beginning 
of the 1980s. Some criticisms focused on the vagueness of the heuristics, their 
contradictory nature and the failure to specify when certain rules will be used 
in preference to others. Others questioned the scientific method of the empirical 
investigation, claiming that Kahneman and Tversky’s methodology was based on 
devising often complex experiments which would lead to poor performance amongst 
subjects. Other criticisms are based on the normative model of rationality against 
which Kahneman and Tversky compare their empirical results. They claim that 
the heuristics literature prescribes a limited normative model which fails to reflect 
the complexity of the world as it is.
I describe below a number of the most significant attacks on the heuristics 
paradigm.
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2 .2 .4 .1 . B irnbaum . One of the first significant criticisms of the heuristics school 
of thought came from Michael Birnbaum (1983). He explained how the famous 
cab problem could be accounted for in terms of optimal behaviour.
Tversky and Kahneman (1982 [92]) use the cab problem to illustrate the neglect 
of base rates in human inference. The problem is stated as follows:
A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab 
companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are 
given the following data:
(a) 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
(b) a witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of 
the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the 
accident and concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of 
the two colours 80% of the time and failed 2 0 % of the time.
W hat is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was 
Blue rather than Green?
In empirical tests, where subjects are given the problem above and asked for 
an answer, the median and modal response is 0.80.
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Tversky and Kahneman claim that the correct answer to the above question 
can be straightforwardly ascertained using Bayes’ theorem:
Posterior odds =  Prior odds x Likelihood ratio
Pt(B | “£ ”) P r(B) P r(“£ ” | B)
Pt(G | “£ ”) _  Pr(G) P r(“B” | G)
0.15 0.8 
0 8 5 '0 2  
1 2  
17
Therefore:
P r(B I “B n) =  — =  0.41
v 1 ’ 12 +  17
where B and G denote the hypotheses that the cab involved in the accident was 
Blue or Green, and “B” is the witness’s report that the cab was Blue. According 
to this result, the cab involved is more likely to be Green than Blue, despite the 
witness’s report, because the base rate is more extreme than the witness is credible. 
Tversky and Kahneman claim that the divergence between their normative solution 
of 0.41 and the empirical responses is explained by subjects ignoring the base rates, 
and that this in turn can be explained by the representativeness heuristic.
On a purely intuitive level, it may seem strange that the report of a witness 
whom we are told is 80% reliable should carry so little weight. This is because 
the ‘normative’ solution here is based on the unrealistic assumption that the likeli­
hood ratio is independent of the base rate. Tversky and Kahneman’s calculations
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implicitly assume that P r(£  | “J5”) =  P r (TS)  and P r(“£ ” | G) = (1 -  Pr(TS)), 
where Pr(T’S') is the probability of success in the court test. In other words, they 
assume that the witness is equally likely to be wrong when reporting that he has 
seen a Blue cab as when he reports seeing a Green cab. Signal detection theory 
suggests that this is not the case. It suggests that the success of the witness in 
reporting each of the colours is different and, furthermore, the success rate in each 
case will vary as the base rates of the colours vary.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the theory of signal detection. Each colour of cab produces 
a normal distribution on a sensory continuum. For example, a Green cab is most 
likely to give sensation x but can, with tiny probability, give rise to sensation 
y. The witness will receive a sensation from the cab and, based on this, must 
then judge whether the cab is Blue or Green. As an example, the witness may 
choose sensation c as his judgement criterion. If the sensation lies to the left of 
c he will report that the cab is Green and if it is to the right of c he will report 
Blue. Tversky and Kahneman’s normative analysis implicitly assumes that this 
judgment criterion is invariant, at c.
The key to Birnbaum’s argument is that the judgement criterion that the wit­
ness uses will be dependent upon the base rate. There are three theories about 
how the judgment criterion is determined:
(1) Range-frequency theory states that judges have a tendency to use response 
categories with equal frequency. Therefore, as Blue becomes less common 
in the base rate, the judgement criterion moves in favour of reporting Blue.
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Figure 2.7. The sensory continuum
prob..
Blut
sensory
continuum
In other words, the judgement criterion moves towards the left, from c to 
c '. This makes the report of Blue more likely than under Tversky and 
Kahneman’s analysis and so suggests a normative solution to the cab 
problem of less than 0.41.
(2) Probability matching theory suggests that if the witness knows the base 
rate, it seems plausible that he will try to match response probabilities 
to stimulus probabilities, i.e. the witness will try to set P r(“B”)=Pr(B) 
and P r(“G”) =Pr(G). In this case the judgement criterion will shift right 
to c "  when Blue has a low base rate, so as to equate the probability of 
reporting Blue to 15%, the actual proportion of Blue in the population. 
This implies a normative solution of 0.58.
(3) Clearly, the above solutions are both conjectures about human behaviour, 
but neither represents an optimal response to the problem that the witness 
faces. The optimal observer will adjust his judgement criterion so as
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to maximise the probability of a correct identification. If Pr(B) is low, 
he will be more concerned about reporting Green correctly than getting 
Blue wrong. This implies a judgement criterion of c ' "  and a normative 
solution to the cab problem of 0.82.
Intuitively, the lower the proportion of Blue cabs in the population, the more 
averse the witness will become to reporting Blue. He is only likely to report Blue 
when he is very confident that the cab is indeed Blue (when the probability of 
the sensation he experiences being caused by a Green cab is extremely remote). 
The subjects responding to Tversky and Kahneman’s empirical studies will have 
taken this effect into account, and so, when the witness reports seeing a Blue cab, 
they recognise that he would only have done so if he were very confident that the 
cab was not Green, and it is this that allows them to have such confidence in the 
witness’s report.
Birnbaum’s criticism centres on the normative model used by Tversky and 
Kahneman. Their use of Bayes’ theorem in the equations above assumes that 
the base rate only affects the prior odds of the possible outcome. The account 
of signal detection theory given above, however, makes clear that this is not so. 
The likelihood ratio is also dependant upon the base rate, because this affects 
the optimal response of the witness. Taking this into account, we find that the 
empirical modal response of 0.80 is very close to the optimal normative solution 
of 0.82.
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2 .2 .4 .2 . G igerenzer. Gerd Gigerenzer (1991 [46]), again, bases his criticism of 
Tversky and Kahneman’s theory on their naive interpretation of probability theory. 
The main thrust of his argument centres on the fact that many of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s experiments require subjects to provide probabilistic interpretations 
of single events. According to the frequentist interpretation of probability this is 
not valid.
For example, Kahneman and Tversky often use experiments such as the fol­
lowing:
Which city has more inhabitants? (a) Hyderabad or (b) Islamabad 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
Typically, such experiments find that only around 80% of people who report 
being 100% confident in their answer are actually correct; only around 75% who 
report being 90% confident are correct; and so on. Kahneman and Tversky take 
this to be evidence of an overconfidence bias. But a discrepancy between confi­
dence in a single event and relative frequencies in the long run is not a violation of 
probability theory from many points of view, because we are comparing two inher­
ently different things. The frequentist school rejects the idea that ‘probability’ can 
even refer to a single event, whilst the subjectivist school only requires the internal 
consistency of subjective probabilities. Gigerenzer reports on an experiment in 
which he rephrased the above experiment in a frequentist manner. His subjects 
were asked fifty questions similar in type to the one above, and were then asked
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how many they thought they had answered correctly. In this way, the reported 
frequency of correct answers could be compared to the actual frequency of correct 
answers. No evidence of overconfidence was found.
Gigerenzer similarly criticises the analysis of the conjunction fallacy. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1982 [93]) illustrate the conjunction fallacy using the ‘Linda’ 
experiment. In this experiment, the subjects were presented with the following 
brief personality sketch:
Linda is a 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She 
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations.
and asked to rank a number of statements in order of probability. The statements 
included, amongst others, the following:
Linda is active in the feminist movement (F)
Linda is a bank teller (T)
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement (F&T)
Tversky and Kahneman report that in a number of trials, with subjects of vary­
ing statistical ability, F&T is consistently reported as being “more probable” than 
T. This, they argue, violates the conjunction rule and is explained by the repre­
sentativeness heuristic. Linda resembles more closely a “feminist bank teller” than 
a “bank teller” and so subjects judge the former to be more probable. Gigerenzer
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argues that this experiment is just another example of subjects being asked for the 
probability of a single event, and so is meaningless from a frequentist view. We 
clearly still have a problem from a subjectivist viewpoint, in that the results are 
a clear breach of Bayes’ theorem. However, Fiedler’s (1988 [40]) rephrasing of the 
problem in a frequentist manner causes the conjunction fallacy to disappear and 
this result cannot be accounted for by the representativeness heuristic.
Finally, Gigerenzer criticises the analysis of base rate neglect. Again, Kahne­
man and Tversky’s empirical studies almost always refer to single events. Even 
on a subjectivist reading, however, it is still unclear in most cases what the ap­
propriate base rate is to use. Furthermore, as Birnbaum has made clear, a base 
rate only matters if subjects are drawn randomly from the population to which the 
base rate refers. Gigerenzer, Hell and Blank (1988 [47]) report a version of Kahne­
man and Tversky’s (1973 [55]) engineer problem, an experiment in which they get 
subjects to draw descriptions from an urn in order to make clear the randomness. 
They find that the base rate neglect disappears. When Cosmides and Tooby (1996 
[28]) rephrase the clinical trial problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1982 [92]) in a 
frequentist way and include extra information to explain the relevance of the base 
rate, they also find that the bias disappears.
2.2.4.3. Further criticism s. During the 1990s and 2000s a large amount of liter­
ature has been published which can be considered as a continuation and deepening
56
of the line of enquiry opened by Birnbaum. It focuses on the crucial role that the 
environment plays in shaping human behaviour. Important contributions in this 
area include Klayman and Ha’s (1987 [61]) explanation of ‘confirmation bias’ and 
Oaksford and Chater’s (1994 [72]; 1996 [73]) explanation of the ‘selection task’.
Wason (1960 [96]) claims that the best way to test a hypothesis is to try to 
disprove it through negative testing. However, he finds that in empirical experi­
ments his subjects almost always try to test a hypothesis through positive testing, 
testing which seeks to confirm the hypothesis. He refers to this anomaly as ‘con­
firmation bias’. Klayman and Ha, however, show that the optimal strategy for 
testing hypotheses depends on the structure of the problem, and is not always 
to try and disconfirm the hypothesis. They argue that when hypotheses concern 
minority phenomena then positive testing is most effective. Furthermore, this is 
the most common type of hypothesis testing that occurs in the real world. Hence, 
whilst Wason can provide an example of a laboratory test in which subjects’ use 
of positive testing is maladaptive, this behaviour is none the less highly adapted 
and optimal in most real life situations.
Wason (1966 [97]; 1968 [98]) provides the ‘selection task’ as an illustration 
of confirmation bias. The task involves four cards, each with P or ->P on one 
side and Q or -iQ on the other. One card shows P, another —>P, another Q and 
the other ->Q. The subjects are required to test the rule that “if P, then Q” by 
turning over as few cards as necessary. Typically, fewer than 10% choose the cards 
that standard logic dictates might falsify the hypothesis, P and ->Q. The majority
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of subjects choose to turn over P and Q. Oaksford and Chater argue that this 
response is not irrational. They show that Bayesian induction prescribes that P 
and Q are the most informative cards with respect to testing the hypothesis if P 
and Q are relatively rare compared to - P  and -iQ. Again, performance in this task 
can be regarded as highly adaptive in a world in which we tend to test hypotheses 
about rare events. In this contrived context, the behaviour of subjects may not be 
optimal but it is likely to be optimal in the real world.
As with the cab problem, much of the behaviour observed in the laboratory 
environment can appear maladaptive and irrational. However, when we take into 
consideration the complex environment in which judgments must always be made, 
that same behaviour can appear compatible with the dictates of optimality.
2.2.4.4. Summary. Kahneman and Tversky’s ([54],[55],[91],[92],[93]) method­
ology in their heuristics literature has been to list a range of biases that they 
have observed in their empirical work and then to explain these biases in terms 
of cognitive heuristics. Clearly, in order to differentiate between ‘correct’ and ‘er­
roneous’ judgments, it is necessary to have a normative model against which to 
compare actual judgments. In nearly all cases, the criticisms of the heuristics lit­
erature revolve around the normative model against which actual decisions have 
been measured. As Gigerenzer (1991 [46]) argues, they “have relied on a very 
narrow normative view and have ignored conceptual distinctions fundamental to
58
probability theory” . Essentially, the heuristics paradigm stands accused of sim­
plifying the theory of probability to the point of nonsense, and then concluding 
that actual decision making is biased because it fails to comply with this simplified 
probabilistic model.
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2.3. R ationality and Irrationality in Economic M odelling
So far I have investigated the details of the two major competing theories of 
how agents make decisions when faced with uncertainty: subjective expected utility 
theory and the heuristics and biases paradigm. I have also considered some of the 
many critiques of these two theories.
As economists, our main concern in deciding between the competing theories 
of rational and heuristic agents is likely to be in the effect of these theories in 
the modelling of final market outcomes. If individual agents are sub-rational in 
ways that other agents in the market can correct for, then the correct specification 
of the decision making process may be relatively unimportant in modelling the 
macroeconomy3. Similarly, if the ‘mistakes’ that agents make are random and 
uncorrelated, then at the macro level they may net out. In this case rationality 
would, again, be a reasonable assumption on which to base macroeconomic models. 
Due to these issues, it makes sense to extend our models of rational and heuristic 
man to the level of the market so that we can draw comparisons between the 
competing theories at that crucial level.
The natural environment in which to challenge the two theories is in the rel­
atively transparent setting of the financial markets. Here the role of preferences 
is likely to be less obfuscating than in other markets because of the relatively ho­
mogenous nature of financial products (a mix of risk and financial value). Because
3Of course, in this case sub-rationality may still have significant consequences in terms of the 
distribution of wealth, and so accurate modelling of decision making would be important in 
addressing distributional concerns.
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of this, it is unsurprising that the bulk of work based on heuristical assumptions 
has been in the field of finance. Behavioural finance has provided a popular area 
for research over recent years, and I will provide an overview of the work in this 
field below. Before that, I will consider the theory against which the behavioural 
finance literature sets itself - the efficient markets hypothesis.
2.3.1. The Efficient M arkets H ypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that actual market prices of assets 
are equal to their fundamental values. This fundamental value is the discounted 
sum of expected future cashflows, where the expectation is taken over the correct 
distribution of possible outcomes conditional on currently available information. 
In an efficient market, ‘prices are right’ in that no investment strategy can earn 
excess returns. Higher returns are only available if higher risk is accepted.
The EMH is the natural conclusion of the theory of rational agents. No rational 
agent would choose to sell an asset for less than its fundamental value and no 
rational agent would choose to buy an asset for more than its fundamental value. 
Hence, the only price at which exchange can take place in a market populated by 
rational agents is that which is equal to the asset’s fundamental value.
Given that a rational agent’s expectation of future cashflows will be contingent 
upon all information available about past, present and future events, current prices 
must also take account of all the available information. Therefore, changes in price
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expectation must simply reflect changes in the information set available from one 
period to the next. If everyone expects that prices in the next period will be £100, 
then our pricing decisions this period will reflect that expectation. Any changes 
in the price between now and then must either reflect the necessary rate of return 
on the asset (the difference between the price now and £ 1 0 0 ) or new information 
coming to light about the fundamental value of the asset (the difference between 
the price next period and £100). As Bachelier (1900/1964 [10]) puts it in the 
original discussion of the hypothesis, “past, present, and even discounted future 
events are reflected in market price, but often show no apparent relation to price 
changes”.
This implication of the EMH can be formally stated as follows:
X t — E  [Xt | $ t-r ]  =  £t 5 E  [£f.<I>t_r] =  0
Prices, A , will vary from their expected values by a random variable e, uncorrelated 
with the information set 4> available at the time that the expectation is formed. 
In other words, any differences between asset price movements and the expected 
movements implied by the market will be random and unforecast able.
Roberts (1967 [78]) posits three different forms of the efficient market hypoth­
esis, each defined in respect to the information set that is prescribed. The weak 
version defines the information set 4> as all past asset prices. The semi-strong ver­
sion defines as all past and present public information, so that it includes such
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things as announcements of annual earnings, stock splits, and so on. The strong 
form of the hypothesis defines <f> as all past and present information, public and 
private.
At first sight, it seems that the claim of unforecastability should be straightfor­
ward to test, but this is not the case. Whilst the price level at time t, X t, and the 
information set at time t — r, are observable; the expectation formed at time
t — r  of the price level at time t, E  [Xt | $*_T], is not observable. In order to test 
the relationships described by the above equations we must, therefore, determine 
the price expectation implied by the market. This involves positing a theory of 
expected returns. The most popular theory of expected returns is the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM).
2.3.1.1. The capital asset pricing m odel. A rational risk-averse investor will 
always require a risk premium on any risky asset. By combining assets in a port­
folio he will be able to diversify away any unsystematic risk associated with the 
asset, but there will remain a certain amount of systematic risk which cannot be 
diversified away. This systematic risk is the extent to which the return on the 
asset moves with the market, the covariance between the return on the individual 
asset and the return on the market as a whole. The greater the systematic risk, 
the greater the return that the investor will require from the asset. In this way, 
an investor’s asset portfolio can be seen as a trade-off between the expected return
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and the variance of the return on the portfolio. Each investor will hold a mean 
variance efficient portfolio, a portfolio which gives maximum expected returns for 
a given variance.
Given that rational investors, with the same information set, will have the same 
beliefs about expected returns and covariances of individual assets, the market 
portfolio will also be mean variance efficient. It can be shown that the expected 
returns on individual assets will then be linearly related to the expected return on 
the market portfolio:
(2.1) E  [rjt -  rft] = fij.E [rmt -  rft]
Where rjt is the return on asset j  in period £, rmt is the return on the market 
in period £, and r jt is the return on riskless assets such as treasury bills. P i is a 
measurement of the systematic risk of asset j .  It measures the extent to which 
variations in the returns on asset j  are related to the fluctuations in the return on 
the market as a whole, and is given by:
_  Cov [rjt, rmt]
3 Varlrmt]
Investors are compensated for bearing this systematic risk, E  [rmt — r f t\ > 0, 
because they cannot eliminate it through diversification of their portfolio.
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2.3.1.2. Consum ption C A PM . Lucas’ (1978 [64]) representative agent theory 
of asset pricing yields the following first-order condition for the optimal consump­
tion and portfolio decision:
where ct is consumption in time period t and p is the time preference of consump­
tion. This result yields the same expected return to holding asset j  as in equation
(2 .1 ) above, but where (3j is as follows:
Equation (2.2) states that an asset’s expected return must be higher the more
intuitive reason for this is that when consumption is low, marginal utility is high 
and 7 t + 1  is large. An asset with a more negative covariance with 7 t+1, therefore,
valued. An investor would therefore require a higher premium to hold such an 
asset.
2.3.1.3. Empirical Evidence o f Efficiency. By combining the EMH and CAPM, 
we can draw several conclusions about the outcomes of asset markets populated 
by fully rational agents, in the SEU sense.
u'(ct) = E  \p.(l + rjt).u(ct+1 )]
(2 .2)
7 , + 1  u ( c )
pu(ct+1 )
negative the covariance between the asset and the ratio of marginal utilities. The
has lower returns when consumption is low, which is precisely when wealth is more
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Firstly, ‘prices are right’ implies that no investment strategy can earn excess 
returns. Chartists, who predict future price movements by seeking to interpret 
past patterns, will fail to do any better than a market tracking portfolio. Similarly, 
fundamental analysts who study corporate reports to try and gain insights into the 
real worth of shares, will fail to earn an excess return because shares will already 
reflect fundamental value. In short, beyond diversifying away unsystematic risk, 
fund management is not profitable.
Secondly, consumption CAPM implies that stock returns should be correlated 
with consumption growth. Therefore, returns may be predictable to some extent, 
but only to the extent that consumption is predictable.
As Fama (1970 [36]) notes in his wide ranging review of the literature on 
efficiency, much empirical work in the field of efficient markets preceded any de­
velopment of the theory. As early as 1900, Bachelier concluded that commodity 
prices fluctuate randomly, and further studies by Working (1934 [99]) and Cowles 
and Jones (1937 [29]) showed that US stock prices and other economic series fol­
low the same pattern. Kendall (1953 [59]) examined 22 UK stock and commodity 
price series and concluded that “the data behave almost like wandering series” .
All of this predates the prescription of a formal theory of efficient markets, 
which has its origins in Samuelson (1965 [81]). He derives a general model of 
fair-game futures pricing which demonstrates that there is no way of making an 
expected profit by extrapolating past changes in the future’s price.
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Fama finds that results are strongly supportive of the weak form of the hypoth­
esis, and that the semi-strong version is also supported. The strong form does not 
appear to be supported, and Fama suggests that such an extreme model should 
be regarded as a benchmark rather than a descriptive model. He concludes by 
remarking that evidence in contradiction to the efficient markets model for price 
changes covering periods longer than a single day is hard to find.
More recently, however, Fama’s conclusions have been challenged widely. Lo 
and MacKinlay (1988 [62]) find serial correlation in stock price changes using 
weekly US data for 1962-1985, though they cannot reject the random walk model on 
the basis of a four week interval. Other studies, including Fama and French (1988 
[37]), have shown evidence of negative serial correlation (mean reversion) over 
longer time periods. These phenomena have been labelled as the ‘predictability 
puzzle’ by Barberis and Thaler (2002 [14]).
Mehra and Prescott (1985) use a variation of Lucas’ (1978) pure exchange 
model to examine US financial data used the period 1889-1978. They find that the 
data strongly violate restrictions that general equilibrium models impose upon the 
average returns of equity and Treasury bills. The explanation of the excess return 
on equities over risk free investments4  implies an unfeasibly large coefficient of risk 
aversion. This result is known as the equity premium puzzle.
4Since 1926 the annual real return on US stocks has been about seven percent, versus a real 
return on treasury bills of less than one percent (Benartzi and Thaler 1995 [19])
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Other anomalies in the data that need to be explained include the high volatility 
of equity returns (for example, Campbell and Cochrane 1999 [25]); the negative 
long run performance of new issues (Ritter 1991 [77]); the outperformance of larger 
stocks by smaller stocks (Banz 1981 [11]); and various seasonal effects, including 
month of the year, day of the week and hour of the day effects (French 1980 [44]; 
Harris 1986 [52]; Rozeff and Kinney 1976 [80]).
2.3.1.4. D evelopm ent o f th e  E M H . As discussed earlier, the EMH has no 
practical relevance unless it is coupled with a theory of expected returns. We 
must posit some underlying asset pricing model, such as the CAPM, if we wish to 
test the hypothesis of market efficiency. However, any such test will consequently 
become a joint test of the EMH and the relevant asset pricing model. The puzzles 
discussed in the previous section, therefore, do not necessarily require us to revise 
or discard the notion of market efficiency. Rather, it may be the case that we 
require a more sophisticated model of asset pricing.
Since the late 1980s researchers have made various attempts to develop more 
sophisticated asset pricing models than the CAPM and consumption CAPM in 
order to try  and capture the effects seen in the data. Some of the literature has been 
based on using ever more sophisticated specifications of utility (for example, Abel 
1990 [1 ]). Others have modelled variable risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane 
1999 [25]). A major focus for research is the ‘Peso problem’, which suggests that
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the variability in a sample may be unrepresentative of the true long run population 
variability. This is likely to occur when there is a small probability of a catastrophic 
event. Agents will take this into account in their expectation formation, but the 
event is very unlikely to have an effect on observed outcomes. For example, Rietz 
(1988 [76]) specifies a model in which there is a small probability (0.4% or 1.4%) 
of a massive fall in output (50% or 25%). In such a situation, risk-averse investors 
demand a large risk premium on equity to compensate for the extreme losses that 
will occur in the case of an unlikely but severe market crash. Rietz concludes that 
this can explain the equity premium puzzle.
2.3.2. Behavioural Finance
As we have already remarked, the traditional finance paradigm, in which agents are 
assumed to be rational, has struggled to explain a number of phenomena that have 
been observed in real world financial markets. These phenomena include the equity 
premium puzzle, the predictability puzzle, and the volatility puzzle. Behavioural 
finance attempts to explain these occurrences by using models in which some agents 
are not fully rational.
The rationality of agents in traditional models is two dimensional. In the first 
place, agents’ beliefs are assumed to be correct. The subjective distribution that 
they use to forecast future realisations of unknown variables is indeed the distri­
bution that those realisations are drawn from. This is the rational expectations
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hypothesis. Secondly, the agents are assumed to make optimal decisions given 
their beliefs. In other words, they maximise subjective expected utility.
Behavioural finance seeks to analyse what happens when we relax either of 
these two assumptions. In some behavioural finance models agents do not hold 
rational beliefs, whilst in others they hold correct beliefs but make choices which 
are suboptimal in terms of subjective expected utility theory.
It is not enough, however, merely to explain why some people may behave ir­
rationally. Behavioural finance must also explain how any rational agents in the 
economy are prevented from arbitraging prices to their ‘rational’ level. Explaining 
how, in an economy in which irrational and rational agents interact, irrationality 
can have a long term impact on prices is one of the two pillars of the behavioural 
finance literature (the other is the explanation of irrationality provided by the psy­
chology literature). We will therefore begin our discussion of behavioural finance 
with a justification of how arbitrage may be limited in real world markets.
2.3.2.1. Limits to  Arbitrage. Behavioural finance argues that asset prices are 
sometimes best interpreted as deviations from fundamental value, brought about 
by the presence of irrational traders in the economy. The straightforward response 
to this from efficient market theorists is that rational traders will rapidly undo any 
mistakes made by the irrational traders.
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John Kay (2004 [58]) draws an analogy between the efficient market and the 
queues at a supermarket. Rational agents at the supermarket checkout will choose 
to stand in the queue with the shortest expected waiting time. In a world solely 
inhabited by rational agents, this will cause the equilibration of waiting times 
at each of the checkouts -  without any explicit coordination, the queues in the 
supermarket will be of roughly the same length. However, even in a world where 
many of the agents do not optimise by choosing the shortest queue, but rather 
choose any queue randomly, the existence of a relatively small number of rational 
agents will ensure the same result as before. These rational agents will all move 
towards the shortest queues, and this will cause an equilibration of queue length 
just as before. The rational agents will gain more from their optimising behaviour 
than they would have done in a fully rational world, but the aggregate result is as 
before. Similarly, in a stock market, irrational traders (noise traders) who become 
overly pessimistic about a company may undervalue its shares at £15 even though 
its fundamental value is £20 a share. However, even if there is just a single rational 
agent (arbitrageur) in the market, he will sense an opportunity to buy shares in 
the company at their bargain price and will continue to do so until the price is 
driven up to its fundamental value.
Arbitrage is often assumed to be a riskless activity. If there is a mis-pricing, 
it is assumed that a riskless profit is there for the taking because the price can be 
forced back to its fundamental value. Behavioural finance argues that a mis-pricing 
does not always provide an attractive investment opportunity, because corrective
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strategies can be so risky as to make them unattractive to the rational investor. In 
this way, arbitrage may be hindered and the price of an asset may not reflect its 
fundamental value. If there is a ‘free lunch’ to be had, any rational investor will 
take it, but behavioural finance theory aims to explain why a mis-pricing does not 
always provide the opportunity for a ‘free lunch’.
Barberis and Thaler (2002 [19]) list four types of risk faced by a potential 
arbitrageur:
(1) Fundamental risk: an arbitrageur faces the risk that, having bought an 
underpriced stock, the fundamental value of the stock falls in the light of 
subsequent bad news. This risk can be hedged by shorting a substitute 
security. However, substitutes are rarely perfect and so fundamental risk 
can never be completely removed.
(2) Noise trader risk: the mis-pricing that is being exploited by the arbitrageur 
may worsen in the short run. The irrationally pessimistic investors who 
caused the mis-pricing in the first instance, may become even more pes­
simistic and cause the asset price to move even further away from its 
fundamental value. Noise trader risk will be irrelevant to arbitrageurs 
with infinite horizons, but arbitrageurs do not have infinite horizons. In 
fact, they usually have very short horizons because of liquidity constraints. 
They are usually fund managers, managing other people’s money. Agency 
problems will require tha t returns are positive in the short as well as the
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long run, because investors are likely to judge the performance of the fund 
manager on the basis of short term returns.
(3) Implementation costs: commissions and bid-ask spreads will obviously 
limit arbitrage. However, legal constraints may also come into play. For 
example, many fund managers are simply not allowed to engage in short­
ing, and this may prevent them from hedging against fundamental risk.
(4) Model risk: the arbitrageur may have assessed the fundamental value of 
the asset wrongly and a perceived mis-pricing simply does not exist.
The key to arbitrage is that rational traders can make a sure profit when an as­
set is mis-priced, because in the long rim asset prices must converge towards their 
fundamental value. However, if we allow for the fact that a mis-pricing can occur 
in the market, we must also allow that in the short run this mis-pricing could well 
increase. If rational traders face a liquidity restraint then they cannot be sure that 
when they need to liquidate their holdings of an underpriced asset, that the under- 
pricing will have been corrected. De Long et al (1990 [32]) present a model which 
demonstrates that “as long as arbitrageurs have short horizons and so must worry 
about liquidating their investment in a mis-priced asset, their aggressiveness will 
be limited even in the absence of fundamental risk”. The addition of fundamental 
risk and other practical issues such as implementation costs merely exacerbate the 
riskiness of arbitrage, and make the case for complete arbitrage less persuasive.
It is difficult to establish the existence of a mis-pricing in the real world because 
to do so normally involves having to model the fundamental value of an asset,
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and any such model process will obviously be open to criticism. There are some 
instances, however, in which a mis-pricing can be observed without having to refer 
to fundamental values. Barberis and Thaler (2002 [14]) provide several examples 
of where arbitrage can be seen to be deficient, including ADRs, index inclusions 
and internet carve-outs. We will illustrate the possibility of mis-pricing with the 
example of twin shares.
The Royal Dutch /  Shell group has shares listed on several stock markets. 
Royal Dutch shares have a claim to 60% of the total cashflow of the group, and 
are traded primarily in the US and in the Netherlands. Shell shares have a claim 
to 40% of the total cashflow of the group, and are traded primarily in the UK. If 
share prices equal fundamental value, then the value of Royal Dutch equity should 
always be l |  times the value of Shell equity. Figure 2.8, taken from Froot and 
Dabora (1999 [45]), illustrates how the ratio of Royal Dutch to Shell equity value 
has deviated wildly from the ratio of l | .
By buying the relatively underpriced stock and shorting on the relatively over­
priced stock, an arbitrageur could exploit the mis-pricing whilst being perfectly 
hedged against fundamental risk (in fact we have not even had to refer to fun­
damental value in determining tha t a mis-pricing exists). Clearly, the only thing 
holding back potential arbitrageurs is noise trader risk. Although they know that 
the fundamentals must in the long run drive the equity ratio back to l | ,  the 
evidence from figure 2 . 8  suggests that the mis-pricing can be persistent.
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Figure 2.8. Deviations in Royal Dutch /  Shell equity values
2.3.2 .2 . M odelling  an  Ir ra tio n a l M arket. As stated above, behavioural fi­
nance can be viewed as the relaxation of the assumptions of rationality inherent in 
traditional finance theory. Clearly, the removal of the straightjacket of rationality 
has the potential of allowing us to provide an explanation of phenomena which 
cannot be explained by traditional models. Much has been written on an intuitive 
or anecdotal level about how certain beliefs might explain some of the puzzles 
of financial data. For example, Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (1998 [13]) claim 
that conservatism suggests that people put too little weight on the latest piece of 
earnings news relative to their prior beliefs. Their model, based on a complex be­
lief structure, can explain such features of the data as post-earnings announcement 
drift. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998 [30]), on the other hand, stress 
biases in the interpretation of private information. They claim that overconfidence 
in private information generates high volatility and long term mean reversal.
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It can appear that there is a tendency in the literature to develop models that 
will explain observed phenomena by construction, rather than to develop models 
based on the theory and then test that against the data. The two models mentioned 
above make very different assumptions about investors’ decision making and are 
able to explain some, but certainly not all of the anomalies in the data.
We consider below three further models which are constructed based on various 
different assumptions about decision making. The first is based directly on prospect 
theory. The second represents an attempt to incorporate some of the features of 
prospect theory into a general equilibrium framework. The third is based on the 
idea that agents employ simple heuristical rules.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995 [19]) attempt to provide an explanation of the equity 
premium puzzle by developing a model in which agents are loss averse, as prescribed 
by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 [56]). Specifically, they prescribe 
a value function of the following form:
(2.3) v (x — r) =  (x — r)a fo r  x > r
— —A (x — r)^ fo r  x < r
where A > 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion. The parameters a  and (3 are both 
specified as 0.88 and A as 2.25, in accordance with the estimations of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992 [94]). One of the consequences of using prospect theory is that
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the frequency with which returns are evaluated must be specified. In prospect 
theory, value is determined in relation to changes in wealth relative to an initial 
asset position, r. The frequency with which this reference point is updated is a key 
determinant of the value function. In a model with loss aversion, the more often 
an investor evaluates his portfolio, and updates the value of r, the less attractive he 
will find a high risk investment. Benartzi and Thaler, therefore, ask the question, if 
investors have preferences as defined by equation (2.3) above, how often would they 
have to evaluate their portfolios in order to explain the equity premium puzzle?
In order to answer this question, Benartzi and Thaler draw samples from 1926- 
1990 monthly returns on stocks, bonds and treasury bills and use simulation tech­
niques to compute the prospective value of holding stocks and bonds for various 
evaluation periods. A further complication is added by having to choose whether 
to use nominal or real returns. Clearly, losses will be more prevalent with each 
asset type when considering real returns. The results for nominal returns on stocks 
and bonds are shown in figure 2.9. The graph shows that the prospective value of 
stock and bond portfolios is equal when evaluated at thirteen month intervals. For 
real returns, the comparable result is between ten and eleven months. Benartzi 
and Thaler conclude that such a time frame is highly plausible, given that investors 
file tax returns annually and receive the most comprehensive information about 
the performance of their investments on an annual basis.
This result is, however, fairly meaningless in that the decision faced by investors 
is not between a portfolio of bonds and a portfolio of stocks. Rather, investors are
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Figure 2.9. Prospective value of holding pure stock and pure bond portfolios
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faced with the decision of what proportion of bonds and stocks to hold in their 
portfolio. Benartzi and Thaler perform a second simulation exercise which assumes 
the one year evaluation period which they claim to have established and then 
searches for the optimal mix of stocks and bonds. The results of the simulations 
using nominal returns are shown in figure 2.10. Portfolios with between 30 and 55 
percent stocks yield the highest prospective value. This, the authors conclude, is 
roughly consistent with the observed behaviour of investors. The equity premium
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puzzle disappears, because the premium can be explained in terms of loss aversion 
and annual re-evaluations of asset position by investors.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001 [12]) make the first attempt to try and build 
prospect theory into a general equilibrium model of the stock market. They do not 
use an explicit value function in the manner of Benartzi and Thaler (1995 [19]), 
but instead augment a standard SEU utility function with a term which reflects 
changes in financial wealth. The utility function is specified as follows:
The first term is a standard risk averse utility over discounted consumption, with 
discount factor p and risk aversion parameter 7  > 0. The second term represents
his risky assets at time t, and zt measures his gains or losses prior to time t as a 
fraction of St. In other words, the representative investor gains utility not only
The function v(.) is discontinuous at the origin of X t+i, and is steeper for 
negative values of X t+\. Essentially, v (X t+i, St, 1 ) is the same as the specification 
of v (.) in equation (2.3) above. This implies an investor who is loss averse, in 
line with the prescriptions of prospect theory. The inclusion of the term zt as a
E
utility from fluctuations in the value of financial wealth. X t+1 is the agent’s finan­
cial gain or loss between time t and t + 1  (measured annually), St is the value of
from consumption but also from changes in the value of his financial wealth.
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determinant of v (.) implies that, despite the annual re-evaluation of the reference 
point against which gains and losses are measured, the investor has a long memory 
and does not completely disregard events which occurred prior to the last re- 
evaluation of his financial position. His risk aversion increases with prior losses and 
decreases with prior gains; an investor who is burned by an initial loss becomes 
more sensitive to additional setbacks whilst an investor who has made substantial 
gains becomes less weary of risk. This concept has been labelled as the ‘house 
money’ effect in the psychology literature.
Essentially, it is this variation in risk aversion, depending on prior stock market 
performance, which allows the model to generate stock returns which have a high 
mean, are highly volatile, significantly predictable, and not highly correlated with 
the underlying low variance consumption growth process. At the same time, the 
model generates a low and stable riskless return. Intuitively, an unexpectedly high 
dividend raises prices, as predicted in any efficient market model. However, in this 
model, the price increase also makes the investor less risk averse, and this makes 
the risky asset relatively more attractive, driving prices still higher. A similar 
story holds for negative dividend news. In this way, returns are substantially more 
volatile than the underlying dividend growth.
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In a series of papers, Frankel and Froot (1986 [42], 1990 [43]) develop the idea 
that exchange rate dynamics can only be explained effectively if we posit that 
investors have heterogenous expectations.
They show how the existence of different forecasting techniques can lead to 
excess volatility in exchange rates. Furthermore, they present evidence that such 
heterogeneity in forecasting does exist in real world financial markets. They present 
evidence that the use of chartist forecasting techniques is widespread. However, at 
the same time, other agents in the foreign exchange markets make use of models 
based on fundamentals to forecast future exchange rates.
Their data also shows that, over time, investors alter the forecasting techniques 
that they use. During the period of study (1978-1988) ’technical’ analysis became 
much more prevalent within their sample of forecasting firms, at the expense of 
fundamental analysis. Indeed, Frankel and Froot conclude that the shift over time 
in the weights that the market places on different forecasting techniques is essential 
in explaining the large fluctuations in exchange rates witnessed during the 1980s.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006 [31]) develop these ideas of a tension between 
fundamental and chartist forecasts into a fully specified model of the foreign ex­
change markets. They claim tha t they are able to use their model to replicate 
many of the characteristics of exchange rate time series, including high levels of 
kurtosis.
81
2.4. Behavioural C onsiderations in Macroeconomics
So fax, I have concentrated on the main area of behavioural influence in eco­
nomics, that is finance. A common perception is that behavioural considerations 
have not penetrated much further than this into economic theory.
Certainly, the direct influence of the heuristics and biases paradigm has been 
overwhelmingly focused in finance. However, other areas of economics, and macro­
economics in particular, have long been informed by psychology.
Many people consider Keynes’ General Theory as the origin of macroeconomics 
as a distinct field of study. This work drew heavily on psychological concepts such 
as cognitive bias, herding and the pursuit of social status.
Keynes’ appeal to "animal spirits" as the basis of investment decisions is well 
documented. However, he makes an equally strong appeal to psychological phe­
nomena as the basis for his consumption function:
These eight motives [to save] might be called the motives of Pre­
caution, Foresight, Calculation, Improvement, Independence, Enter­
prise, Pride and Avarice; and we could also draw up a corresponding 
list of motives to consumption such as Enjoyment, Short-sightedness, 
Generosity, Miscalculation, Ostentation and Extravagance. ( General 
Theory chapter 9.1 [60])
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Keynes’ intuitive understanding of psychology is certainly primitive and rudi­
mentary, but he makes use of it in explaining many important economic phenom­
ena. Foremost amongst these, perhaps, is the resistance of workers in accepting 
nominal wage cuts.
2.4.1. M oney Illusion
Irving Fisher wrote of money illusion as long ago as 1928 [41], and the issue of 
price and wage stickiness has remained central to the study of macroeconomics ever 
since. Without it, explanations of the non-neutrality of money are unconvincing5. 
Although the psychological basis for money illusion is rarely discussed, nominal 
rigidities provide the basis for the entire New Keynesian literature.
Shafir Diamond and Tversky (1997 [83]) provide a wealth of evidence to sup­
port the idea that people tend to think in terms of nominal prices rather than real 
(or relative) prices. They “interpret money illusion as a bias in the assessment 
of the real value of economic transactions, induced by a nominal evaluation” . In 
other words, people are predisposed to assess different options within the frame of 
nominal currency rather than in a real frame. This is due to the salience of the 
nominal frame. Essentially, it is easy to assess nominal prices, whereas assessing
5New Classical explanations of non-neutrality, based on imcomplete information, can only explain 
non-neutrality in the very short run.
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real prices takes more effort. Nominal prices are a heuristic for assessing funda­
mental value - as a rule of thumb nominal prices are a convenient way of choosing 
between alternatives. It is only when this rule of thumb becomes ineffective, for 
example in times of hyperinflation, that people will resort to the costly process of 
calculating real prices.
Akerlof and Yellen (1985 [5],[6 ]) show that the losses associated with using this 
heuristic is relatively small. In a model with efficiency wages and monopolistic 
competition, they show that the cost to firms of failing to readjust prices in the 
face of a money supply shock are second order. The aggregate impact on output, 
however, is first order. This result is complemented by Fehr and Tyran’s (2001 
[39]) finding that in a model with both rational agents and agents who suffer money 
illusion, there is an incentive for the rational agents to imitate the behaviour of 
those who are deluded. In this way, acting in accordance with the nominal heuristic 
may have very little cost to individuals but at the same time it has a significant 
macroeconomic effect.
As I’ve already alluded to, there are relatively few papers which consider the 
psychological basis of money illusion compared to the number that assume price 
stickiness as a given. The majority of New Keynesian models make use of well 
established constructs such as Taylor or Calvo contracts. Such constructs are 
often criticised as ad hoc, and defences of their use rarely go beyond citing their 
effectiveness in reproducing empirical phenomena. However, their true justification
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is in the fact that they are a parsimonious way of introducing complex psychological 
phenomena into macroeconomic models.
2.4.2. The Labour Market
A serious problem for the rational expectations literature has been to explain the 
existence of involuntary unemployment. In a world of free and efficient markets 
workers should always be able to find work as long as they are willing to accept 
a low enough wage. According to New Classical models, employment falls during 
recessions because an unexpected decline in aggregate demand reduces nominal 
wages, which workers mistake for a fall in the real wage and they therefore withdraw 
from the labour force. Such a ‘voluntary unemployment’ interpretation of recession 
simply doesn’t square with the empirical facts. The New Classical story implies 
that voluntary resignations should be counter-cyclical, whereas in reality they fall 
dramatically during recessionary periods.
A series of papers appeared during the 1970s and 1980s6 which put forward var­
ious efficiency-wage explanations to the observation that excess supply of labour 
does not seem to lead to aggressive wage cutting. The key insight of these models 
is that, because positive wage differentials lead to increases in the marginal pro­
ductivity of labour, profit maximising firms have an incentive to pay a real wage 
above the market clearing level.
6 See Yellen (1984 [100]) for a survey.
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There are a number of explanations as to why higher wages may be associated 
with higher productivity. Some of these explanations are compatible with rational 
optimisation. One explanation is that paying a wage above the market clearing 
level provides an incentive for workers not to shirk (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984 
[84]). This view is compatible with the Marxist conception of unemployment as 
a labour disciplining device. Another explanation is based on transactions costs 
(e.g. Stiglitz 1974 [87]). In this case, setting wages above the market clearing 
level reduces costly labour turnover. Asymmetric information can also provide 
justification for setting high wages (e.g. Stiglitz 1976 [8 8 ]). If workers are of 
heterogeneous ability, and reservation wages are positively correlated with that 
ability, then adverse selection explains why higher wages and higher productivity 
coincide.
The problem with all of these explanations for efficiency wages is that there is 
often an alternative, pareto-superior solution to the problem identified. In the case 
of shirking, fees for starting employment provide the same discipline as involuntary 
unemployment but allow the market to clear efficiently (Eaton and White 1982 
[33]). Similarly, fees paid by workers to cover transactions costs would allow for 
efficiency. In the case of adverse selection, the usual solutions of self-selection and 
screening devices may lead us to conclude that it is unlikely to account for much 
involuntary unemployment. More significantly, all of the explanations considered 
so far explain why involuntary unemployment persists, but they do not explain
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its counter-cyclical behaviour. Why any of the issues discussed should be less 
significant during boom periods is unclear.
For all of these reasons, psychological explanations of efficiency wages are the 
most convincing. Reciprocity, fairness and adherence to group norms all provide 
coherent explanations of the empirical facts. Akerlof’s (1982 [3]) gift exchange 
model shows how firms may improve the work norms of their workers by paying 
them in excess of the minimum required to keep them in the job. Fehr and Gachter 
(2000 [38]) provide evidence of the importance of reciprocal behaviour in employ­
ment contracts. All of these theories are based on ideas of equity and fairness that 
can be traced back to Adams (1963 [2 ]). In a similar vein, insider-outsider models 
rely on the assumption that insiders are able to coordinate so as to sabotage the 
inclusion of new workers. This can be explained by group formation theory (e.g. 
Roy 1952 [79]).
2.4.3. Inter-tem poral D iscounting
A commonly held view is that people tend to display myopia when it comes to 
choosing between current and future consumption. As a result, almost all states in 
the developed world provide some sort of income support for elderly citizens, and 
have tax systems which are intended to incentivise saving. Of course, in the New 
classical world of rational, optimising agents such schemes would be unnecessary
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as agents, by assumption, choose the level of savings that maximise their life­
time utility. Given that undersaving cannot be explained by conventional market 
failures, such as externalities, we must either accept that undersaving does not 
exist, or that conventional models fail to account for an empirical phenomenon.
The evidence suggests that there is a significant difference between the inter­
temporal discount rates that people think they ought to use and those that they 
actually do use. We could treat this as any other difference between reported and 
revealed preferences. Akerlof ( 2 0 0 2  [4]), however, argues that the difference comes 
from the fact that welfare is given by a particular function, but people actually 
maximise a different function altogether. The difference between the two functions 
is driven by the salience of present consumption and a lack of self-control. This 
view is supported by empirical evidence that people use high discount rates to 
choose between immediate consumption and future consumption, but that they 
use a lower discount rate when the same choice is presented over an equidistant 
period at some point in the future. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992 [63]) show that 
a hyperbolic discount function can account for such behaviour.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008 [90]) report a wealth of evidence that suggests that 
when people have the opportunity to pre-commit to certain future choices, they 
are able to avoid these problems of inter-temporal inconsistency. For example, 
they report that when pension schemes are set up so that people can commit to 
saving out of future wage increases, savings rates increase significantly.
2.4.4. A sset M arkets
In the previous section, I discussed in some depth the evidence for less than rational 
behaviour in financial markets. It suffices to note here that asset markets are 
central to any economic system. Hence, any serious attempt at explaining the 
macroeconomy must incorporate the lessons learnt in financial research.
2.4.5. Summary
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that psychological phenomena have in­
formed a number of different areas of macroeconomic research, in particular finan­
cial economics. However, much of the core of macroeconomics research remains 
unconcerned with behavioural issues. The New Classical school of macroeconomics 
has been consistent in its adherence to the rational paradigm. The New Keynesian 
school, on the other hand, relies upon nominal rigidities to explain macroeconomic 
dynamics. But, even though such rigidities must arise from some deviation from 
rational behaviour, the cause of this is rarely made explicit. There remain large ar­
eas of macroeconomics where either there has been no attempt to develop beyond 
the rational paradigm, or else the psychological underpinnings are vague.
In the next two chapters I attem pt to address two important issues that have 
yet to be posed by the behavioural macroeconomic literature. The first is whether
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simple heuristical models are able to capture the dynamics of asset prices in ways 
that rational models fail. The second is whether such models can help to inform 
monetary policy.
CHAPTER 3
A Behavioural Explanation for A sset Prices
As discussed in section 2.3.1.3, the use of rational expectations (RE) modelling 
in the field of asset pricing has received much empirical criticism. The efficient 
markets hypothesis (EMH) gives rise to a number of well known puzzles in the 
data. These include the equity premium puzzle1, various predictability puzzles2, 
the volatility puzzle3, and various seasonal effects4. W hat is clear is that standard 
RE-EMH models fail to replicate many of the characteristics of real world asset 
price time series. Standard models would suggest that returns to holding assets 
should be normally distributed, whereas in the real world the distribution displays 
much higher levels of volatility and kurtosis (fat tails).
There have been a plethora of responses in the finance literature to these puz­
zles. Some of these responses have been compatible with the axiomisation of man 
as a rational agent, whilst others require some departure from the normative model.
1 Mehra and Prescott (1985 [69]) find that the explanation of the historical excess return on 
equities over risk free investments implies an unfeasibly large coefficient of risk aversion.
2Lo and MacKinlay (1988 [62]) find serial correlation in stock price changes using weekly US data 
for 1962-1985, whilst Fama and French (1988 [37]) show evidence of negative serial correlation 
(mean reversion) over longer time periods.
3For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999 [25]).
4These include month of the year effects (French 1980 [44]), day of the week effects (Harris 1986 
[52]) and hour of the day effects (Rozeff and Kinney 1976 [80]).
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At the rational end of this spectrum is research based on the ‘Peso problem’. 
This line of research is based on the fact that the variability in a sample may be 
unrepresentative of the true long run population variability. This is likely to occur 
when there is a small probability of a catastrophic event. Agents will take this into 
account in their expectation formation, but the event is very unlikely to have had 
an effect on observed outcomes. For example, Rietz (1988 [76]) specifies a model in 
which there is a small probability (0.4% or 1.4%) of a massive fall in output (50% 
or 25%). In such a situation, risk-averse investors demand a large risk premium 
on equity to compensate for the extreme losses that will occur in the case of an 
unlikely but severe market crash. Rietz concludes that this can explain the equity 
premium puzzle.
Using a similar specification, Meenagh, Minford and Peel (2007 [6 8 ]) show that 
they can account for the FTSE all-share index simply as the discounted sum of 
the rational expectation of future profits.
The second type of response to the puzzles mentioned above has been to de­
velop more sophisticated asset pricing models which involve specifying the utility 
function in non-standard ways. Abel (1990 [1 ]) finds that he can derive equity pre­
mia which are as large as the historically observed equity premium in the United 
States when he specifies a non-standard utility function. In his specification, util­
ity depends upon habit and on the consumer’s level of consumption relative to 
the lagged cross-sectional average level of consumption. Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999 [25]) similarly show how habit persistence in the utility function can cause
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risk aversion to vary over the cycle, and how this can explain some of the volatility 
in stock returns. Both these papers make use of standard optimisation techniques 
but are not truly consistent with the RE-EMH because they introduce concepts of 
habit persistence and relative consumption which are inconsistent with the rational 
paradigm. Habit persistence and concern for social status are both well established 
in the psychology literature, but are inconsistent with standard conceptions of ra­
tionality.
The third type of response to the puzzles discussed above is more firmly based 
upon psychological foundations. This is known as the behavioural finance litera­
ture, and it discards the assumption of rational expectations in favour of agents 
who use heuristics, or rules of thumb, as the basis for decision making.
These models have often been based on the heuristics and consequent biases 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974 [91]). For example, Barberis, Schleifer 
and Vishny (1998 [13]) claim that conservatism suggests that people put too little 
weight on the latest piece of earnings news relative to their prior beliefs. Their 
model, based on a complex belief structure, can explain such features of the data as 
post-earnings announcement drift. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998 
[30]), on the other hand, stress biases in the interpretation of private information. 
They claim that overconfidence in private information generates high volatility and 
long term mean reversion.
Clearly, the scope for producing models in which agents are not fully rational 
is endless. In some behavioural finance models agents do not hold rational beliefs,
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whilst in others they hold correct beliefs but make choices which are suboptimal 
in terms of subjective expected utility theory. The literature has indeed been 
criticised for a tendency to develop models that will explain observed phenomena 
by construction, rather than to develop models based on the theory and then 
test that against the data. The two models mentioned above make very different 
assumptions about investors’ decision making and are able to explain some, but 
certainly not all of the anomalies in the data.
What all behavioural models have in common is that there is some additional 
source of variance in the return from holding equities beyond the variance in the 
future profit stream. This additional source of risk is an inefficiency in the market 
often known as noise trader risk (see De Long et al (1990 [32]) for the seminal 
account of noise trader risk).
In this chapter I set out to test whether a particular behavioural model can 
account for the time series data we have for the FTSE all-share index. The model 
that I use is a development of the behavioural model used by De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006 [31]) to model the exchange rate. I choose this model for two 
reasons. Firstly, it models noise trader risk explicitly, using simple and general 
forecasting rules. Secondly, De Grauwe and Grimaldi use the model to explain the 
entire time series properties of an asset market rather than particular anomalies
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(though they consider the exchange rate market, and only make general compar­
isons to the dynamics of real world markets, rather than providing a full test).
In this model, heterogeneous agents make a portfolio choice in order to max­
imise their utility. However, the expectations on which they base their choice are 
not rational in the conventional sense, but based on one of two simple heuristical 
rules. Agents choose to base their expectations either on a fundamental model of 
the asset price, or on a technical (or chartist) analysis of past asset price move­
ments. Their choice of which rule to apply depends upon the past profitability of 
the rules. In this way the model can be viewed as being evolutionarily rational.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006 [31]) have already established that the tension 
between simple rules can produce the type of dynamics that are characteristic of 
many asset price series in the real world: fat tails, excess kurtosis and GARCH 
properties. In this chapter I build on those results. I define the fundamental value 
of the FTSE as discounted future profits and am thereby able to discipline the 
model by requiring it to be consistent with the historical UK profits data. By 
bootstrapping the model, I am then able to determine whether it can account for 
the actual observed FTSE time series.
The question of whether asset market prices efficiently reflect fundamental val­
ues or whether they are partly the product of ‘investor sentiment’ is of key empirical 
importance. If the hypothesis tha t asset prices accurately reflect fundamental risks
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holds true, then all profitable speculation must be welfare enhancing and unfet­
tered capital markets inevitably lead to the most efficient allocation of resources. 
If, on the other hand, the contentions of behavioural economists are correct, then 
speculation itself is a cause of risk - traders produce noise which is not present in 
the fundamental. In this way, capital market liberalisation is likely to give rise to 
new forms of risk. If the behavioural hypothesis is true, then this may well provide 
justification for some level of intervention in or regulation of capital markets.
The model is described in section 3.1. In section 3.2, I analyse the dynam­
ics of the model and also examine the sensitivity of the model to its numerous 
parameters.
The model has a number of exogenous, behavioural parameters. In section 3.3 
I examine the ways in which we can discipline our model by tying down these 
parameters empirically.
The data is presented in section 3.4. I examine the distribution of FTSE All- 
Share Index returns over a forty four year period. I also consider the fundamental 
driver of these returns, the UK profits series, over the same period.
In section 3.5 I stochastically simulate the model using the disciplining devices 
discussed, and test whether the model could reasonably explain the data observed 
in the real world. I also apply the same test to a benchmark rational model in 
order to compare my model’s performance. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.1. A B ehav iou ra l A sset P ric ing  M odel
In this section, I outline a behavioural model similar to that of De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006 [31]). Heterogeneous agents make a utility maximising portfolio 
decision, conditioned upon their expectations of future asset prices. Their expec­
tations of the future asset price is based on one of two simple heuristical rules - a 
fundamentalist rule or a chartist rule.
There are two assets in the model, a risky asset and a riskless asset. The riskless 
asset pays a known rate of return, r, per period. The risky asset’s return is simply 
any appreciation in i t’s price level, which is determined by market clearing.
We assume a continuum of agents from 0 to 1, each of whom is characterised 
by the forecasting rule, z, that they use. Each agent maximises their utility, which 
is a mean-variance function of wealth:
(3.1)
subject to the wealth constraint:
(3.2) Wi,t+1 — Pt+idi,t +  (1 +  — Ptdi,t)
where fi is the coefficient of risk aversion, dijt is the quantity of the risky asset held 
from period t until t -1-1, and (Wijt — Ptd^t) is therefore the holdings of the risk 
free asset.
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Given that E^t is the expectation formed using forecasting rule i and condi­
tioned on information available of time t (i.e. di)t, Wl)t, Pt and r  are known with 
certainty); and that V^ t is a measure of one period ahead risk; then we can restate 
the problem as the maximisation of:
(3.3) U (Wi<t+1) = difE itt (Pt+l) + ( 1  +  r)(Wht -  P,ditt) -  (P(+i)
The first order condition of this maximisation is:
(3.4) 9U (Wi,t+l) = ^  _  (l + ^  (p^  = Q
oa t^
Hence, the optimal holding of the risky asset by any agent is equal to its risk 
adjusted expected excess return:
/o c) J _  Ei,t (Pt+l) — (1 +  r)Pt(3-5) dij — -------------- — ----
l^i,t \Pt+l)
Aggregating across all agent types we get the market demand function:
i—1
I
where wijt is the proportion of people who use forecasting rule i in time period t, 
and I  is the total number of different forecasting rules used.
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Market clearing implies that the total market demand for the asset must equal 
the supply of the asset, St. This allows me to solve for the market clearing price 
in period t:
i
MAPt+i)
(3.8) Pt =  — j----------------+  r]t r)t ~  iid{0, drj)
( 1  +  r ) ^ Wj, t
i= 1
where rjt is a white noise pricing error.
I must now describe the forecasting rules that individuals make use of. The fun­
damentalist rule forecasts that the market price will move towards it’s fundamental 
value, P*, during the next period, unless it is already close to the fundamental, 
defined by the bounds ±C:
(3.9) Eu  (Pt+1) = Pt_x -  ^ (P t_i -  P;_x) where \Pt_x -  P U  \ > C 
= Pt- 1 where \Pt-i — Pt-\ \ ^  C
We can think of C  as an uncertainty bound. Fundamentalists recognise the uncer­
tainty inherent in their modelling of the fundamental price and so they only take 
an active trading position when the actual price is significantly different from the 
fundamental value. If the actual price is already close to fundamental (i.e. within 
the band defined by C ) then they predict no change in the actual price.
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The chartist rule, on the other hand, simply extrapolates the previous move­
ments of the market rate:
OO
(3.10) ECjt (Pt+i) = Pt- 1 +  (3 y   ^p7 X ( 1  — p)APt-j 0  < p < 1
j=i
Clearly, neither of these expectations forming processes is rational in the con­
ventional sense. The contention of behavioural economics is that the level of com­
plexity in the real world makes it impossible for agents to fully comprehend the 
markets in which they trade. In such a world, the ex-ante use of simple rules such 
as those in this model may constitute a best response. However, even in a complex 
world, the ex-post assessment of trading rules is relatively cheap. I therefore im­
pose some limited rationality in the form of an evolutionary switching procedure 
based on the ex-post profitability of the competing rules. Agents are assumed 
to assess the ex-post risk adjusted profitability, n- t , of each of the forecasting 
rules and then select the rule that they will use in the next period. Hence, the 
proportions of agents using each of the rules develops according to the following 
identities:
(3.11) wu  =
(3.12) wCit =
exp(7n 'f t )
exp(7n ^ ) + exp(7n^) 
eMifK,t) 
exp(7n^ f) + exp(7n ;t)
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(3.13) n *,t = n iyt -  fio \t
(3.14) n*,f =  \Pt- 1 -  (1 +  r)P t_2].sign [Eitt-i(Pt) ~  (1 +  r)Pt- 1
(3.15)
OO
=  y y - ' a  -  p) [£ * -> - 1 m - i )  -  ^  i2
3=1
where Wfjt is the proportion of agents at time t using the fundamentalist rule 
and wC)t is the proportion using the chartist rule. 7  is a parameter measuring
the intensity of revision of the forecasting rules. If 7  =  0 then agents never
change the forecasting rule that they use, and exactly half the population uses 
each rule. As 7  approaches infinity all agents switch immediately to the rule that 
was most profitable in the preceding period. For all intermediate values agents 
switch between rules, but only sluggishly. This suggests some form of status quo 
bias, as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1974 [91]).
The final equation I need to close the model is the determination of the funda­
mental price. When I come to test the model empirically, I will use the underlying 
profits process to discipline the fundamental price. However, in the following analy­
sis of the dynamics of the model, it is enough to observe that the fundamental price
of the asset, P*, follows a random walk with drift:
(3.16) P£ = Pi_\ +  <£ +  £* St ~  iid{0, <j £)
I assume that the news , et , becomes public information during the time period.
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The timing of events within a period can be summarised as follows:
(1 ) The beginning of period information set is given by $>t = {Pt-i, Pt~i}i=ltooo-
(2) The profitability and risk of the various forecasting rules is assessed, IT * 
and o ft, and agents decide which forecasting rule to use this period. 
Hence, the weights w^t are determined.
(3) Expectations are formed of the next period price, Eijt (Pt+1 ), and so this 
period’s demand functions, di)t, are determined.
(4) Market clearing determines the present period price, Pt.
(5) News determines the present period fundamental, Pt*.
3.1.1. Solving the M odel
Solving the model is relatively straightforward. It is simply a matter of iterating 
the equations of the model, given a particular parameterisation and realisation of 
the shocks.
I use the Fortran programming language to simulate the model. The Fortran 
code is included in appendix A .l, but this code also includes the estimation and 
testing procedures that I will discuss in subsequent sections.
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3.2. Basic A nalysis of the Model
The highly non-linear nature of the model makes the analysis of its steady 
state and dynamics very complex. In this section I therefore take a three pronged 
approach to the analysis. Firstly, I look at an example stochastic simulation in 
order to illustrate some of the basic properties of the model. Secondly, I consider 
a simplified, ‘deterministic’ version of the model, so as to be able to provide some 
analytical results about the steady state. Thirdly, I carry out some numerically 
simulated sensitivity analyses of the full model in order to provide some intuition 
about the role of the model’s parameters and initial conditions.
3.2.1. An Exam ple Stochastic Sim ulation
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a 1,000 period stochastic simulation of the model. 
The fundamental value of the asset, Pt*, is given by the black line in the upper 
portion. As discussed earlier, this is a random walk with drift. The pink line shows 
the market price for the asset, Pt. In this simulation the asset price shadows its 
fundamental value less than precisely for the majority of the simulation period, 
but at times it deviates markedly and persistently away from the fundamental. 
The lower portion of figure 3.1 shows us the weight on the fundamentalist rule, 
Wf, over the simulation period. We can see that the deviations from fundamental
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value (or bubbles) are associated with low weight on the fundamentalist rule, and 
hence high weight on the chartist rule.
3.2.2. A  Simple, ‘D eterm inistic’ M odel
I simplify the model in a number of ways so as to provide an analytical solution:
• I set the net supply of the asset equal to zero, St =  0 .
• there is no pricing error, rjt = 0 .
• there is no news in the fundamental price, which I normalise to zero, 
P? =  0. In this way, Pt can be considered as the discrepancy between the 
actual price and its fundamental value.
•  the interest rate is equal to zero, r =  0 .
I can then express the model as a difference equation:
(3.17) Pt =  [ 1  -  +  0(1 -  p )e c,t] -  [0(1 -  p)2 0 Cii] Y ,  ff~2Pt-
i =2
where = are the risk-adjusted weights of the different trading
rules [NB f +  Qc t =  1 ].
Figure 3.1. An example stochastic simulation
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3.2.2.1. Steady State Solutions. By dropping the time prefixes, I can solve for 
all of the model’s steady state price levels, P:
(3.18) P'ip9f  = 0
I can now identify two types of steady state. In the first, the actual asset price is 
equal to its fundamental value (P = P* =  0); there are zero profits; zero risk; and 
the weights on the forecasting rules are both equal to a half.
The second type of steady state is characterised by a weight of zero on the 
fundamentalist rule (0 /  =  0). A sufficient condition for this to be the case is that 
chartist risk is zero whilst the risk for fundamentalists is strictly positive. This can 
occur with any constant asset price not equal to the fundamental value. Clearly, 
in a deterministic setting such non-fundamental steady states appear absurd - it 
is uncertainty caused by the stochastics that drive agents to use heuristical rules. 
However, by considering the model with the stochastics stripped out, we can get 
some understanding of how shocks can lead to a persistent divergence of the price 
from its fundamental value.
3.2.2.2. Sensitivity Analyses. In this section I consider how the parameters in 
the model affect the way in which the asset price responds to a single shock.
We can see clearly from equation 3.17 that given an initial price of zero, future 
prices will also be zero. I therefore shock the initial period price in order to see
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the effect on the steady state price of different parameterisations of the model (in 
this case I set Po = 5 and Pt =  0 for all t < 0). In each case I begin with a base 
parameterisation and then vary one of the parameters at a time in order to analyse 
the sensitivity of the steady state solution. Figure 3.2 shows how the steady state 
price changes as we vary each parameter. The red dotted lines represent the base 
parameterisation of ?/>=0.3, /?=0.85, p=0, 7 = 6 .0 , p=1.0 and (7=0, under which the 
steady state price is 14.2.
In order to understand the relationships shown we need to appreciate the self- 
fulfilling nature of the model. If agents predict a large increase in price, then they 
will demand more of the asset and this will, in turn, drive the price upwards. 
Hence, when 'ip is high, representing an aggressive fundamentalist forecast, the 
price is driven back to its fundamental value following the shock. On the other 
hand, when (3 is high and chartists expect a high correlation between future and 
past price changes, the price diverges from fundamental.
Another important characteristic of the model is the herding behaviour en­
capsulated in the switching rule. This implies the existence of a tipping point in 
the model. If the risk-adjusted profits associated with the chartist rule are just 
marginally higher than those associated with the fundamentalist rule then agents 
will begin to shift towards the chartist rule and the chartist forecast will become 
self-fulfilling. If, on the other hand, the fundamentalist rule proves more profitable, 
agents will flock towards it and the price will move towards its fundamental value. 
In this way, the relative profitability of the two forecasts in the period immediately
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following a shock is key. The tipping point is illustrated in the sensitivity analyses 
in the discontinuities in the relationships between each of the parameters ip and (3 
and the steady state price.
p represents the weight that chartists put on previous price changes relative to 
last period’s price change. Therefore, as p increases the reaction of the chartist 
forecast to any individual price shock is increasingly spread out over time. As p 
increases and the reaction is staggered out over more periods, there are two effects:
(1 ) there is a less aggressive reaction by individual chartists in the period 
immediately following the shock.
(2 ) there is a more aggressive reaction to the shock in subsequent periods. 
This is significant because, when the chartist rule is the more profitable 
in the period immediately following the shock, many agents move to the 
chartist rule in subsequent periods, and so the staggered reaction to the 
shock is acted upon by a greater number of agents. Hence, the chartist 
rule is more vigorously reinforced.
In our sensitivity analysis the second effect dominates for values up to p =  0.51, 
and the steady state price gets further away from the fundamental as p increases. 
Beyond this point, the first effect dominates and the steady state price gets closer 
to the fundamental until the model reaches the tipping point discussed above, at
p  =  0.62.
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When 7  =  0  there is no switching at all, so 50% of agents always use each of the 
forecasting rules. In the present case, the chartists’ expectations cause the price to 
increase initially, beyond the magnitude of the shock. The presence of agents using 
the fundamental rule means that the price is pulled back towards its fundamental 
value once the effect of the shock dies out in the chartist forecast. However, the 
chartist forecast causes the price to overshoot the fundamental. The price finally 
comes to rest at a value just below fundamental. At this price, fundamentalists 
expect an appreciation in the asset price but also experience a positive risk in 
their forecast, whilst chartists’ expectations are fulfilled. For each agent, demand 
is constant and, given that the price is as well, profits are zero for all agents.
As 7  increases agents begin to switch away from the less profitable rule. In the 
period immediately following the price shock, the chartist rule is more profitable 
and so agents switch to it. When 7  is positive but small this switching occurs 
very slowly and so serves only to increase slightly the overshooting effect. When 
7  > 0.34 the switching occurs rapidly enough that the pull back towards the fun­
damental is short-lived, and the initial chartist expectations become self-fulfilling.
The coefficient of risk aversion, (i, has little role to play in this ‘deterministic’ 
version of the model and so the sensitivity analysis is flat.
As long as C is less than the size of the shock, fundamentalists behave in 
the same way as if C =  0. However, for C greater than the size of the shock 
fundamentalists exert no influence on the price during the period immediately 
following the shock. Hence, we have a step shaped sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 3.2. Sensitivity analysis in the deterministic model
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One of the striking features of all these graphs are the discontinuities in the 
relationships between the parameters and the steady state outcomes. It is these 
discontinuities that cause chaotic behaviour in the model - very small causes can 
have very large effects.
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3.2.3. Further Stochastic Sim ulation
The analysis presented in the previous section highlights the numerous non-linearities 
and discontinuities in the model. It is illuminating to consider sensitivity with re­
spect to a single shock, but it is difficult to extrapolate from this the effect of 
varying parameters on the time series of the asset when it is continuously subject 
to shocks. It is, therefore, useful to look at full stochastic simulations of the model 
under different parameterisations.
In appendix A.2 I present graphically the time series of the asset price under 
various parameterisations but with exactly the same stochastic structure in each 
case. Here I confine myself to making some general observations on the effects of 
varying the parameters in the model, and provide some intuition for the observa­
tions.
Generally, as ifj increases we see two effects. When the price is close to fun­
damental, it follows the fundamental value more closely because of the increased 
aggressiveness in the fundamentalist forecast. However, when bubbles occur they 
are more persistent and deviate further from the fundamental because once agents 
shift to the chartist rule they are less likely to shift back to an aggressive funda­
mentalist forecast.
For low values of (3 the asset price closely shadows its fundamental value. As 
/3 increases bubbles becomes more common, more persistent and more extreme.
I l l
Increases in the value of p ameliorate the response of the chartist rule to in­
dividual shocks and so they reduce the magnitude of the divergence of the asset 
price from fundamental during bubbles.
For high values of 7  agents switch rapidly between the forecasting rules in 
response to relative profitability. This makes the asset price more volatile, and 
divergences from fundamental more extreme.
As risk aversion, /x, increases we see more extreme and more persistent devia­
tions from fundamental. Given that chartist behaviour introduces additional risk 
into the market, in the form of noise, it appears to be counter-intuitive that in­
creased risk aversion encourages chartist behaviour. However, the chartist forecast 
covaries more closely with the price than does the fundamental rule. Therefore, as 
the coefficient of risk aversion increases, more agents will choose to use the chartist 
rule and this causes longer and more extreme bubbles.
When C ^  0  fundamentalists exert no influence over the asset price so long as 
it is within ± C  of the fundamental. However, so long as the price remains within 
those bounds fundamentalists are likely to be more or less equally profitable as the 
chartists. Hence, when the price hits the bound, there are likely to be around 50% 
fundamentalists in the market who will drive it back within the bounds. Hence 
as C  increases we see more volatility in the price within the bounds but fewer 
occurrences of the price escaping the bounds.
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3.3. D isciplining the Model
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that we have a very flexible model. 
With six exogenous parameters and two exogenous stochastic processes, we have 
a model with so many degrees of freedom that it would be surprising if we could 
not, under some parameterisation, provide a good for fit for real world data. In 
this section I will discuss some empirical limitations on the exogenous aspects of 
the model.
3.3.1. The Fundamental Price
A crucial aspect of the model is the fundamental price on which fundamentalists 
base their expectations of future price movements. We can think of this as being 
akin to a rational expectation of the price level, based on the fundamental value of 
the asset. In other words, it is a discounted sum of the future cashflows arising from 
ownership of the asset. In the case of equities, this is equivalent to the discounted 
sum of future profits since all profits must ultimately accrue to the equity owners.
Clearly, profits are driven by the marginal productivity of capital. However, 
there is no generally accepted theory explaining the growth of the productivity of 
capital. Conventionally, therefore, both productivity and profits have been mod­
elled by simple univariate time series processes. I follow this convention, and use
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a parsimonious ARIMA representation of profits as the basis for the fundamental 
value of the asset.
In this way I can provide some discipline to the fundamental price in the model 
- it must be consistent with the actual profits process that underlies it. And, 
of course, we have data for this profits process. In section 3.5 I will derive the 
parsimonious univariate time series representation of the UK profits series. In the 
following section, I will then derive bootstrapped series of the fundamental price 
which are consistent with rational expectations of future profits.
3.3.2. The Coefficient of Risk Aversion
A significant amount of research has been carried out in respect of the empirical 
magnitude of the coefficient of risk aversion (e.g. Epstein and Zin 1991 [35]). The 
general consensus suggests a value of unity. Accordingly, I set p equal to 1 .
3.3.3. Other Parameters
The value of the parameters in the forecasting rules, ip, and p, and the switching 
rule, 7 , are clearly unobservable and more open to debate. Their value will certainly 
depend upon the length of time period we consider, and must fulfil some concept 
of ‘reasonableness’. For example, when I come to test the model I will consider
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quarterly time periods because profits data are only available quarterly. ip then 
measures the proportion of the gap between market price and fundamental value 
that fundamentalists believe will be closed during the next three months. We 
might then say that values of ip less than 0.1 are unreasonable. Beyond this, all 
we can say is that the behavioural parameters must be internally consistent and 
ensure stability in the model i.e. 0  < - 0  < 1 , 0  < /? < 1 , 0  < p < 1  and 0  < 7 .
As far as the uncertainty parameter C  is concerned, it is difficult to define what 
would be a reasonable size band within which fundamentalists remain inert. As a 
reasonable starting point, I restrict C to being no more than 10%.
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Figure 3.3. Real FTSE 1963-2006
1984 20061963 1973 1995
3.4. The D ata
3.4.1. The FTSE All Share Index
The FTSE All-Share Index (hereon referred to as the FTSE) is considered to be the 
best performance measure of UK equities, accounting for 98% of the UK’s market 
capitalisation. The index was launched in April 1962. Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
real value of the index (calculated using the GDP deflator) from the first quarter 
of 1963 up until the last quarter of 2006.
I approximate the real rate of return to the FTSE as the first difference in logs:
(3.19) F T S E  rate o f  return = A (In [real FTSE])
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Figure 3.4. FTSE real quarterly rates of return and estimated pop­
ulation moments
Mean 0.00459
0.01051
0.01784
Variance
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Excess Kurtosis 6.57152
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This series, along with its estimated population moments, are shown in figure 3.4. 
It is clear from the illustration that these returns are not normally distributed. 
The sample is characterised by fat tails, particularly of negative returns, positive 
skewness and excess kurtosis.
I carried out a regression analysis to determine the best fit time series for the
rates of return. Using the Hannan-Rissanen procedure with Schwartz selection
criterion, I found that the following ARMA(0,0)-GARCH(1,1) process provided
the most parsimonious representation of the series:
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(3.20) A(ln[realF7\S£t]) =
(s td  e r ro r )
(3.21) <  =
Hence I can conclude, as is usual in the finance literature, that stock returns 
follow a random walk with drift but that the volatility of returns is to some extent 
predictable . 5
0.0080 +  ut 
(0.0064)
0.0016 +  0.1983m? !  +  0.6343a?,
(0.0011) (0.0795) (0.1774) * 1
3.4.2. UK  Profits
The fundamental variable underlying the performance of the FTSE is the profits 
of UK publicly quoted companies. We use a seasonally adjusted transformation of 
the Office for National Statistics’ quarterly profits series6  as a measure. Figure 3.5 
shows this series in real terms (calculated using the GDP deflator).
In order to investigate the time series properties of the data I take the differ­
ences of the log of profits to produce a stationary series representing the rate of
5Despite the fact that the constant terms in both the primary and the variance equations are 
insignificant, we report them here because when we come to test our behavioural model we will 
want to see whether it is capable of reproducing such values as have actually ocurred in the data.
6The series that we use is the sum of the gross operating surplus of private non-financial corpo­
rations (ONS code NRJK) and the gross operating surplus of financial corporations (ONS code 
NQNV). Both series are reported in table 1.3 of the Monthly Digest of Statistics and on the ONS 
website. We use a multiplicative moving average method to adjust for the seasonality in the raw 
data.
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Figure 3.5. Real UK Profits 1963-2006
1963  1973  1984  1995  2006
change of quarterly profits. The transformed series and the related estimates of 
the population moments are shown in figure 3.6.
I once again used the Hannan-Rissanen procedure with Schwartz selection cri­
terion to determine the most parsimonious ARIMA representation of this series. 
As is clear from figures 3.5 and 3.6, the log profits series is integrated of order 1 . 
The best representation of the rate of change of profits is given by the following 
ARMA(1,0):
(3.22) A(ln[realprofit])t = 0.008435 -  0.260975A(ln[realp ro f i t ] ) ^  +  ut
(std error) (0.004325) (0.070986)
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Figure 3.6. Rate of change of real quarterly profits and estimated 
population moments
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Diagnostic testing shows that the residuals from this regression do not display 
significant low order serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey test), nor do they display 
ARCH properties. However, we can reject the hypothesis that the residuals are 
normally distributed (Jarque-Bera p-value of 0.034). The residuals have positive 
skewness of 0.08 and kurtosis of 3.95. This non-normality implies that, when we 
come to simulating the profits process in our model-testing procedure, we need to 
bootstrap these residuals rather than use stochastic simulation.
120
3.5. Testing the M odel
3.5.1. The Procedure
In order to test the model’s ability to account for the empirical facts, I make use of 
the methodology adopted by Meenagh, Minford and Peel (2007 [6 8 ]) (henceforth 
referred to as MMP). I begin by taking 50,000 bootstraps of the UK profits series 
and discount them to provide possible realisations of the fundamental value of 
the FTSE. I then stochastically simulate the model with each of these potential 
realisations of the fundamental. In this way, I derive 50,000 stochastic simulations 
of the FTSE series under the null hypothesis that the model is true.
I then use the distribution of the moments and time series properties from these 
simulations to construct 95% confidence intervals. If I find that the moments and 
time series properties of the actual FTSE series lie outside the confidence intervals 
then I can reject the null hypothesis that the model is true. Conversely, if the 
properties of the actual FTSE lie within the confidence bounds, then I cannot 
reject the model. I also employ a joint test of all the moments and GARCH 
parameters.
In fact, I carry out this testing procedure both on the ’behavioural’ model 
and on MMP’s ‘rational’ model using the same dataset7  so that I can provide a 
comparison with a RE-EMH model.
7This dataset differs from that of MMP in two ways. Firstly, the MMP data covers 1963Q1 to 
2002Q2. My data continues up to 2006Q4. Secondly, MMP use the average daily close over the 
quarter as their measure of the FTSE price whereas we use the quarterly close. Clearly, our 
FTSE data is therefore more volatile.
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I use a search algorithm to find the best-fitting values for the behavioural 
parameters and the standard deviation of the pricing shock in the behavioural 
model (subject to the restrictions discussed in section 3.3). The parameterisation 
used is as follows8:
Ip P P 7 P C (Jrf
0.425 0.99 0 . 2 3.75 1.0 0.5 0.025
3.5.2. The Results
Table 3.1 summarises the moments and time series properties of the FTSE simula­
tions from each model and compares them to the actual data. As can be seen, the 
only case of a property of the actual data falling outside the confidence bounds is 
variance in the MMP model. For all other properties, the MMP model passes the 
95% test. The behavioural model satisfies every property test. Graphical represen­
tations of the distributions of properties under each model are shown in appendix 
A.3.
According to the results in figure 3.1 we cannot reject the behavioural model, 
but can reject the MMP model on the basis that less than 5% of the simulations 
of that model produce variances in returns as large as we see in the actual FTSE 
index. It is clear, however, that the MMP model does better than the behavioural
8In the model, C  is measured in absolute terms. An absolute value of 0.5 is equivalent to 10% of 
the steady state fundamental price.
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Table 3.1. Moments and time series properties of the simulated and 
actual FTSE series
ACTUAL Behavioural Model MMP Model
FTSE Lower Upper Lower Upper
2.5% lim it 2.5% limit 2.5% limit 2.5% limit
Mean 0.0046 -0.1403 0.1389 -0.0075 0.0139
Variance 0.0105 0.0009 0.0155 0.0026 0.0076
Skewness 0.0178 -1.3116 2.2961 -0.7626 1.5572
Kurtosis 9.5715 1.9121 14.1262 2.6187 18.8049
Trend 0.0080 -0.1517 0.1459 -0.0079 0.0153
ARCH constant 0.0016 0.0000 0.0016 0.0001 0.0054
ARCH 0.1983 0.0000 0.9956 0.0000 0.5516
GARCH 0.6343 0.0000 0.9419 0.0000 0.9232
model in terms of some of the other properties. For example, if we look at the 
distribution of the mean return in each model, the mean of the distribution is 
close to the actual FTSE mean return in each case, but the distribution is much 
tighter around that value in the case of the MMP model. This observation suggests 
two things. Firstly, it would be useful to consider a single metric that takes into 
account the joint distribution of all of the properties considered in figure 3.1 and 
see whether the FTSE lies within the 95% confidence interval for such a metric. 
We could also use the p-value of the metric to compare our models. Secondly, it 
would be useful to be able to say something about the power of our tests.
It is important to note at this point that the MMP model involves a latent 
profits model. The profits process is driven by the model parameters via a Markov 
switching process. Any joint test of this model should, strictly speaking, consider 
the time series properties of the profits process as well as those of the asset price.
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In the behavioural model, on the other hand, the profits process is simply driven 
by the historical profits data, and so there is a good fit by construction. In order 
to compare the two models, here we only consider a test of the joint distribution 
of the asset price characteristics. This could prove to be a lenient treatment of 
the MMP model, but we simply accept that the parameters of that model were 
selected in the first place to fit the profits data as well as the asset price data.
Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2007 [70]) propose such a metric, based 
on the Mahalanobis distance. This is a statistical distance measure based on the 
correlations between different variables. Formally, the Mahalanobis distance is cal­
culated as MDi = >/(Xi — n)Cov~l (xi — fi)' , where x % is a vector of observations 
(in this case, the vector of moments and time series properties from simulation i), /i 
is the mean of the x*, and Cov is the associated covariance matrix. I calculate the 
M D  of each simulation from the set of model simulations and use the distribution 
of those values to get a 95% confidence limit. I then calculate the distance of the 
actual data from the model simulations, and see whether it lies within the bound. 
For each model, the actual FTSE lies within the 95% limit (see appendix A.3 for 
a graphical representation).
If I can find a p-value for the distribution of Mahalanobis distances then I can 
use this to rank the alternative models. If I can find a likelihood value then I 
can use this to give an idea of the power of the test. It is a well known result 
that if the population under consideration may be considered multivariate normal, 
then the square of the Mahalanobis distance will follow a chi-square distribution.
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However, as can be seen in appendix A.3, the distributions of many of the time 
series properties are highly non-normal. For example, for each model the GARCH 
parameter is insignificant in 30% to 55% of the simulations. Unsurprisingly, I find 
that the chi square distribution is a very poor fit for our distributions of MD.  
I therefore simply use the actual distribution of M D  to calculate p-values and 
likelihoods for each model. I normalise the M D  distribution so that it is bounded 
by 0 and 1 and so that the area under the distribution is equal to one. The 
normalised distribution for each model is shown in figure 3.7. The dashed red line 
in each graph shows the M D  of the actual FTSE, and p-values and likelihoods are 
as stated.
To summarise the various tests, I can say that the MMP model has more 
power than the behavioural models we look at (illustrated by the concentration 
of M D  values and the narrowness of the confidence intervals for individual time 
series properties). It also has a reasonably good fit overall, with a p-value of 65%. 
However, it fails to account for the high volatility of FTSE returns that we see in 
the data.
The behavioural model also provides a good fit overall, with a p-value of 47%, 
and can account for all of the individual time series characteristics of the data. We 
should note, however, that the test appears to have less power when applied to the 
behavioural model.
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Figure 3.7. p-values and likelihood values for each model
1 4 BEHAVIOURAL MODEL:
0.46994
6.66
p — value 
likelihood1 2
1 0
0 . 50 . 40.2 0 . 30 . 1
3 0
MMP MODEL:
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17.2
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likelihood2 5
20
1 5
1 0
5
0
0 . 50 . 3 0 . 40 . 1 0.20
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In conclusion, it is difficult to distinguish between the models on the basis of 
their overall fit of the data. However, it is clear that the MMP model cannot 
account for the large variance in returns, whereas the behavioural model can.
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3.6. Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided a framework with which to test the efficacy 
of different asset pricing models in explaining the empirical facts. I have applied 
this framework to two competing models; a behavioural model which has been 
discussed in detail, and a RE-EMH model which has been explained elsewhere 
(Meenagh, Minford and Peel 2007 [6 8 ]). The results show that either model gives 
a reasonable account of the overall FTSE time series, but that the MMP model 
struggles to explain the volatility in stock returns.
Essentially the choice between the two modelling frameworks comes down to 
whether the complex dynamics of asset prices are driven by a complex profits 
process or by complex behaviour in asset markets. The implications of the two 
models axe starkly different. If we accept the first argument then asset prices reflect 
the true riskiness of asset ownership. If we accept the second argument then there 
is a source of inefficiency in equity markets, in the form of noise trader risk.
The behavioural model explains the dynamics of the asset price as the result 
of the tension between fundamental and chartist forecasting rules. There is no 
doubt that the model put forward in this paper is far from a precise account of the 
way that asset markets function. There is a wealth of evidence (e.g. Brock et al 
1992 [24]) that technical or chartist analysis has a prominent role on the trading 
floor. It is, however, clear that the chartist rules employed by traders are far more
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sophisticated than that which I put forward in this chapter (equation 3.10). There 
is clearly scope for developing more sophisticated behavioural models, and they 
may well provide a better fit for the data.
What is significant to note is that even with the extremely simple forecasting 
rules that I use here, we have a model that produces very complex dynamics which 
are consistent with the actual data. Clearly, what leads us to reject this model as a 
precise representation of the actual FTSE market is the intuition that such highly 
rewarded financial practitioners could not be using such naive forecasting rules. 
A useful extension to this paper would be to examine more closely the rules that 
practitioners do actually appear to use in the real world (e.g. volatility modelling) 
and incorporate them into our framework.
A concern that we may have about the results in this chapter is that the power 
of the test appears to be low. Of course, it is the chaotic nature of the model that 
gives it this property, and this is exactly what I am exploiting in order to explain 
the FTSE dynamics.
A more particular concern is that the model allows for extremely long bubbles, 
where the asset price deviates massively from its fundamental value. This occurs 
when all of the agents in the model switch to a chartist rule. In this case, the 
model’s stochastics provide the only route back towards the fundamental value. 
This is counter intuitive. We may believe that the market can be dominated by 
non-fundamental beliefs in the short run but it is common to think that there is 
some mechanism that ensures a return to fundamental value in the long run. The
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rational expectations literature makes use of transversality conditions to eliminate 
the possibility of long-run bubbles caused by self-fulfilling expectations. It may 
be that we need something similar here to prevent long-run self-fulfilling chartist 
bubbles.
Analysis of the model shows that the parameter C is very important in the 
explanation of the FTSE dynamics, in particular the high kurtosis. This is because, 
with positive C , fundamentalists don’t expect any movement back towards the 
fundamental value if the asset price is already close to it. They only expect a 
return towards fundamental if there is already a large discrepancy between the 
actual and the fundamental values. I have explained this as a consequence of the 
uncertainty surrounding the fundamental value. An equivalent mechanism might 
be found in the tension between short run and long run behaviour. If agents 
choose to follow the market in the short run (following chartist rules) but form 
forward looking expectations in the long run (following fundamental rules), this 
may have a similar effect to ignoring small discrepancies from the fundamental but 
acting upon large discrepancies. Such behaviour could potentially be accounted 
for by the relative infrequency of news about the fundamental as compared to the 
high frequency of news about the market, and the resulting effects on behaviour, 
particularly in the presence of principal-agent problems.
Incorporating forecasting rules that model this short run versus long run di­
chotomy would be a worthwhile extension to the present model.
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The MMP model explains the dynamics of the asset price simply as the dis­
counted sum of future profits, but where those future profits are driven by a Markov 
switching procedure with four regimes. The fourth regime is a massive crash with 
very low probability that has not been realised in the observable data. Extensions 
to this framework are harder to envisage.
Given that I find that this simple behavioural model performs at least as well 
as the MMP model, and given that the scope for extending and improving the 
behavioural model is great, I conclude that behavioural rules have a useful role 
in explaining the dynamics of asset prices. I would further argue that this is 
particularly true in the short run, when news about fundamentals is infrequent. 
This conclusion implies that there is some source of inefficiency in equity markets, 
namely noise trader risk. The question then arises as to whether there are policies 
that could be put in place to mitigate this inefficiency. This question provides the 
motivation for the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
The M onetary Policy Implications 
of Behavioural A sset Bubbles
In this chapter my intention is to examine the implications that behavioural 
finance theories may have for the implementation of monetary policy. In particular, 
I hope to inform the debate on whether and to what extent asset prices should be 
included in central banks’ policy considerations.
The use of asset prices in monetary policy formulation has a long and chequered 
history. For the majority of history, monetary policy has been inextricably linked 
to asset prices. The value of money was tied either to the value of precious metals 
or to the value of other currencies almost continuously up until the final decades 
of the twentieth century.
However, a near-consensus evolved within the literature over the latter decades 
of the twentieth century. It held that monetary policy should respond to expected 
inflation and possibly to the output gap, but should not be directly influenced by 
asset price movements. There has been some dissent to this view (for example 
Cecchetti et al (2000) [27]) and, furthermore, some evidence exists to suggest that
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central banks do indeed take asset price movements into consideration when setting 
interest rates (Mishkin (2007) [71], Cecchetti et al (2000) [27]).
I will begin with a review of the literature that reflects both sides of this 
debate. I will then devote most of the chapter to developing a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model based on heuristical foundations of the type 
that I considered in the previous chapter. I will use the results from the model 
to address the issue of whether the absence of rational expectations in financial 
markets may provide a justification for including asset prices in central banks’ 
Taylor rules1.
T use the phrase Taylor rule throughout this chapter to refer generically to monetary policy 
rules.
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4.1. L ite ra tu re  Review
In his now infamous speech to the American Enterprise Institute, the then 
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan posed a question very similar to the 
one I am now attempting to answer:
But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly esca­
lated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and pro­
longed contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And 
how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? (Greenspan 
1995 [48])
These comments were, at the time, a rare reflection on the potential importance 
of asset mis-pricing to monetary policy. The slumps in world stock markets which 
have followed, in the early 2 0 0 0 s and during the recent credit crunch, have strength­
ened the view that asset price bubbles exist as an empirical fact. However, the 
literature relating to the subject is still relatively sparse.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000 [16]) provide the original investigation into the 
implications of asset price bubbles for monetary policy. They incorporate an ex­
ogenous asset bubble into their financial accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist 1999 [18]). The financial accelerator model is a New Keynesian model in 
which firms own their stock of capital directly, rather than renting it from house­
holds as is usual in most models. It also differs from the standard New Keynesian
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model in that it incorporates credit market frictions, which make external finance 
more expensive than internal finance. Furthermore, the premium on external fi­
nance depends on the collateral that a firm is able to provide, so that the cost of 
capital is directly related to asset prices. The more valuable are the assets that sit 
on a firm’s balance sheet, the cheaper it is for the firm to access external finance.
A positive productivity shock has the usual positive effect on output and em­
ployment via improvements in the productivity of capital. However, the increase 
in asset prices associated with the shock also reduces the cost of capital, further 
increasing investment, output and asset prices. This positive feedback loop, known 
as the financial accelerator, means that the effects of a shock are amplified. It also 
gives extra traction to monetary policy. For example, a monetary loosening re­
duces real interest rates, raising asset prices, and therefore makes external finance 
less expensive.
The asset price bubble that Bernanke and Gertler add into this model is exoge­
nously determined. They define the bubble as the difference between the market 
price of capital, St, and the fundamental value of capital, Qt, which is simply 
the discounted sum of future dividends. The bubble develops according to the 
following rule:
St + 1  -  Qt+i =  ~(St — Qt) R qt + 1 with probability p
P
St+i — Qt+i =  0 with probability (1 — p)
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where p < a < 1. In other words, the bubble grows until such time as it bursts, but 
the expected discounted value of the bubble decays over time. When the bubble 
bursts, the asset price goes instantaneously back to the fundamental value.
Bernanke and Gertler simulate their model under two alternative monetary 
policy rules. The first of these rules has the interest rate responding only to 
inflation, but under the second rule policy also reacts to the lagged asset price. 
They conclude that the best policy is to focus aggressively2  on inflation and ignore 
asset prices, in that this policy achieves the lowest variance of output and inflation. 
Their simulations show that a monetary policy rule which accommodates inflation 
but responds to asset prices actually leads to a decline in output and inflation 
during a positive bubble. The rise in interest rates in response to the bubble 
drives down fundamental values to a greater extent than the bubble stimulates 
them. When the monetary policy rule aggressively targets inflation, they find 
that adding in the response to asset prices makes little difference, though what 
difference it does make is still destabilising. They conclude that:
a monetary regime that focuses on asset prices rather than funda­
mentals may well be actively destabilising. The problem is that the 
central bank is targeting the wrong indicator.
2 They test two different parameters on expected inflation in the Taylor rule - one of which 
represents an aggressive response to inflation, whilst the other is more accomodating.
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Cecchetti et al (2000 [27]) reach very different conclusions from the same model. 
They criticise Bernanke and Gertler for considering too narrow a set of Taylor 
rules and for failing to consider different parameterisations of the New Keynesian 
Phillips’ curve. They report the results of simulations of the model in which they 
loosen these restrictions. In particular, they consider:
(1) Taylor rules which include the output gap, and which allow for interest 
rate smoothing.
(2 ) policy rules that react to asset mis-pricing rather than to the asset price 
itself. In other words, they assume that the central bank can distinguish 
between asset price movements caused by changes to the fundamentals, 
and those which are caused by a bubble.
(3) the implications of making agents more or less backward looking in their 
wage setting. In other words, they vary the weights on past inflation and 
future expected inflation in the New Keynesian Phillips’ curve.
They report that in the majority of cases, it is optimal for interest rates to respond 
to asset mis-pricing.
They further criticise Bernanke and Gertler on the basis that both the bubble’s 
size and duration, and the level of leverage in the economy are treated as exogenous. 
They argue that when private agents expect the monetary authorities to ‘prick’ a 
bubble, the bubble is less likely to appear in the first place. Alternatively, if the 
bank can tighten policy in the formative stage of the bubble it will mitigate the
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worst excesses that might otherwise occur. The authors also contend that if it 
is known that the monetary authorities will react to asset prices, then firms and 
households will react to stock market buoyancy by reducing their leverage, and 
this will dampen the effect of the financial accelerator.
Bordo and Jeanne (2002 [23]) suggest that the best way to think of asset price 
targeting is as costly insurance against financial crisis. In their highly stylised 
model, they incorporate a financial shock whose distribution depends on firms’ 
indebtedness. The justification for the endogeneity of this shock is similar to 
Bernanke and Gertler’s explanation of the financial accelerator. It lies in the 
fact that financial intermediaries rely on collateral to reduce financial frictions. 
Collateral in turn is driven by asset prices. Given that monetary policy can affect 
asset prices, and thereby debt accumulation, it also affects the probability of a 
damaging financial shock. A proactive monetary policy can thus prevent a credit 
crunch from emerging in the future. However, such a policy incurs a cost in terms 
of sacrificing short-run macroeconomic objectives.
The authors define indebtedness, D, as a decreasing function of monetary pol­
icy, r, and an increasing function of ‘optimism’, n:
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Figure 4.1. Bordo and Jeanne (2002 [23]) optimal monetary policy
Interest
rate, r
proactive
where optimism reflects the subjective probability associated with high future prof­
its. They find that the optimal monetary policy depends decisively upon the op­
timism of the private sector. This result is illustrated by figure 4.1, which is lifted 
from their paper. When optimism is low, firms do not leverage themselves very 
highly, so the risk of a credit crunch is low, and the cost of a proactive policy is not 
worth bearing. As the private sector becomes more optimistic they increase their 
leverage and the probability of a credit crunch increases. It becomes worthwhile to 
insure against that risk with a proactive monetary policy. However, as optimism 
increases, there is also an increase in the cost of the proactive monetary policy. 
The cost increases because the more optimistic private agents are, the greater the 
interest rate that needs to be set to curb their indebtedness. At some point, the 
cost associated with distorting monetary policy becomes so high that it no longer 
pays to insure against the credit crunch.
In this way, Bordo and Jeanne conclude that there is no simple rule as to how 
central banks should respond to asset prices. The optimal policy depends on the
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economic circumstances in a complex, non-linear way that cannot be represented 
in a straightforward Taylor rule.
Bean (2004 [15]) examines the effects of targeting asset prices within a simple 
New Keynesian model. His key conclusion is that expectations of future policy 
actions are at least as significant as current policy in preventing asset booms and 
busts. In his model, credit crunches occur with a given probability, but their 
severity depends upon the level of indebtedness in the economy. In the model, 
higher interest rates reduce capital formation and associated indebtedness, but the 
higher interest payments exactly offset this so that the output cost of a credit 
crunch is unaffected. In this way, current monetary policy does not have any 
impact on the severity of a credit crunch. However, monetary policy can effect the 
severity of future credit crunches through its impact on future expected output, 
and therefore on current capital accumulation and leverage. Hence, a central bank 
may find it optimal to use monetary policy commitments to limit the build up of 
leverage in the economy. The optimal commitment is in fact to stabilise output by 
less than the discretionary optimum when a credit crunch occurs. This counter­
intuitive result arises because, by committing to a larger output cost if a credit 
crunch does occur, the central bank is disciplining private agents to limit their 
indebtedness.
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In summary, a number of themes recur within the literature:
(1) There is great difficulty in identifying whether asset price movements are 
driven by changes in the fundamentals or by noise trading. It is only with 
the benefit of hindsight tha t bubbles become recognisable. For many au­
thors (see for example Greenspan 2002 [49]) this provides an overwhelm­
ing reason for not attempting to target asset prices. Cecchetti et al (2000 
[27]), on the other hand, make an analogy between the concept of a fun­
damental asset price and the concept of potential output. They argue 
that measuring asset mis-pricing is of a similar complexity as measuring 
the output gap.
(2) The macroeconomic consequences of bubbles are relatively mild in the 
absence of some kind of financial accelerator effect. As Bean (2004 [15]) 
states, “if the only macroeconomic consequences of booms and busts in 
asset prices were via conventional wealth effects on aggregate demand, 
then they would constitute little more than a nuisance to monetary policy 
makers” . It is only when falling asset prices combine with financial mar­
ket frictions to cause credit rationing and credit crunches that significant 
welfare losses occur.
(3) A number of authors argue that the magnitude of the monetary policy 
response that would be needed to correct for a bubble would risk causing 
serious harm to the real economy. Greenspan ( 2 0 0 2  [49]) provides a selec­
tion of empirical evidence that suggests that the response of asset prices
141
to monetary policy is weak. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008 [9]) 
estimate VARs in order to assess the responses of equity and house prices 
to monetary policy across 17 different countries. They concur that using 
monetary policy to offset asset price movements in an attempt to guard 
against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity.
(4) Conversely, Bean (2004 [15]) highlights the way in which a commitment to 
future policy may have significant effects on the expectations, and hence 
the behaviour, of the private sector. Such commitments, if they are ef­
fective in preventing bubbles from occurring, may never actually have to 
be acted upon. Cecchetti et al (2000 [27]) illustrate this in a simulation 
of the Bernanke and Gertler model. They compare Taylor rules with and 
without a response to asset prices. Although the asset targeting rule in­
volves a larger response ex-ante to bubbles, ex-post the monetary policy 
response is smaller because private agents fully expect the central bank’s 
response, and so bubbles do not grow as large.
(5) Even if it is appropriate to target asset mis-pricing, the timing of mone­
tary policy poses significant difficulties. The lags in the transmission of 
monetary policy mean that it may be counter-productive to respond to a 
bubble with a monetary tightening. If the bubble bursts of its own accord, 
just as the monetary tightening takes effect, then the economy will be hit 
simultaneously by two deflationary forces. Gruen et al (2003 [50]) show
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that the informational requirements for implementing an asset price tar­
geting policy are particularly stringent when these timing considerations 
are taken into account.
In the remainder of this chapter I will present a model which will attempt 
to address the final three themes highlighted above. Much has been said on the 
first theme, and though I will return to the issue of measuring mis-pricings in the 
conclusion, this is not an issue for theoretical modelling. As far as the second theme 
is concerned, the importance of financial accelerator affects is well established and 
relatively uncontroversial. Again, therefore, I will not concern myself with this 
issue in the model that follows, but will return to the issue in my conclusion.
My main concern in what follows is to provide a new perspective on the asset 
price targeting debate. All of the models discussed above either treat the bubble 
process as exogenous or use some simple but poorly specified construct to endo- 
genise the bubble process. My main contribution is to use a specific behavioural 
framework to generate an endogenous bubble.
A further contribution is tha t I use a fully specified dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model to assess different policy rules. This allows me to do 
a full welfare analysis, rather than having to resort to ad hoc assessments using 
central bank loss functions.
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4.2. The M odel
I set up a standard New Keynesian DSGE model but inhabit it with investors 
who base their portfolio decision on one of two heuristical forecasting rules.
The model economy consists of a set of households, a set of firms and a bond- 
issuing government. The households derive an income by providing a differentiated 
labour service and consume a mixed bundle of output. They allocate their wealth 
intertemporally by holding government bonds or through capital ownership. Firms 
set the price for their output via Calvo contracts and households set the wage for 
their differentiated labour similarly. The nominal rigidity introduced by the Calvo 
mechanism is essential in providing a role for monetary policy.
I use the artifice of a perfectly competitive bundler to transform the differen­
tiated output of the firms into a homogenous output-bundle which is consumed 
by the households or reinvested as capital. I use a similar bundler to transform 
the differentiated labour into a homogenous labour-bundle which is used in the 
productive process by the firms. Each of these firms pays a wage to labour and a 
rent to its capital owners.
To this extent I have a standard New Keynesian model (see, for example, 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2007[26])). My model only differs from this standard 
to the extent that agents’ expectations of asset prices differ from the rational 
expectation. I model agents’ beliefs about future asset prices in the same way as 
I did in the previous chapter. Each individual agent follows a behavioural process
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whereby they choose between two simple heuristical forecasts, in the traditions of 
Flrankel and Froot (1986 [42]) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006 [31]).
4.2.1. H ousehold M axim isa tion
There is a continuum of households indexed by h across the unit interval. Each 
household maximises its intertemporal utility function,
where Ch,t is the household’s real consumption of the composite good, yt, and lh,t is 
its differentiated labour supply. I consider a cashless economy in which households 
can transfer their wealth from one time period to another by holding government 
bonds, bh,ti or investing in capital, kh t. Government bonds are one period, paying
rate 8  and there is a capital adjustment cost. Hence, each household faces the 
budget constraint:
a pre-announced gross nominal return of ( 1  +  R^). Capital is bought at the price 
Pt and has a rental return each subsequent period. Capital depreciates at the
kh,tRt +  bh,t0- + R t) “I" lh,tWh,t — ch,tPt + ih,tPt + bh,t+i
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and the law of motion of capital is given by:
k h , t + i  =  (1 — $ )  k h , t  +  i h , t  ~  2  ^
where the final term represents the cost of capital adjustment.
This optimisation yields some standard results. Firstly, the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure is set equal to a mark up on the real 
wage, because of imperfect competition in the labour market:
W„,tM R S c,t = - ^  = - ^ (  l + eLh)
cKt p<
where e^h — wry ou ,' *s *-^le elasticity of demand for labour from household h.
Secondly, the expected real intertemporal returns on the different assets are 
equalised. When the return on bonds is discounted at the stochastic discount rate 
we get unity:
0 E f h',+\ \  + f O  = i
Ah,t
At is the marginal utility of nominal wealth. The capital holding conditions are 
more complex because, in this case, the total return is a combination of the rental 
rate, the depreciation and the capital adjustment cost. However, I can still show 
that the expected discounted return from investing one dollar in capital is again
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unity:
(3Et
r
D k 1 — 1/ -“ t+l ,
1
Pt+i
A h,t ' Pi ' l - v<
r *m+i s]
k h , t+ 1 Pt
U - f l  +  2
\  2
1h,t+ 1 \ — S2
kh,t+i J
It is also straightforward to show that the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption this period and next is equal to the product of the intertemporal 
discount rate and the gross real interest rate:
EtCh,t+i 
Qi,t
— (3 ( l +  E trbt+l)
where 1 +  Etr bt + 1 =  (1 +  R bt+\) EtPpt+1
4.2.1.1. Calvo w age se ttin g . I introduce nominal rigidities in the labour market 
by using Calvo wage contracts. A proportion of households, ( 1  — a;), are free to 
adjust their wage. They choose the wage which maximises their utility across the 
states of nature for which that wage rate will hold. I assume that the remainder 
of the households simply update their last period wage by the steady state gross 
inflation rate, ( 1  -h II).
Households sell their differentiated labour in a monopolistically competitive 
market to a perfectly competitive bundler. The bundler combines the labour of 
the various households into aggregate labour which is employed by the firms. The
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bundling technology is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
h = /<?dh
7 - 1
The bundler’s cost minimisation implies that each household faces the following 
demand for their labour service:
Households which are free to optimise in period t choose the wage rate, Wj*t , 
which maximises utility across the states of nature for which that wage rate will 
hold, subject to the labour demand curve, the budget constraint and the law of 
motion of capital. In other words, it maximises:
S — t
-V h ,s
+A/i,s
ln(c, s ) _ I ( ^ ^ p £ ^
kh,s+1 -  (1 -  <5) kh,, ~  ih.s + f  (7 7  -  kh.
kKsR ks +  ((i +  n r *  W^j) 1 - 7  W]ls+ 
bh,s ( l  4“ ^ s )  C-h,sPs ih,sPs ^h,s+1
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Therefore:
W*h,t =
i
1 + 7 0
Et £  M ) '~ ‘ (l + n )“7(1+^ )(s‘ ‘) w;<1+«/]+*
7 s= t____________________________________________________
1 oo
7 - 1  Et £  M ) “- ‘ AhlSW ]ls (1 + n )<1- 7)<s- <)
S — t
When wages are fully flexible (i.e. u> =  0 and Wt = W ^t) this reduces to W£t 
. In other words, the wage is a mark up over the disutility of work.
The aggregate wage is given by:
} < ;wt dh
1 - 7
l
1 - 7
1 ~ 7
4.2.2. Firm Optimisation
There is a continuum of retail firms indexed by /  across the unit interval. Each 
firm hires bundles of labour at the aggregate wage rate, Wt. They hire capital 
from the households in a perfectly competitive factor market at the rental rate of
149
capital, R$. The firms make the decision of how much labour, and how much 
capital, kfjt, to employ; and thus how much output to produce, yfit. They sell 
their output in a monopolistically competitive market at the price, and are 
constrained by production technology.
Each firm chooses an input mix to maximise profits:
yf ,tPf ,t — k fjR t ~~ h jW t
subject to its production function:
VU =  z t k j / / - a)
Note that the technology, zt, is common across all firms.
The optimal inputs are therefore:
( 1  -  a)yu Pf ,t 
1 =  Wt
When firms charge different prices, the optimal level of inputs varies across firms. 
However, the optimal capital to labour ratio is constant across firms:
kf,t _  a  Wt 
l u  (1 -  a )  R f
Because of this symmetry, marginal cost is also constant across firms. It can be 
derived as:
W l~aR fMCf t = -----^ztoa{ 1 — q:)^ 1
I assume Calvo-type nominal rigidities in the goods market, similar to those in 
the labour market. In each period a randomly chosen fraction, (1 — 77), of the firms 
are free to reset their prices. These firms set new prices taking their respective 
demand curves as given. The remainder of the retail firms cannot reoptimise, but 
adjust their price by the steady state inflation, (1 +  II).
If a firm has the opportunity to reset its price then it chooses the new price, 
Pj t. The general price level is:
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I assume the artifice of a perfectly competitive goods bundler employing Dixit- 
Stiglitz technology. Each individual firm, therefore, faces the demand curve:
In periods when the firm gets the opportunity to choose a new price, it chooses 
the price which maximises its expected discounted future stream of profits across 
the states of nature for which that price will hold. In other words, it maximises:
oo .
Et E w r'-f  [v,p! {(i+nr' p'uY~e - TCr]
s = t  1
This yields the optimal price:
°o
.  Et 'El(r)P{l + n )- ,,)’- ih.P.y.MCu
D *  ___ S — tl f t  — a i 00 1 /
9 1 £,£(*>/» U + n j ' - V A . j ? # .
S = t
In other words, the firm sets the price so that its expected value is equal to a mark 
up, over expected marginal cost. In the case of no price stickiness (i.e. 77 =  0), 
Pf t = j z jM C f]t. This is the standard result that under monopolistic competition 
firms set price as a mark up over marginal cost.
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4.2.3. Aggregation
For tractability, I assume that there are full contingent claims markets. Given 
the ex-ante homogeneity of the households, this ensures that consumption and 
wealth are constant across all households. Effectively, risk averse households will 
insure against not being able to adjust their wage rate. Hence, Ch,t = Q V/i and
It also entails that all households which are free to optimally set their wage in 
a given period are in exactly the same position and will choose the same wage,
Firms which are free to set their optimal price axe also all in identical positions, 
and so PJt = Pf \/h. Furthermore, I have already shown that marginal cost and 
the capital to labour ratio are the same across all firms.
In order to aggregate output, I begin by noting that an individual firm’s demand 
and supply must be equal, and then integrating across all firms:
Am  =  At V/i.
w i t  = w ;  VA
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 o
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i i
( I )  I lf-tdf = VtpSt I p' ”dfo o
yt =
„ L.OC/(!-“)ZtKt tt
pdt
l
where pdt =  P? j  P fJ  df
0
In other words, aggregate output is a decreasing function of price dispersion, pdt.
4.2.4. A sset P rices
The model so far expounded is a relatively standard New-Keynesian model. In 
this section I depart from that standard and introduce heterogeneous forecasting 
of asset prices. The behavioural finance literature suggests that the assumption of 
rational expectations in asset markets is difficult to support. The suggestion is that 
asset markets are prone to uncertainty and speculation in a way in which goods 
markets and labour markets are not. For this reason a more complex specification 
of the forecasting rules employed in asset markets is needed, rather than a simple 
appeal to rationality.
I will, however, begin with an account of asset prices under rational expec­
tations. This will provide a benchmark against which to assess the behavioural
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model which I consider thereafter. It also provides us with a measure of the fun­
damental value of the asset, and this will form the basis for one of the behavioural 
forecasting rules.
4.2.4.1. A sset P rices U n d e r R a tio n a l E xpectations. If I were to model an 
equity market in a rational expectations framework, I could simply introduce equity 
trading into the households’ optimisation problem. This would entail an equity 
price which is the discounted sum of all future rental payments to capital:
S = l ~ f-1
Alternatively, I can express this as the discounted value of the sum of the next 
period rental payment and price:
I define Q l , the price of equity in the rational model, as the fundamental value of 
equity.
Equivalently, in real terms, I have:
In this way, I can see that in a rational expectations model the present equity 
price is a function of future expectations of the equity price, or equivalently of the
Q l =  E t0^ - i  [Rk+l + Q,*+1]
(4.1) ql =  Et0 ^ I  [rf+1 + %*+1]
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infinite series of returns. It is the ability of agents to form such expectations in 
highly volatile equity markets tha t behavioural finance questions.
Behavioural finance suggests that, because of the limited rationality of indi­
vidual agents and effective limits on arbitrage, the actual asset price at any time 
can deviate from the fundamental level that ql represents. This is equivalent in 
a macroeconomic context to arguing that there is a bias to the expected future 
return on capital. In the next section, we derive that bias.
4.2.4.2. A sset P rices  U n d er B ehav ioura l A ssum ptions. I follow in the tra­
dition of Frankel and Froot (1986 [42]) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006 [31]) 
in specifying an alternative determinant of asset prices. They highlight the impor­
tance of the frictions between chartist and fundamental forecasts in the determi­
nation of asset prices.
I assume that agents operating in the capital markets choose between two 
simple heuristical rules when forecasting future asset prices. At the beginning of 
each period chartist and fundamentalist forecasts of the asset price this period 
and next are formed. The forecasts of this period’s asset price then determine the 
actual asset price via a bargaining process. The forecasts of next period’s asset 
price imply a particular expected return on capital.
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The chartist forecasts of the present and next period asset price are a simple 
extrapolation of the historical price series:
(4-2) E Cyt (qt) =  qt- i  +  Xc(Qt-1 — q t - 2 ) +  x l ( Q t - 2  — q t - 3 ) +  •••
(4.3) E Cjt (qt+1 ) =  E Cft (qt) +  x c ( E c,t ( q t )  — q t - 1 ) +  x l ( Q t - 1 — q t - 2 ) +  •••
It is arguable as to whether such heuristical rules should be specified in real or 
nominal terms. I choose real terms on the basis that, in this paper, I am attempting 
to address the issue of asset market bubbles, and hence I want to avoid the issue 
of money illusion.
The fundamentalist forecast is that the asset price will move back towards its
fundamental value, q%, during the next period, unless it is already close to the
fundamental, defined by the bounds EC:
(4.4) Eu  (qt) =  qt- i  -  X ffa t- 1 -  Q t )  where \qt_i -  q*t \ > C
=  Qt- 1 where \qt- i  -  q*t \ ^  C
(4.5) E u  (qt+1 ) =  E u  (qt) -  X f ( E f , t  ( q t )  ~  Qt)  where \qt_i -  q*| > C 
=  Ef,t (qt )  where \qt-!  -  q*t \ < C
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The actual asset price is determined via a bargaining process between those 
who favour the chartist rule and those who favour the fundamentalist forecast:
(4.6) qt = wCjtECjt (qt) +  Wf,tEu  (qt)
where the weights depend on the past performance of the two forecasts. I use 
the functional form:
(A ^  exp(i;ftc>t)(4.7) wct -
(4.8) w ft =
exp (vQfj)  +  exp(r;0C;t)
______ expj vQf j )______
exp (vSlft) + exp (i>ftCjt)
The parameter v represents the propensity with which agents switch between fore­
casting rules. and Qfjt axe the excess returns over holding bonds associated 
with following the chartist forecast and the fundamentalist forecast respectively. 
They are calculated as follows:
(4.9) n Cft = [qt - i  — q t - 2  (l +  r t-i)] s ign  [Ecj - 2  ( q t - 2 )  ~ q t - 2 ]
(4.10) = [qt_ 1 -  qt_2 ( l +  rJ_j)] .sign [EU - 2 (qt-2 ) -  qt-2 ]
where qt - 2  (l +  f't-i) represents the return to investing funds in bonds and qt- \  is 
the return to investing the same funds in equities, sign [ECj t - 2  ( q t - 2 )  — q t - 2 ] takes 
the value -1 when Ecj_2 ( q t - 2 )  < q t - 2 , in which circumstances an agent following 
the chartist rule would choose to invest in bonds rather than equities, and takes
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the value +1 when chartists choose equities over bonds, sign [-Ey,f- 2  (Qt-2 ) — Qt-2 ] 
is analogous.
The average expected return on capital that is implied by these behavioural 
forecasting rules can be solved for by substituting the actual asset price and the 
weighted average forecast of next period’s asset price for the respective fundamental 
values in equation 4.1. Therefore:
(4.11) Ebftr +^1 =  %-^rr [wc,tEc,t (qt+1 ) +  wf,tEf,t (<7t+i)]
P £jtM+ 1
In this way, we can think of behavioural rules as driving an asset mis-pricing 
by inducing a bias in the expected future return on capital.
4.2.5. The Government
The government’s only role in this model is as a bond issuer. I assume that the 
government sets the nominal interest rate, R b+i, according to a Taylor rule which 
includes a response to the most recent asset mis-pricing:
(4.12) iJ?+1 = r 6’ + n# +  Cn (n« -  II*) +  Cy In +  CQ In ( | ^ )
where rb* and y* are the steady state real interest rate and output respectively; II* 
is the target inflation rate; and ql_x is the fundamental asset price. The government 
supplies as many bonds as are demanded at this interest rate.
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The response is to the asset mis-pricing in period t — 1 because we are in a world 
in which asset prices cannot easily be predicted. In rational models, policy can 
react to current variables, which in turn depend upon policy, because all variables 
are determined simultaneously. There is an implicit assumption that agents cost­
lessly form entire response functions and costlessly and instantaneously adjust their 
trading volumes in response to price signals. This is inconsistent with the essence 
of behavioural economics. In the behavioural world, the government cannot per­
fectly anticipate how private agents will respond to its policy prescriptions. Hence, 
the simultaneous realisation of monetary policy and asset prices is not within the 
spirit of a behavioural model. Equivalently, a solution method for such a system 
of equations would require the imposition of some concept of rational consistency. 
The Taylor rule that is most compatible with the spirit of behavioural modelling, 
therefore, is one in which the monetary authorities react to the mis-pricing from 
the previous period.
The aim in this paper is to assess whether the central bank should take account 
of asset prices in setting monetary policy. I will do this by comparing the welfare 
effects of various parameterisations of the weight on the asset price, ( q .
4.2.6. Welfare
I use a strictly utilitarian notion of welfare, defining it as aggregate utility:
Given our assumption of complete contingent claims markets, consumption is con­
stant across all households. Therefore, the aggregate (or average) utility derived 
from consumption is just the same as the utility of consumption for any individ­
ual household. However, given price stickiness, firms employ different amounts of 
labour from different households, and so the aggregate disutility of labour is not 
straightforwardly related to the disutility of an individual household. I calculate 
it as follows:
We can clearly see that nominal rigidities have an adverse effect on welfare. Wage 
dispersion directly increases the aggregate disutility of work. Price dispersion, on
/ o C  dh _  fJW w ji,)1** dh
1 + 0  1 + 0
where wdt = W ^ 1+® f* Wh dh is a measure of wage dispersion.
Therefore, welfare is given by:
l l^w ds
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the other hand, indirectly reduces welfare by reducing aggregate output, and hence 
consumption.
4.2.7. P aram eterisin g  th e  M odel
My intention in this chapter is to pose questions about the effectiveness of monetary 
policy as a tool for alleviating the damaging effects of asset price bubbles. It is 
not to produce a model for calibrating the optimal policy. I, therefore, make no 
attempt to estimate the model. Instead, I borrow my parameterisation of the 
model from previous work. The parameters for the New Keynesian aspects of the 
model are taken from Canzoneri et al (2007 [26]), whilst those for the behavioural 
aspects are taken from the estimation of the model in the previous chapter. The 
baseline parameterisation that I use is given in appendix B.l.
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4.3. Solving th e  M odel
Solving this model presents very significant challenges. I am assuming rational­
ity in the goods and labour markets, which means that agents are forward looking 
and understand the model, so that all of the equations that describe these markets 
must hold in both the present period and in their expected terms for all future 
periods. On the other hand, I am assuming that rationality breaks down in the as­
set market. In keeping with the spirit of the behavioural finance literature, agents 
make use of simple heuristical rules to determine what they consider to be a fair 
price for the asset and also in determining how the asset price will behave in the 
future. However, due to the complexity of the asset market, agents do not under­
stand the behaviour of others in the market, and so the market clearing condition 
only holds in the present period. It does not hold in its expected future forms.
I can always impose some kind of asset mis-pricing. However, as long as agents 
understand the mechanism which causes that mis-pricing, and they rationally ex­
pect it to persist, then all that happens is that there is a persistent dislocation 
between the fundamental value of the asset and its price. If future dislocations are 
fully anticipated then the net effect is that the expected return to asset-holding 
is unchanged. If this is the case, then there will be no distortions in the wider 
economy. The key here is that it is biases to the expected return on asset holding, 
and not the mis-pricing of the asset in and of itself, which drives distortions in the 
allocation of resources.
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My approach to solving the model is to take advantage of well established 
techniques for solving rational expectations models, and then introduce the non- 
rational aspects of the model via ‘shock’ processes. Shocks to the current and 
future expected asset price drive these variables away from their fundamental val­
ues. Of course, these are not shocks in the conventional sense. The behavioural 
model describes exactly how these deviations from fundamental are determined. 
As already stated, if the agents in the model understood this behavioural process 
then they could form a rational expectation of future deviations, and the asset 
mis-pricing would not effect the wider economy. By introducing these biases to 
the current and future asset price as unanticipated shocks, they cause a bias to 
the expected return on capital, and thereby alter the allocations throughout the 
economy.
Figure 4.2 summarises the solution method. I solve the majority of the model as 
if it were a rational expectations model. I do this using the Dynare pre-processor 
and the MATLAB programming environment. Dynare uses perturbation tech­
niques to solve a system of non-linear equations with forward looking variables. 
The solution consists of a set of policy and transition functions which describe how 
each variable is determined by pre-determined variables (initial conditions) and a 
set of ‘shocks’. There are four ‘shocks’ to the ‘rational’ model. The first is a con­
ventional productivity shock. There are a pair of asset price ‘shocks’. One affects 
the present asset price, driving a wedge between the actual asset price and its fun­
damental value. The other asset price ‘shock’ drives a wedge between the expected
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Figure 4.2. Solving the model 
Productivity sh ock s
M onetary policy
With asse t prices
"shocks"
A sse t price history
F undam ental a s se t  price
future asset price and its fundamental value. Combined, these two shocks have the 
effect of biasing the expected return on capital, which in turn drives distortions in 
the rest of the model. The fourth ‘shock’ is the monetary policy response to the 
asset mis-pricing.
The productivity shock is treated as a random variable. The other three shocks, 
however, are endogenously determined. The asset price ‘shocks’ are determined by 
the behavioural asset pricing rules explained above (equations 4.2 to 4.10). The 
monetary policy response is determined by the Taylor rule in equation 4.12.
The various constituent parts of the model are described in greater detail below.
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4.3.1. The Dynare Sub-M odel
Appendix B.2 lists the equations of the dynare sub-model. All variables have been 
transformed into their real equivalent (p£ =  Xt =  AtPt etc) or, in the case 
of the optimum wage, are given as a ratio to the average wage (u£ =  All
equations have also been transformed into first order difference equations in order 
to avoid infinite sums.
The dynare sub-model consists of:
(1) A set of ‘rational’ equations which is made up of the household and firm 
optimisations, production constraint, market clearing conditions, mone­
tary policy rule, welfare definition and the rational asset pricing equation
4.1. The variables in this part of the model are denoted with an R  super­
script in the appendix.
(2) A set of ‘behavioural’ equations that is made up of exactly the same 
features except:
• the asset price, qR, is set equal to its fundamental value (the asset 
price from the ‘rational’ equations, q^R) plus an ‘asset price shock’ 
term,
•  the expected future asset price, q fF, is set equal to its fundamental 
value (the expected future asset price from the ‘rational’ equations, 
Etqt+i) plus an ‘expected asset price shock’ term, ejF.
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• the return on capital is derived from the asset price and expected 
future asset price via equation 4.13.
The variables in this part of the model are denoted with a B  superscript 
in the appendix. Note that the expected future asset price, is not a 
rational expectation of the value that the asset price, q f , will take in the 
next period. This is where the lack of rationality enters the model, and it 
permeates the ‘behavioural’ equations by biasing the expected return on 
capital:
nB \ RfA i o \  c  „ kB  y t  ' ' t  „BF
(4-13) E trt+1 =  -a „ . B ~ h
P  B t At+1
(3) A standard productivity process.
In this way, I have two, almost distinct, sets of equations. The ‘rational’ set, 
along with the productivity process, constitute an independent model in which 
all expectations are formed rationally. These equations do not depend upon the 
‘behavioural’ equations in any way, and can be solved separately. The ‘behavioural’ 
equations, on the other hand require the fundamental asset price and rationally 
expected future asset price as pre-determined inputs if they are to be solved.
In fact, I need to include the ‘rational’ equations in the dynare model for two 
reasons. Firstly, the behavioural biases that come from the behavioural sub-model 
are calculated as deviations from the fundamental, and so I need to know what 
the fundamental is when I import the deviations as shocks into the dynare model.
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Secondly, the fundamental value of the asset is the basis of the fundamentalist 
forecast in the behavioural sub-model, so I need to be able to calculate this and 
export it to the behavioural model.
The dynare sub-model can be solved to provide a set of functions which deter­
mine how that model’s variables depend on predetermined variables and the four 
dynare ‘shocks’: the asset price ‘shock’, ej; the expected asset price ‘shock’, efF; 
the policy response, and the productivity shock, et. In this way we have
functions which we can iterate to find the time paths of variables in our model, 
once we have determined the size of the ‘shocks’. These are determined by the 
behavioural sub-model, the Taylor rule and the productivity process.
The dynare code is shown in appendix B.3.
4.3.2. The Behavioural Sub-M odel
The behavioural sub-model is a set of equations which, given the relevant initial 
conditions, solves to give the size of both the current and future expected asset 
mis-pricings. It consists of equations 4.2 to 4.10, transformed where appropriate 
into first order difference equations in order to avoid infinite sums. The behavioural 
sub-model also includes an equation which describes the monetary policy response 
to an asset mis-pricing.
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The full listing of the equations is given in appendix B.4.
4.3.3. The Com plete M odel
In the next section, I will analyse some of the characteristics of the model. My 
ambition in this section is limited to describing the mechanics of the model and, 
in particular, how the dynare and behavioural sub-models mesh together. A sim­
ple way of illustrating this is to consider how a productivity shock is propagated 
through the model.
Solving for the steady state is straightforward. In the steady state, the asset 
price is equal to its fundamental value and is constant over time, so that both 
the fundamentalist and chartist forecasts are fulfilled. Hence, there is no effective 
behavioural bias. The steady state of the dynare sub-model can be solved in the 
usual way, by dropping time subscripts and solving the resulting set of simultaneous 
equations.
Beginning from steady state, a productivity shock impacts on the ‘rational’ 
variables in the dynare sub-model in the same way as we would expect in a stan­
dard New Keynesian model. In a fully rational model, one of the variables that 
would be affected is the asset price. A positive productivity shock increases the 
productivity of capital, and thereby also increases the returns to capital and the 
asset price. In this model, the fundamental price of the asset is impacted directly
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by the productivity shock. The increase in the fundamental value drives up the 
fundamentalist forecast, and therefore the actual asset price as well.
In terms of the mechanics of the model, I first solve the dynare sub-model. 
This leaves me with a set of policy and transition functions which describe how 
each variable is determined by pre-determined variables (initial conditions) and the 
‘shocks’. To simulate the model for a given realisation of the productivity shock, 
I proceed through the following routine:
(1) For t = 0, set all variables equal to their steady state value.
(2) Use the steady state values, and the realisation of the productivity shock 
in t =  1 to derive the fundamental value of the asset in the dynare sub­
model. At this stage, assume the other three ‘shocks’ axe equal to zero.
(3) Use the behavioural sub-model to determine the size of the current and 
future expected asset mis-pricings, sq and eqF.
(4) Re-solve the dynare sub-model for period 1, with the original productivity 
shock and the two asset mis-pricing ‘shocks’.
(5) Solve the dynare sub-model for period 2 with the realisation of the pro­
ductivity shock in that period; using the realisations of all the variables 
from period 1 as initial conditions, and setting eq = eqF =  0. Hence, 
derive the fundamental value of the asset in period 2.
(6) Use this fundamental value, and the past realisations of the asset price 
to solve the behavioural sub-model. This time the behavioural sub-model
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determines the policy response to the previous period’s mis-pricing, as
well as the two asset mis-pricing ‘shocks’.
(7) Re-solve the dynare sub-model for period 2, with the original productivity 
shock, the asset mis-pricing ‘shocks’, and the policy response.
(8) Iterate steps 5 to 7 for each subsequent time period.
In this way, I can solve the full time-series of each variable. The assumption of 
rational expectations in the goods and labour markets is preserved, but decisions 
in the asset market are governed by behavioural rules. Similarly, the monetary 
policy response to inflation and the output gap are fully anticipated, but any 
response to an asset mis-pricing is unanticipated. Hence, the model is consistent 
with the general theme of the behavioural finance literature, that it is the particular 
complexity of financial markets that drives agents to use heuristical rules.
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4.4. Preliminary Analysis of the Dynare sub-model
If I simply treat the asset price shocks and the policy response as random 
shocks, with mean zero, then the dynare sub-model collapses to the rational ex­
pectations paradigm. Furthermore, if I restrict them to always equal zero, then 
I have a rational model with a single technology shock. This provides a relevant 
benchmark against which to compare the results of our full model.
Here, I present and briefly analyse the impulse responses to all four ‘shocks’ in 
the dynare sub-model.
Figure 4.3 shows the responses of some key variables to a 1% productivity shock, 
with an auto-regressive component, g, of 0.95. Given that there are no asset price 
‘shocks’, the behavioural variables in dynare follow exactly the same path as their 
‘rational’ counterparts. The direct effect of the increase in productivity increases 
output, y, by 1% in period 1. Output actually rises by more than this because the 
productivity shock also affects the employment of capital and labour. It increases 
the productivity of both capital, k , and labour, /, which in turn lead to increases in 
investment and the demand for labour. The increase in permanent income drives 
up consumption, c, and reduces the supply of labour. In the periods immediately 
following the shock, the expansion in demand for labour outweighs the contraction 
in supply, but this is eventually reversed with the quantity of labour falling below 
its steady state value from around period 5. Discreet period utility, v, is driven
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Figure 4.3. Impulse responses to a 1% productivity shock (i.e. £i  =  0.01)
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mainly by changes in consumption, which are of an order of magnitude greater 
than the changes in labour. Initially, the return on capital and expected future 
return on capital are driven up by the productivity shock as the employment of 
labour increases rapidly, and the accumulation of capital lags behind. By period 
9, however, sufficient capital has been accumulated so that the returns to capital 
have fallen back below their steady state level, as productivity falls back towards
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Figure 4.4. Impulse responses to a 1% shock to the current asset
price (i.e. ef  =  0.01)
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its steady state level. The asset price, q, shoots up in response to the productivity 
shock and gradually falls back to its steady state level. This is perfectly anticipated 
(see Etqt+i) since there are no other shocks after period 1.
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Figure 4.4 shows the response to a transitory 1% shock to the current asset 
price, whilst figure 4.5 shows the response to a transitory 1% shock to the future 
expected asset price. These represent the biases to the asset price that are deter­
mined within the behavioural model. In the dynare model, they have no direct 
effect on the ‘rational’ variables3. These two shocks do not occur in isolation in the 
full dynamic simulations of the model that we will discuss later, but for now we will 
consider the impulse responses separately. A positive shock to the current asset 
price discourages investment, boosting consumption and reducing labour supply 
in period 1. The under-accumulation of capital reduces output and consumption 
in subsequent periods.
A positive shock to the future expected asset price has the effect of increasing 
labour supply and reducing consumption in order to fund investment in capital, 
which is brought forward in anticipation of an over-pricing of capital in the next 
period. This drives down present period utility. Intertemporal utility increases, 
though it is important to note that this is ex-ante intertemporal utility. In effect, 
we have a shock to expectations which is a wedge between ex-ante and ex-post 
returns to capital and which also drives a wedge between ex-ante and ex-post 
intertemporal utility. In fact, by the time agents reach period 2 and recognise 
their mistaken beliefs in period 1, they have already accumulated extra capital
3However, it is worth noting that they do affect the accumulation of capital in the full model, 
and hence affect the initial conditions for subsequent time periods. In this way, these shocks do 
have an effect on future fundamentals.
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Figure 4.5. Impulse responses to a 1% shock to the expected future
asset price (i.e. =  0.01)
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which advantages them in period 2 and henceforth, though not to the extent that 
they had anticipated in period 1.
Figure 4.6 shows the response to a 1% transitory shock to the Taylor rule. 
As with the productivity shock, the monetary policy ‘shock’ in isolation does not
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Figure 4.6. Impulse responses to a 1%  shock to the Taylor rule (i.e.
e f p =  0.01)
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cause the rational and behavioural variables in the dynare model to diverge - it 
affects the equivalent variables in exactly the same way. If the nominal interest 
rate is set above its steady state value then, in the presence of price rigidities, the 
real return to bond-holding increases and agents substitute out of capital and into
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bonds. The decrease in capital reduces the marginal productivity of labour, and 
hence labour falls. A fall in output, consumption and utility ensues.
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4.5. R esu lts
In order to assess the effect of including an asset price target in the monetary 
policy rules, I simulate the entire model under different parameterisations of the 
Taylor rule. The parameterisation that I use in the benchmark model is as follows:
R\+l =  0.01 + n , +  2.02 (n , -  IT) +  0.184 In +  CQ In
This is based on Canzoneri et al’s (2007 [26]) estimation of a Taylor rule over 
the Volcker and Greenspan years as Federal Reserve chairmen (1979 - 2003). Of 
course, the estimated Taylor rule does not include a response to asset mis-pricing, 
so £Q = 0.
I run 1,000 stochastic simulations of the model under each of several different 
values of Cq- I consider:
(1) a ‘passive’ monetary regime, where there is no response to asset mis­
pricings. In other words, ( q =  0.
(2) a variety of ‘activist’ regimes with different weights, both positive and 
negative, on the asset mis-pricing. The weights I consider are £q = 
0.05, -0.05,0.1, -0.1,0.5, -0 .5 ,1  and -1 .
For each individual simulation, I run the model for forty periods. The only 
exogenous shock is the productivity shock, and this is drawn at random from a
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normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.00864 for each of 
the forty periods. I calculate the actual welfare each period and, for the final 
period, I also calculate the expected future welfare. I then discount these values to 
get a measure of inter-temporal welfare for each simulation. Averaging this welfare 
measure across the 1,000 simulations gives me a measure of expected welfare under 
each alternative monetary regime.
As is the case for any measure of welfare, the cardinal units are more or less 
meaningless. I follow the convention, initiated by Lucas (2003 [65]), of calculating 
and reporting consumption equivalents. The welfare measures for all of the results 
reported in this chapter refer to  the proportion of consumption that households 
would be prepared to give up permanently, holding work effort constant, in order to 
live in a rational world with no asset bubbles and no associated monetary response.
Table 4.1 presents the estimation of welfare in the benchmark behavioural 
model, under different specifications of the Taylor rule. The second column of the 
table states the loss in welfare relative to the rational model under each monetary 
regime.
The behavioural model with a passive monetary regime ((q =  0) leads to 
expected welfare which is equivalent to a loss of 0.177 of one percent of permanent 
consumption relative to the rational model. We can think of this as the cost of
4This parameter comes from an estimate of the 1960 - 2002 US data (with a log linear trend) by 
Canzoneri et al (2007 [26])
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Table 4.1. Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the benchmark model
M onetary
regim e
=
U tility  cost versus 
ra tio n a l m odel
(%age permanent consumption)
Perform ance 
re la tive  to  ( q =  0
(%age bias corrected)
0.00 -0.177 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.187 % -6.1 %
-0.05 -0.167 % 5.5 %
0.10 -0.199 % -12.8 %
-0.10 -0.158 % 10.5 %
0.50 -0.357 % -101.9 %
-0.50 -0.113 % 35.9 %
1.00 -1.083 % -512.8 %
-1.00 -0.113 % 36.3 %
irrationality in the asset markets. I use this value as a basis against which to 
compare the performance of the alternative monetary policy options.
For example, the behavioural model with a modest ‘leaning against the wind’ 
monetary regime of ( q =  0.055 experiences a loss in welfare relative to the rational 
world which is equivalent to 0.187 of one percent of permanent consumption. Com­
pared to the passive regime, this represents an exacerbation of the misallocation 
of resources which irrationality has caused. The welfare loss is 6.1% higher than 
under the passive monetary regime. This measure of the performance of activist 
monetary policy rules relative to the passive regime is reported in the third column 
of table 4.1.
5This is the monetary policy response recommended by Cecchetti et al (2000 [27])
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In other words, a negative number in column 3 signals a monetary policy rule 
that increases the cost of behavioural biases - we can think of this as a monetary 
policy rule that exacerbates those biases. On the other hand, a positive number in 
column 3 signals a monetary policy rule that reduces the cost of behavioural biases 
- we can think of this as a monetary policy rule that corrects for those biases.
The surprising result is that ‘leaning against the wind’ policies (policies which 
lead to a monetary tightening when asset prices are above fundamental, and a 
loosening when they are below fundamental, i.e. ( q > 0) exacerbate the cost 
of behavioural biases. Even more surprisingly, the contrary ‘running with the 
wind’ policy, where an asset bubble is met with a monetary loosening, actually 
ameliorates the effects of the bubble. An explanation of these counter-intuitive 
results is required, and I will provide this in the next section.
Before providing that explanation, I shall briefly consider the significance of the 
welfare losses reported. The figures presented in table 4.1 seem relatively small, but 
if we compare them to Lucas (2003 [65]) they are certainly not trivial. Using US 
data, Lucas calculates that the welfare cost of fluctuations in consumption around 
its trend is only about 0.05 of one percent of consumption. Although this model, 
and the utility function I use, differs from Lucas’, this does give us some idea of
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the significance of the effect of the behavioural biases in the model. Furthermore, 
there are two reasons to believe that this cost is understated.
(1) Firstly, the idea of using future expectations from this model as the ba­
sis for welfare comparisons is clearly problematical. The fact that the 
model is not based on fully rational expectations means that ex-ante (or 
anticipated) welfare can be inconsistent with ex-post (or realised) welfare. 
Given that I use expectations to estimate the effect on welfare from pe­
riod 41 onwards, there are grounds to believe that this measure of welfare 
underestimates the effect of the behavioural biases on actual welfare. De­
spite the fact that later periods are more heavily discounted, periods 41 
to oo still account for around two thirds of inter-temporal welfare.
(2) Secondly, as noted earlier, the main costs associated with asset price bub­
bles in the real world are as the result of credit rationing which often 
accompanies the bursting of a bubble. In this model, I have no financial 
market frictions which could cause such a credit crunch. The only way 
in which asset mis-pricings effect allocations in the real economy is via 
wealth effects. As Bean (2004 [15]) notes, "if the only macroeconomic 
consequences of booms and asset prices were via conventional wealth ef­
fects on aggregate demand, then they would constitute little more than 
a nuisance to monetary policy makers". Hence, the fact that I derive 
a significant cost to behavioural biases even in the absence of financial 
accelerator effects is noteworthy.
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If my intention in this chapter were to try and provide a meaningful estimate of 
the cost of behavioural biases, then I would clearly need to address both of these 
issues. In fact, my intention is not to do that, but rather to assess the effectiveness 
of monetary policy in correcting for behavioural biases. In order to do this, I do 
not need an accurate estimate of the cost of behavioural biases, I only need for my 
estimate of that cost to be consistent across monetary policy regimes. For that 
reason, and given the computing power necessary to accurately measure ex-post 
welfare, and given the difficulty of introducing financial accelerator effects into 
a DSGE model, I will postpone the attempt to accurately estimate the costs of 
behavioural biases until further work.
4.5.1. In tu itio n  for th e  R esult
In order to provide intuition for these results, I consider here a single simulation 
of the model.
Figure 4.7 shows the productivity process in this particular simulation. It 
also shows that the rational asset price mimics, almost exactly, the productivity 
process6. Figure 4.8 contrasts the asset price in the rational model with that in the 
behavioural model under a passive monetary regime, based on the same underlying
6The rational asset price illustrated in figure 4.7 is the asset price that I get when I simulate the 
model without any behavioural biases. This differs from the fundamental asset price under any 
simulation of the full model because the behavioural rules affect capital accumulation, and this 
in turn drives changes in what would then be a rational asset price.
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Figure 4.7. The productivity process and rational asset price in a 
simulation of the model
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productivity process. We can see that the effect of the behavioural rules is that 
the asset price becomes slow to react to changes in productivity. This is because 
initially only fundamentalists react to the change in productivity. Chartists grad­
ually jump on the bandwagon, but are slow to react when there is a turning point 
in productivity. This type of dynamics coincides with the type of story that is 
often told to explain asset price bubbles. For example, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s there was a revolution in information technology, largely based on the 
growth of the internet, which did actually drive improvements in productivity. A
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Figure 4.8. The asset price in the rational model and in the behav­
ioural model with a passive monetary policy
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plausible explanation of equity prices through the 1990s might argue that at first 
there was a slow response to the fundamental changes in productivity that were 
being driven by technological progress. However, once the response started to take 
place it accelerated at exactly the same time as the growth rate of productivity 
began to return to more normal levels. Hence, asset prices began to outstrip their 
fundamental value in what came to be known as the dot-com bubble. Similar sto­
ries have been told about the recent boom in house prices, but this time based on 
financial rather than informational innovations.
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Figure 4.9. The asset price in the behavioural model with a ‘leaning
against the wind’ monetary policy
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The question now is what effect monetary policy has in the model. Figure 4.9 
illustrates the effect of a ‘leaning against the wind’ monetary policy, with ( q = 0.5. 
The dashed blue line is the monetary policy (interest rate) response to the asset 
mis-pricing. Monetary policy is expansionary (low interest rate) when the asset 
price was below fundamental in the previous period and it is contractionary (high 
interest rate) when the asset price was above fundamental in the previous period. 
With this monetary policy response, the asset price is described by the solid blue 
line. As we can see, in periods 1 to 7 of this simulation the monetary policy
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response has the effect of driving the asset price closer to its fundamental value 
(approximated by the black line of the rational model). However, this means that 
when productivity growth falls off, in period 8, the chartist rule imparts greater 
momentum onto the asset price than it did under the passive monetary regime. 
Therefore, when the productivity process reaches a turning point, the bubble that 
develops is more pronounced. To return to my previous analogy, if the monetary 
authorities had recognised the under-pricing of equities during the technological 
boom of the early 1990s, and had relaxed monetary policy in response to the 
mis-pricing there would have been two consequences. In the short-run the under- 
pricing would have been reduced. However, the faster growth in equity prices 
that that would entail would have resulted in a greater momentum in asset prices 
when technological progress diminished in the latter half of the decade. Hence, the 
dot-com bubble would have been more pronounced than what actually occurred.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the effect of a ‘running with the wind’ monetary policy, 
with ( q = —0.5. The dashed green line is the interest rate response to the asset 
mis-pricing. Monetary policy is contractionary when the asset price was below 
fundamental in the previous period and it is expansionary when the asset price was 
above fundamental in the previous period. With this monetary policy response, 
the asset price is described by the solid green line. The effect here is the reverse of 
the ‘leaning against the wind’ policy. During periods 1 to 7 the asset price drifts 
further away from its fundamental value. However, when productivity growth
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Figure 4.10. The asset price in the behavioural model with a ‘run­
ning with the wind’ monetary policy
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begins to fall the momentum in the chartist forecast is less than under other policy 
specifications, and so the resulting bubble is less pronounced.
In this model bubbles appear when turning points in the productivity process 
occur. The crucial factor in how large those bubbles turn out to be is the rate 
of change of the asset price in the periods prior to any turning point. There is a 
momentum inherent in the chartist forecasting rule, and this momentum is greater 
when the rate of change in the asset price is higher. Since a ‘leaning against
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the wind’ policy tends to promote rapid changes in asset prices, it also promotes 
greater momentum in the chartist rule, and more pronounced bubbles.
4.5.2. R obustness Testing
In appendix B.6, I report the results of some robustness testing exercises. Each 
table in the appendix is equivalent to table 4.1, but I have altered one of the 
parameters in the behavioural rules. I consider different values for the propensity 
to switch between the forecasting rules. I also consider different values for the 
uncertainty band in the fundamentalist rule, C.
The only case in which a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy increases welfare 
is when the switching parameter, v , is very large. Even in this case only a small 
response is beneficial, whilst an aggressive policy is extremely harmful.
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4.6. Conclusions
The main result of the model that I have developed in this chapter is that 
‘leaning against the wind’ monetary policies are counter-productive whilst ‘running 
with the wind’ policies can ameliorate the effects of behavioural biases. This result 
is clearly model specific. It relies on the particular characteristics of the behavioural 
forecasting rules on which the model is based. Although I have shown, in the 
previous chapter, that these simple heuristical rules can account for historical 
asset price dynamics, I do not want to claim that they are a realistic description 
of real world financial markets. I, therefore, need to be cautious in drawing policy 
conclusions from this model.
What is clear is that ‘leaning against the wind’ monetary policies cannot be 
relied upon to correct for behavioural biases, and in some cases will cause serious 
harm. It is not so clear that we should be supporting systematic use of ‘running 
with the wind’ policies. It is likely that this result is very model specific. The issue 
here is that the dynamics of the bubble, and the behavioural underpinnings of 
those dynamics, are extremely important in determining the most relevant policy 
response. The big problem, of course, is that the monetary authorities do not have 
much understanding of that behaviour.
It is important to note some caveats to what I have said so far. Firstly, my 
model ignores any financial accelerator effects that may exist. These would likely
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exacerbate the costs of sub-rational behaviour. However, they will also serve to 
add further complexity to the picture.
Secondly, my model does not allow for any effect caused by expectations of fu­
ture monetary policy. The model does not allow for the fact that a pre-commitment 
to a ‘leaning against the wind’ might cause private agents to hedge against mis­
pricings by shunning chartist rules. However, we know that if there is an asset 
mis-pricing, it must be as the result of some irrationality in the market. If such 
irrationality exists then it is unclear as to why it would not prevent agents from 
responding optimally to policy pre-commitments. In Calvo-type models, monetary 
policy can correct for nominal rigidities by keeping inflation and expectations of 
inflation equal, through a commitment to an inflation target. In such models, ra­
tionality reigns and the monetary authorities are able to take advantage of this in 
predicting how private expectations will react to future monetary policy. As soon 
as we loosen the requirement for rationality, it becomes difficult for the monetary 
authorities to predict how policy affects private sector expectations.
Thirdly, it is important to note that in my analysis, I have only considered 
systematic monetary policy rules. It may well be possible that a one off monetary 
tightening or loosening could be effective in increasing welfare if the monetary 
authorities are able to identify turning points in the productivity process.
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Bubbles can only exist in a world where agents are less than fully rational. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of bubbles are dependant upon the nature of that ir­
rationality. The relevant policy response to a bubble depends upon the particular 
nature of the behavioural reaction of the market. We have only a very rudimentary 
understanding of such behaviours. What we do know suggests that such behav­
iours are complex and cause discontinuities in the relationships between different 
variables. For all these reasons, it is likely that any attempt by central banks to 
try to influence market psychology is likely to have highly unpredictable outcomes.
In conclusion, I am arguing that a systematic monetary policy response to asset 
mis-pricings is unlikely to enhance welfare. The reason for this is that monetary 
authorities lack the full information necessary to implement an effective policy.
CHAPTER 5 
Overall Conclusions
Rationality can be viewed as a normative model of decision making. It defines 
the basis on which we should make decisions. Positive models of decision making, 
on the other hand, seek to describe how people actually make decisions in the 
real world. Behavioural theories belong to this class. What is clear is that the 
standard model of rationality, as expressed by subjective expected utility theory, 
fails to provide a complete explanation of how people in the real world make 
decisions. It is a moot point as to whether this is because there is some lacking 
in our axiomisation of rationality, or whether people simply fail to live up to the 
rational ideal.
A useful distinction to draw is between those models which are prefaced on a 
normative account of human decision making, and those that are based on a pos­
itive account. We are used, in some fields of economics, to distinguishing between 
models which have explanatory and conceptual powers, on the one hand, and those 
which have descriptive powers, on the other. For example, nobody believes that 
perfectly competitive markets actually exist in the real world. The model of perfect 
competition is based on many assumptions, including those of perfect information 
and homogenous goods, which simply are not observed in the real world. The
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model of perfect competition, however, provides us with useful concepts against 
which to compare the real world; an understanding of some of the relationships 
between different economic variables; and an ideal towards which economic policy 
might focus. The theory of perfect competition provides us with an account of how 
an ideal world might be, not how the real world actually is. This type of model 
can enhance our understanding of how the economy works just as much as more 
empirically accurate ones can.
A similar dichotomy can be observed in macroeconomics. Real business cy­
cle theory (and classical theories more generally) can be seen as a counterpart to 
perfect competition. It describes how an economy ‘should’ function, if only peo­
ple were rational, there were no informational constraints, and no-one could exert 
market power. Such theory tells us a lot about the relationships between different 
macroeconomic variables and, arguably, describes how an ideal economy might 
function. However, unsurprisingly, it does very poorly in describing real world 
economies. There is a well established consensus that, in order to build macro- 
economic models that can actually account for real world experiences, we must 
include some form of nominal rigidity. Clearly, nominal rigidities must arise out 
of some imperfection when compared to the real business cycle model. This might 
either be due to imperfect information (as is popular in neoclassical accounts), or 
due to some type of menu cost, or it may be due to some sub-optimal behaviour 
by agents. This final explanation is referred to as ‘money illusion’.
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Even though introducing nominal rigidities tends to improve the performance 
of macroeconomic models in replicating the real world, New Keynesian models are 
still poor at doing this in many respects. In particular, they struggle to recreate 
the volatility and kurtosis in equity returns.
In chapter 3, I established the fact that simple behavioural rules can help us 
to explain the dynamics of asset prices. There are, of course, other explanations 
of why asset prices behave in the way that they do, but a growing consensus is 
emerging that human behaviour is an essential ingredient in any comprehensive 
explanation. The significance of my results in chapter 3 is that I am able to explain 
all of the dynamics of the FTSE all-share index using a behavioural model. W hat’s 
more, I am able to do so with a relatively simple set of heuristical rules.
I do not want to claim that the heuristical rules in the model in chapter 3 
provide an accurate account of the way in which agents in financial markets actually 
behave. Rather, my claim is that these equations are a construct that capture some 
of the dynamics that are caused by irrationality in those markets. In much the same 
way, no one believes that Calvo contracts are a description of any phenomenon that 
actually exists in the real world. Instead, they are a construct which encapsulate 
the effects of an imperfection in real world economies (whether that be money 
illusion, menu costs, imperfect information or a combination of all three).
I can persist with this analogy with nominal rigidities and Calvo contracts 
in explaining the model that I put forward in chapter 4. In the same way as I 
include Calvo contracts in the model as a proxy for nominal rigidity, I include
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the behavioural equations as a proxy for sub-rational decision making in financial 
markets.
I began this thesis by posing the question of whether considerations of the ways 
in which people deviate from rationality are important in explaining the behaviour 
of the macroeconomy. If so, the next obvious question is what ramifications this 
may hold for macroeconomic policy formulation. Following the previous chapters, 
I am now hopefully in a reasonable position to lend a fresh perspective to these 
questions.
My conclusion from chapter 3 is that behavioural considerations can indeed 
help us to explain asset price dynamics. In turn, this might help us to explain 
further macroeconomic variables. However, it does not hold that the existence of 
noise trader risk gives rise to an additional target for monetary policy.
By its very nature, irrationality is complex. Kahneman and Tversky highlight 
three different heuristics that give rise to innumerable biases. Which of these biases 
are most salient and what happens when different biases are in conflict with each 
other is unclear. Even their axiomisation of these concepts as prospect theory 
allows for ambiguities in the outcomes of very similar decisions. These ambiguities 
are referred to as framing effects.
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As we discovered in chapter 3, even when we begin with a well specified set 
of simple heuristical rules, discontinuities in the relationships between behavioural 
variables leads to complex and even chaotic outcomes. In this particular model, 
herding effects are apparent as an example of this complexity.
Indeed, I find in chapter 4 that in that particular model, under most parame- 
terisations, a counter-intuitive ‘running with the wind’ monetary policy is effective 
in increasing welfare. This result arises because such a policy tends to prevent 
momentum in the chartist rule from developing quickly. Clearly, for a central 
bank to be able to anticipate such an effect, it would have to have an intimate 
understanding of the behavioural norms that exist in the market. It is unrealistic 
to posit such a level of understanding.
It is appropriate to close this thesis with reference to the recent periods of 
financial turmoil, notably the crash of the dot-com bubble in 2001 and the more 
recent ‘credit crunch’.
Few commentators have attempted to explain the dot-com equities bubble or 
the housing bubble that preceded the credit crunch without some reference to the 
role of sub-rational human decision making. The dynamics of both of these bub­
bles are consistent with the ideas inherent in the behavioural models that I have
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explored in this thesis. Both bubbles have been described as the result of momen­
tum that built up when there were improvements in the underlying fundamentals, 
but which was not checked when the improvements in fundamentals abated.
If these bubbles were indeed the result of chartist speculation, as exemplified in 
my models, then the results of chapter 4 concur with Alan Greenspan’s assessment 
that:
"the notion that a well timed incremental tightening [of monetary 
policy] could have been calibrated to prevent the ... bubble is almost 
surely an illusion" (Greenspan 2002 [49])
The reason that I reach this conclusion, however, is very different to Greenspan’s 
explanation. He argues that if central banks had access to information that would 
allow them to reasonably calculate the fundamental value of assets, then private 
agents would be able to do so as well and bubbles would be very unlikely to 
develop. I do not contest the fact that assessing the fundamental value of assets 
is problematic, though Cecchetti et al (2000 [27]) provide strong arguments that 
misalignments are often identifiable. However, what my model illustrates is that, 
even if central banks can perfectly measure the fundamental asset price, there are 
reasons why it would be imprudent for them to use monetary policy to try to 
correct for a mis-pricing.
For a bubble to exist in the first place there must be some imperfection in the 
asset market. At least some proportion of the agents in the market must have
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beliefs that are incompatible with rational expectations. Furthermore, there must 
exist some barriers to arbitrage which prevent those who have rational beliefs from 
driving the price back to fundamental. It would take a brave individual to predict 
what effects monetary intervention would have in such a market. What I can say 
is that, under the particular behavioural rules examined in chapter 4, a ‘leaning 
against the wind’ monetary policy would be detrimental.
Seeing as most of the welfare costs associated with asset mis-pricing arise from 
financial accelerator effects, the authorities would be best advised to aim their 
efforts at lessening financial frictions and reducing leverage. The analysis in this 
thesis suggests that a prudent central bank should not attempt to mitigate these 
costs by influencing market psychology.
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APPENDIX A
A Behavioural A sset Price M odel 
A .I. Fortran code
PROGRAM C5grid
!Purpose: end of column 70— >
! To search for the best fit parameters for the subroutine C5model 
!
!Record of revisions:
! Date Programmer Description of change
! 26/09/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Original code 
IMPLICIT NONE 
!Declare variables:
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: double=8 !double precision
INTEGER :: i, j ,k,l,counter,inseed !loop and counter vaxiables
REAL, DIMENSION(10) :: parameters !model parameters
REAL, DIMENSION(6) :: startpars, bestpars !starting/best model parameters 
REAL, DIMENSION(6) :: maxpar, minpax, step, stepsize !max and min parameter
lvalues, step size
REAL, DIMENSION(7,13) :: x !
EXTERNAL G05FDF, G05CBF !pseudo-random number generator 
REAL(KIND=double) :: crit, bestcrit !(best) critical value 
INTEGER, PARAMETER : : ss=10 Inumber of stochastic simulations
I at each parameterisation
I Fixed parameters 
parameters(5)=1.0 I mu 
parameters(6)=0.0 I phi 
parameters(7)=0.0 !r 
parameters(9)=0.0 IpO
I Parameters to search over:
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! psi beta rho gamma c sdeta
startpars=(/ 0.525,0.965,0.4, 3.75, 0.425,0.04 /) 
step= (/ 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 1.0, 0.1, 0.01 /) 
minpar= (/ 0.3, 0.5, 0.2, 1.0, 0.30, 0.01 /) 
maxpar= (/ 0.7, 0.95, 0.6, 5.0, 0.50, 0.05 /)
!Calculate critical value for starting parameters
parameters(1)=startpars(1)
parameters(2)=startpars(2)
parameters(3)=startpars(3)
parameters(4)=startpars(4)
parameters(8)=startpars(5)
parameters(10)=startpars(6)
C CALL C5 (parameters, inseed, ss, crit)
bestpars=startpars 
bestcrit=100000
inseed=0
steps: DO 1=0,2 
DO i=l,6
stepsize(i)=step(i)/(2.0**1) 
END DO
parsearch: DO 
inseed=inseed+100
!put best parameters and critical value in first row of x matrix
x=0.0
DO j=l,6
DO k=l,13
x(j,k)=bestpars(j)
END DO 
END DO 
C x (7,1)=bestcrit
!vary one parameter in every other row of x matrix 
DO i=l,6 
DO j=l,2
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k=(i*2)+j-l
x(i,k)=x(i,k)+(2*j-3)*stepsize(i)
IF (x(i,k) > maxpar(i)) x(i,k)=maxpar(i)
IF (x(i,k) < minpar(i)) x(i,k)=minpar(i)
END DO 
END DO
!calculate critical values for all rows of x matrix 
DO k=l,13
parameters(1)=x(1,k) 
parameters(2)=x(2,k) 
parameters(3)=x(3,k) 
parameters(4)=x(4,k) 
parameters(8)=x(5,k) 
parameters(10)=x(6,k)
CALL C5 (parameters, inseed, ss, crit)
x(7,k)=crit
END DO
WRITE(1,*) inseed 
WRITE(1,’(7F10.4)’) x
!search for lowest critical value and transfer those parameters to bestpars 
bestcrit=x(7,1) 
counter=l 
DO k=2,13
IF (x(7,k) < bestcrit) THEN 
counter=k 
bestcrit=x(7,k)
DO i=l,6
bestpars(i)=x(i,k)
END DO 
END IF 
END DO
!if no improvement in critical value, reduce step size 
IF (counter==l) EXIT parsearch
END DO parsearch 
END DO steps
END PROGRAM
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SUBROUTINE C5 (parameters, inseed, ss, crit)
!Purpose: end of column 70— >
! To simulate the model ss number of times given a particular 
! parameterisation and return a critical value
i
!Record of revisions:
! Date Programmer Description of change
! 06/07/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Original code 
IMPLICIT NONE
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: double=8 !double precision 
!Declare calling parameters:
REAL, INTENT(IN), DIMENSION(IO) :: parameters Imodel parameters 
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: inseed !input seed
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: ss Inumber of stochastic simulations at each
! parameterisation
REAL(KIND=double), INTENT(OUT) :: crit !critical value, store old parameter 
!Declare local variables:
INTEGER :: i,j Hoop and counter variables
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: t=1000 Inumber of simulation periods
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t+2) :: p, pstar, profits Ivectors of actual and
I fundamental prices and profits 
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t) :: epsilon Ivectors of fundamental
I and price shocks 
EXTERNAL G05FDF, G05CBF Ipseudo-random number generator 
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t+2) :: wf, wc, epf, epc Iweights, expected
I prices
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t+2) :: pif, pic, varf, varc Iprofits, risks 
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(175) :: dlnp !D(ln[generatedFTSEprice]) 
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(4) :: momdlnp, avemom I(average) moments of
I price series
REAL(KIND=double) :: critl I
INTEGER :: seed I seed for random number generators
crit=0.0
ssloop: DO j=l,ss
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seed = inseed + j + 25 
!Generate pstar
CALL genpstar (t, seed, pstar, profits)
!Run model
CALL C3model (t, parameters, seed, pstar, p, wf, wc,
> epf, epc, pif, pic, varf, vaxc)
!Calculate moments of the generated FTSE series (final 175 observations of 
! dlnp)
DO i=l,175
dlnp(i) = p(t+2-175+i) - p(t+2-175+i-l)
END DO
CALL moments (175, dlnp, momdlnp)
!Calculate critical value
critl = (((momdlnp(1) - 0.004593708026)/0.004593708026) ** 2)
> + (((momdlnp(2) - 0.010507946551)/0.010507946551) ** 2)
> + (((momdlnp(3) - 0.017838538603)/0.017838538603) ** 2)
> + (((momdlnp(4) - 6.571520857831)/6.571520857831) ** 2)
crit = crit + critl
END DO ssloop
crit = crit / ss
C avemom(2) = avemom(2) / ss
C avemom(3) = avemom(3) / ss
C avemom(4) = avemom(4) / ss
C !Calculate critical value
C crit = (((avemom(l) - 0.004593708026)/0.004593708026) ** 2)
C > + (((avemom(2) - 0.010507946551)/0.010507946551) ** 2)
C > + (((avemom(3) - 0.017838538603)/0.017838538603) ** 2)
C > + (((avemom(4) - 6.571520857831)/6.571520857831) ** 2)
RETURN
END SUBROUTINE
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SUBROUTINE C3model (t, parameters, seed, pstar, p, wf, wc, 
> epf, epc, pif, pic, varf, varc)
Purpose: end of column 70— >
To numerically simulate the more complex De Grauwe type model
Record of revisions:
Date P r o g r amme r  Description of change
12/03/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Original code
15/03/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Add in price setting shock
20/03/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Add history to chartists’ forecast
22/03/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Import parameters and errors from external files
27/03/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Update to chapter 3 model
09/05/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Convert to subroutine
IMPLICIT NONE
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: double=8 !double precision
!Declare calling parameters:
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: t Inumber of simulation periods 
REAL, INTENT(IN), DIMENSION(IO) :: parameters Imodel parameters 
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: seed Iseed for random number generators 
REAL(KIND=double), INTENT(IN), DIMENSI0N(t+2) :: pstar Ivector of fundamental
! price 
p !actual price 
wf !fundamentalist weight 
wc !chartist weight 
epf !fundament ali st 
! expectation 
!chartist expectation 
!fundamentalist profit 
!chartist profit 
!fundamentalist risk 
varc !chartist risk
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double),
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double), 
REAL(KIND=double),
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT)
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT) 
INTENT(OUT)
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2)
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2) 
DIMENSION(t+2)
epc
pif
pic
varf
!Declare local variables:
INTEGER :: i,j Hoop variables
INTEGER, DIMENSION(t+2) :: tp Itime period
REAL :: psi !speed of adjustment to fundamental
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REAL :: beta !chartists’ extrapolation 
REAL :: rho !chartists’ memory
REAL :: gamma Irate of revision of forecasting rules
REAL :: mu !coefficient of risk aversion
REAL :: phi Irisk perception
REAL :: r !interest rate
REAL :: c !transaction cost
REAL :: pO '.initial condition
REAL(KIND=double) :: sdeta !standard deviation of price shocks 
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t+2) :: eta !pricing error
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(t+2) :: s, muf !supply of asset, time varying
! risk aversion 
EXTERNAL G05FDF, G05CBF !pseudo-random number generator
!Initialisation values 
psi = parameters(1) 
beta = parameters(2) 
rho = parameters(3) 
g amma  = parameters(4) 
mu = parameters(5) 
phi = parameters(6) 
r = parameters(7) 
c = parameters(8) 
pO = parameters(9) 
sdeta = parameters(10) 
tp(l) = -1 
DO i = 1,2 
p(i) = 0.0D0 
wf(i) = 0.5D0 
wc(i) = 0.5D0 
epf(i) = 0.0D0 
epc(i) = 0.0D0 
pif(i) = 0.0D0 
pic(i) = 0.0D0 
varf(i) = 0.0D0 
varc(i) = 0.0D0 
tp(i+l) = tp(i) + 1 
END DO 
s = 0
p(l) = pstar(l) 
p(2) = pstar(2) + pO 
epf(l) = pstar(l) 
epf(2) = pstar(2) 
epc(l) = pstar(l)
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epc(2) = pstar(2)
!Generate pricing errors 
CALL G05CBF(2*seed)
CALL G05FDF(0.0D0,sdeta,t,eta)
loopl: DO i = 3,t+2
!define time periods 
tp(i) = tp(i-l) + 1
!Calculate risks:
varf(i) = (rho * varf(i-l)) + ((1 - rho) *
> ((epf(i-2) - p(i-l))**2))
varc(i) = (rho * varc(i-l)) + ((1 - rho) *
> ((epc(i-2) - p(i-l))**2))
!Calculate fundamentalist profit:
IF (epf(i-l) > ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pif(i) = (p(i-l) - ((1 + r) * p(i-2)))
ELSE IF (epf(i-l) < ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pif(i) = -(p(i-l) - ((1 + r) * p(i-2)))
ELSE IF (epf(i-l) == ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pif(i) = 0 
END IF
!Calculate chartist profit:
IF (epc(i-l) > ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pic(i) = (p(i-l) - ((1 + r) * p(i-2)))
ELSE IF (epc(i-l) < ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pic(i) = -(p(i-l) - ((1 + r) * p(i-2)))
ELSE IF (epc(i-l) == ((1 + r) * p(i-l))) THEN 
pic(i) = 0 
END IF
!Calculate fundamentalist and chartist weights: 
muf(i) = mu / (1 + (phi * ABS(p(i-l) - pstar(i-l)))) 
wf(i) = EXP (gamma * (pif(i) - (muf(i) * varf(i)))) / 
> (EXP(gamma * (pif(i) - (muf(i) * varf(i)))) +
> EXP(gamma * (pic(i) - (mu * varc(i))))) 
wc(i) = 1 - wf(i)
!Calculate fundamentalist price expectation:
IF (ABSCp(i-l) - pstar(i-1)) > c) THEN
epf(i) = p(i-l) - (psi * (p(i-l) - pstar(i-l)))
ELSE
epf(i) = p(i-l)
END IF
!Calculate charist price expectation: 
epc(i) = p(i-l) + (rho * (epc(i-l) - p(i-2))) 
> + ((1 - rho) * (beta * (p(i-l) - p(i-2))))
!Calculate market clearing price:
IF (ABS((muf(i)*varf(i))-(mu*varc(i)))<=EPSIL0N(0.0D0)) THEN 
P(i) = (((wf(i) * epf(i)) + (wc(i) * epc(i))
> - (s(i) * muf(i) * varf(i))) /
> ((1 + r) * (wf(i) + wc(i)))) + eta(i-2)
ELSE
p(i) = (((wf(i) * epf(i) * mu * varc(i))
> + (wc(i) * epc(i) * muf(i) * varf(i))
> - (mu * muf(i) * varf(i) * mu * varc(i) * s(i)))
> / ((1 + r) * ((wf(i) * mu * varc(i))
> + (wc(i) * muf(i) * varf(i))))) + eta(i-2)
END IF
END DO loopl
RETURN
END SUBROUTINE
SUBROUTINE genpstar (t, seed, pstar, profits)
!Purpose: end of column 70— >
! To generate bootstapped profits series based on the regression 
! dlnrp(t) = 0.006689 - 0.260975dlnrp(t-l) + u(t)
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Record of revisions:
Date Programmer Description of change
! 12/06/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Original code 
! 14/06/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Convert to subroutine
IMPLICIT NONE
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: double=8 !double precision 
!Declare calling parameters:
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: t Inumber of simulation periods 
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: seed !seed for random number generators 
REAL(KIND=double), INTENT(OUT), DIMENSION(t+2) :: pstar, profits Ivector of
! fundamental price series
!Declare local variables:
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: it=1000 Inumber of iterations 
INTEGER :: i,j Hoop variables
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSION(174) :: residuals Iresiduals from actual
! regression
INTEGER, DIMENSI0N(t+2) :: random Ivector of random integers 
EXTERNAL G05DYF, G05CBF I random number generators 
INTEGER :: G05DYF !random number generators
REAL(KIND=double), DIMENSI0N(t+2) :: u, dlnrp Ivector of random error terms,
I generated dlnrp
REAL(KIND=double), PARAMETER :: c=0.008434957528795 Idlnrp regression
I constant
REAL(KIND=double), PARAMETER :: ar=-0.260974680648267 Idlnrp regression arl
I parameter
REAL(KIND=double) :: edln, eln I expected dlnrp, lnrp 
REAL(KIND=double), PARAMETER :: beta=0.99 I discount factor 
REAL(KIND=double) :: discount I cumulative discount factor
DATA residuals /
>-0.028244277,-0.0062064057,-0.011598109, 
>0.096912936,-0.048749864,-0.063979229,
>0.021223778,0.04918006,-0.051853865,
>-0.055090369,-0.039011901,0.0074308862, 
>0.02776317,-0.064727678,0.040706301,
>0.07420187,-0.10925488,-0.066119839,
>0.037778505,0.048828162,0.037724215,
>-0.052218183,0.029925076,-0.0089474608, 
>-0.030926285,0.010325857,-0.06479717,
>-0.044803086,-0.018870103,0.12261226,
>0.0036853552,-0.047093562,0.014700671,
>0.080885062,0.0088680662,-0.030635158, 
>-0.026921937,0.10712826,0.14938749,
>-0.06694645,-0.11976774,0.058023423,
>-0.20035847,0.01022806,-0.04356883,
>-0.033365071,-0.077630221,-0.11084529, 
>-0.075054114,0.12849141,0.041452921,
>-0.06737936,0.0074815804,0.17773763,
>0.1144986,0.036990421,-0.020314605,
>0.020373271,0.031074458,-0.029163859,
>-0.0017408722,-0.032064281,-0.036765652, 
>0.10278902,-0.05111146,-0.0030760222,
>-0.025792926,0.0068880323,-0.12411376, 
>-0.041866315,-0.064703752,0.011462214,
>0.052449414,0.045696622,-0.077245079,
>0.13868803,0.011173646,0.033479654,
>-0.0067745238,0.068771582,0.039219523,
>0.014729704,-0.046920194,-0.019393053,
>0.044904784,0.059453969,0.041066923,
>-0.025979353,0.00136561,0.012645093,
>-0.00023560257,-0.045974855,-0.027863518 
>0.0044994725,0.064835779,-0.041343831,
>0.046233334,0.019214307,0.027753447,
>-0.052228446,0.040148513,-0.0028085386, 
>-0.0038162519,0.016598741,0.032279573, 
>-0.055633746,-0.038642745,0.047144406, 
>-0.045087208,-0.11398978,-0.05391175,
>-0.020068152,0.031911075,0.0041931567, 
>-0.0098681635,-0.01977683,-0.028443641, 
>0.069406952,0.0081819931,0.050818787,
>0.0065876972,-0.002110552,0.079210355,
>0.020063703,0.022556511,-0.019174155,
>0.0071703439,-0.04176948,0.046091376,
>-0.015478813,0.029629145,-0.0073499661, 
>0.019319379,0.029268053, -0.0011111588, 
>-0.024149462, -0.0065146387, -0.0033174068 
>-0.0048189316,-0.019015305,0.051698179, 
>-0.11156888,-0.10435068,0.058437885,
>0.11548093, -0.0053956046, -0.050071373, 
>-0.040982477,0.015895658, -0.045825347,
>0.015206307,-0.097573309,0.1131244,
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>-0.095943147,0.055005955,0.014888195,
>0.060069263,0.010329354,0.029832735,
>-0.033858288,0.030936261,-0.044646257, 
>0.070313117,0.010553599,0.011350235,
>-0.045893987,-0.020119242,0.0097048307, 
>-0.022750675,-0.028034134,0.018347715, 
>0.027390806,0.025790253,-0.024368407/
!generate vector of random integers 
CALL G05CBF(seed)
DO i=l,t+2
random(i) = G05DYF (1,174)
END DO
!generate errors randomly from residuals 
DO i=l,t+2
u(i) = residuals(random(i))
END DO
!generate dlnrp series 
dlnrp(l) = c + (ar*0) + u(l)
DO i=2,t+2
dlnrp(i) = c + (ar * dlnrp(i-l)) + u(i)
END DO
!generate profits series 
profits(l) = 1.0 
DO i=2,t+2
profits(i) = EXP(dlnrp(i) + LOGCprofits(i-l)))
END DO
!generate fundamental price series 
DO j=l,t+2
pstar(j) = profits(j) 
edln = dlnrp(j) 
eln = L0G(profits(j))
DO i=l,it
edln = (edln * ar) + c
pstar(j) = pstar(j) + ((beta**i) * EXP(edln + eln))
eln = eln + edln
END DO
END DO
DO j=l,t+2
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pstar(j) = LOG(pstar(j)) 
END DO
RETURN
END SUBROUTINE
SUBROUTINE moments (t, series, moms)
!Purpose: end of column 70— >
! To calculate the moments of a series 
!
(Record of revisions:
! Date Programmer Description of change
! 04/07/07 Rhys ap Gwilym Original code 
IMPLICIT NONE
INTEGER, PARAMETER :: double=8 (double precision
(Declare calling parameters:
INTEGER, INTENT(IN) :: t (size of series
REAL(KIND=double), INTENT(IN), DIMENSION(t) :: series (seed for random
! number generators
REAL(KIND=double), INTENT (OUT) , DIMENSIONS) :: moms (vector of fundamental
! price series
(Declare local variables: 
INTEGER :: i,j (loop variables
(Calculate mean 
moms(l) = 0.0 
DO i=l,175
moms(l) = moms(l) + series(i) 
END DO
moms(l) = moms(l) / REAL(t)
(Calculate variance 
moms(2) = 0.0
DO i=l,175
moms(2) = moms(2) + ((series(i) - moms(1))**2)
END DO
moms(2) = moms(2) / (REAL(t)-l)
!Calculate skewness 
moms(3) = 0.0 
DO i=l,175
moms(3) = moms(3) + ((series(i) - moms(1))**3)
END DO
moms(3) = ((REAL(t) / ((REAL(t)-l) * (REAL(t)-2))) * moms(3))
> / (moms (2) ** (1.5))
!Calculate mean 
moms(4) = 0.0 
DO i=l,175
moms(4) = moms(4) + ((series(i) - moms(l))**4)
END DO
moms(4) = (((((REAL(t)+l) * REAL(t)) / ((REAL(t)-l) * (REAL(t)-2)
> * (REAL(t)-3))) * moms(4)) / (moms(2) ** 2.0))
> - ((3.0 * ((REAL(t)-l) ** 2.0))
> / ((REAL(t)-2) * (REAL(t)-3)))
RETURN
END SUBROUTINE
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A .3. Results of th e  Stochastic Sim ulations
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APPENDIX B 
A D SG E M odel w ith  A sset Bubbles
B .l .  Parameters for the Benchmark M odel
Intertemporal discount factor: P — 0.99
Elasticity in the goods aggregator: e - 7.00
Work disutility coefficient =  1 +  0, <t> = 3.00
Probability Calvo fairy does not visit price setter: V 0.67
Probability Calvo fairy does not visit wage setter: LU 0.75
Inertia in productivity shock: P = 0.95
Elasticity in the labour aggregator: 7 = 7.00
Depreciation rate: 6 = 0.025
Coefficient in adjustment cost for investment: V =- 8.00
Share of capital in the production function: a = 0.25
Chartist rule parameter: X c = 0.991.99
Fundamentalist rule parameter: X f = 0.50
Uncertainty bound in fundamentalist rule: c = 0.00
Propensity to switch between forecasting rules: V = 3.75
Taylor rule weight on inflation: Cn = 2.02
Taylor rule weight on output gap: Cy = 0.184
Taylor rule weight on asset mis-pricing: = various
Standard deviation of productivity shock: = 0.0086
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B.2. The Dynare Sub-model: Equation listing  
B.2.1. Rational variables
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B .2.2. Behavioural variables:
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B.3. The Dynare Code
// DYNARE MODEL 
// NOTATION:
// The following axe in log form:
// z, zq, zfq
// r_c, r_lambda, r_wstar, r_l, r_w, r_mu, r_i, r_k, r_q, x_mc, r_pstax, r_y 
// b_c, b_lambda, b_wstar, b_l, b_w, b_mu, b_i, b_k, b_q, b_mc, b_pstax, b_y 
// rf_q, bf_q
// The following are log of the gross rate:
// r_rb, r_RBi, r_pi 
// b_rb, b_RBi, b_pi 
// The following are in levels:
// r_rk, r_wb, r_wa, r_pb, r_pa, r_pd, r_wd, r_v, r_u, r_wdg 
// b_rk, b_wb, b_wa, b_pb, b_pa, b_pd, b_wd, b_v, b_u, b_wdg 
// rf_rk, bf.rk 
//VARIABLES 
var z, zq, zfq,
r_c, r_lambda, r_wstar, r_l, r_w, r_mu, r_i, r_k, r_q, r_mc, r_pstar, r_y,
b_c, b_lambda, b_wstar, b_l, b_w, b_mu, b_i, b_k, b_q, b_mc, b_pstar, b_y,
rf_q, bf_q, rf_lambda, bf_lambda, 
r_rb, r_RBi, r_pi, 
b_rb, b_RBi, b_pi,
r_rk, r_wb, r_wa, r_pb, r_pa, r_pd, r_wd, r_v, r_u,
b_rk, b_wb, b_wa, b_pb, b_pa, b_pd, b_wd, b_v, b_u,
rf_rk, bf_rk; 
vaxexo eps, eq, efq, pol;
//PARAMETERS
parameters gamma, phi, omega, beta, sspi, delta, nu, alpha, theta, eta, rho, 
RBstar, zetapi, pistax, zetay, ystax, rhoq, rhofq, sigma; 
gamma = 7.0; 
phi = 3.0; 
omega = 0.67; 
beta = 0.99; 
sspi = 0.0198; 
delta = 0.025; 
nu = 8.0; 
alpha = 0.25; 
theta = 7.0; 
eta = 0.67; 
xho = 0.95; 
zetapi = 0.5; 
pistax = 0.0198; 
zetay = 0.5;
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ystar = 0.495432665018909; 
rhoq = 0.0; 
rhofq = 0.0; 
sigma = 0.0001;
//MODEL EQUATIONS: [NB k=k(t+l), rb=rb(t+l), RBi=Rb(t+l), rkstar=rkstar(t+1)] 
model;
//RATIONAL MODEL 
//Household optimisation:
//marginal utility of consumption set equal to marginal utility of wealth: 
r_c = -r_lambda;
//Calvo wage setting. Expected wage equals markup over expected disutility 
of work:
r_wstar*(l+gamma*phi) = log(gamma)-log(gamma-l)+log(r_wb)-log(r_wa); 
r_wb = exp(r_l*(l+phi))+omega*beta*r_wb(+l)*(exp(r_pi(+l)-sspi+r_w(+l)-r_w)) 
~(gamma*(1+phi));
r_wa = exp(r_lambda+r_w+r_l)+omega*beta*r_wa(+l)*(exp(r_pi(+l)-sspi+r_w(+l)- 
r_w))~(gamma-1);
1 = (l-omega)*exp(r_wstar*(l-gamma))+omega*(exp(r_pi-sspi+r_w-r_w(-l)))“ 
(gamma-1);
//expected returns to holding capital and bonds equalised, but with a 
behavioural wedge:
exp(r_mu) = beta*(exp(r_lambda(+1))*r_rk(+l)+exp(r_mu(+l))*(l-delta+(nu/2)* 
(exp(2*(r_i(+1)-r_k))-delta“2))); 
r_lambda = r_mu+log(1-nu*(exp(r_i-r_k(-l))-delta)); 
r_rb = r_lambda-r_lambda(+l)-log(beta);
// r_rkstar/r_rk(+l) = 1+wdg;
// wdg = wdgar*wdg(-l)+erk; 
exp(r_q) = beta*(exp(r_lambda(+l)-r_lambda)*r_rk(+1)+exp(r_lambda(+1)- 
r_lambda+r_q(+l)));
//Law of motion of capital: 
exp(r_k) = (1-delta)*exp(r_k(-1))+exp(r_i)-(nu/2)*((exp(r_i-r_k(-l))-delta) 
~2)*exp(r_k(-l));
//Firm optimisation:
//Factor input ratio set equal to ratio of marginal returns: 
r_k(-l)-r_l = log(alpha)-log(1-alpha)+r_w-log(r_rk);
//Calvo pricing, xpctd pric quals markup ovr xpctd marginal cost: 
r_mc = r_w*(1-alpha)+log(r_rk)*alpha-z-alpha*log(alpha)-(1-alpha)*log(1- 
alpha);
exp(r_pstar) = (theta/(theta-1))*(r_pb/r_pa);
r_pb = exp(r_lambda+r_mc+r_y)+eta*beta*((exp(r_pi(+1)-sspi))“theta)* 
r_pb(+l);
r_pa = exp(r_lambda+r_y)+eta*beta*((exp(r_pi(+l)-sspi))“(theta-1))* 
r_pa(+l);
1 = (1-eta)*(exp(r_pstar)“(1-theta))+eta*((exp(sspi-r_pi))“(1-theta)); 
//Production and market clearing:
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r_y = z+(r_k(-l)*alpha)+(r_l*(1-alpha))-log(r_pd);
r_pd = (1-eta)/exp(r_pstar*theta)+eta*((exp(r_pi-sspi))'‘theta)*r_pd(-l);
z = rho*z(-l)+eps;
exp(r_y) = exp(r_c)+exp(r_i);
//Definition of real interest rate and monetary policy: 
r_rb = r_RBi-r_pi;
// RBi = pistar-log(beta)+zetapi*(pi-pistar)+zetay*(y-ystar)+pol;
// RBi = pi(-l)-logCbeta) ;//+zetapi*(pi(-l)-pistar)+zetay*(y-ystar)+pol;
// r_pi = 0.0198;
//Canzoneri:
// RBi = -(1-0.824)*log(beta)+0.824*RBi(-l)+(l-0.824)*2.02*pi+(1-0.824)*
0.184*(y-ystar)+pol;
//Canzoneri no smoothing: 
r_RBi = r_pi-log(beta)+2.02*(r_pi-pistar)+0.184*(r_y-ystar)+pol;
//Trad TR:
// RBi = -log(beta)+pi+0.5*(pi-sspi)+0.5*(y-ystar)+pol;
//Welfare:
r_wd = (1-omega)/(exp(r_wstar*gamma*(1+phi)))+omega*((exp(r_w-r_w(-1))*(exp 
(r_pi-sspi)))~(gamma*(1+phi)))*r_wd(-l); 
r_v = r_c-exp(r_l*(l+phi))*r_wd/(1+phi); 
r_u = r_v+beta*r_u(+l);
//Further variables for export: 
rf_lambda = r_lambda(+l); 
rf_q = r_q(+l); 
rf_rk = r_rk(+l);
//BEHAVIOURAL MODEL 
//Household optimisation:
//marginal utility of consumption set equal to marginal utility of wealth: 
b_c = -b_lambda;
//Calvo wage setting. Expected wage equals markup over expected disutility 
of work:
b_wstar*(l+gamma*phi) = log(gamma)-log(gamma-l)+log(b_wb)-log(b_wa); 
b_wb = exp(b_l*(1+phi))+omega*beta*b_wb(+l)*(exp(b_pi(+l)-sspi+b_w(+l)-b_w)) 
“(gamma*(1+phi));
b_wa = exp(b_lambda+b_w+b_l)+omega*beta*b_wa(+l)*(exp(b_pi(+l)-sspi+b_w(+l)- 
b_w))~(gamma-1);
1 = (1-omega)*exp(b_wstar*(1-gamma))+omega*(exp(b_pi-sspi+b_w-b_w(-1)))~ 
(gamma-1);
//expected returns to holding capital and bonds equalised, but with a 
behavioural wedge:
exp(b_mu) = beta*(exp(b_lambda(+l))*bf_rk+exp(b_mu(+1))*(l-delta+(nu/2)*(exp 
(2*(b_i(+l)-b_k))-delta~2))); 
b_lambda = b_mu+log(l-nu*(exp(b_i-b_k(-l))-delta)); 
b_rb = b_lambda-b_lambda(+l)-log(beta);
// b_rkstar/b_rk(+l) = 1+wdg;
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// wdg = wdgar*wdg(-l)+erk; 
exp(b_q) = beta*(exp(b_lambda(+l)-b_lambda)*b_rk(+l)+exp(b_lambda(+l)- 
b_lambda+bf_q)); 
b_q = r_q+zq; 
zq = rhoq*zq(-l)+eq; 
bf_q = r_q(+l)+zfq; 
zfq = rhofq*zfq(-l)+efq;
// bf_q = r_q(+l)+eqf;
//Law of motion of capital: 
exp(b_k) = (1-delta)*exp(b_k(-1))+exp(b_i)-(nu/2)*((exp(b_i-b_k(-l))-delta)~ 
2)*exp(b_k(-l));
//Firm optimisation:
//Factor input ratio set equal to ratio of marginal returns: 
b_k(-l)-b_l = log(alpha)-log(l-alpha)+b_w-log(b_rk);
//Calvo pricing. Expected price equals markup over expected marginal cost: 
b_mc = b_w*(1-alpha)+log(b_rk)*alpha-z-alpha*log(alpha)-(1-alpha)*log(1- 
alpha);
exp(b_pstar) = (theta/(theta-l))*(b_pb/b_pa);
b_pb = exp(b_lambda+b_mc+b_y)+eta*beta*((exp(b_pi(+l)-sspi))“theta)*b_pb(+l); 
b_pa = exp(b_lambda+b_y)+eta*beta*((exp(b_pi(+l)-sspi))~(theta-1))*b_pa(+l);
1 = (1-eta)*(exp(b_pstar)~(1-theta))+eta*((exp(sspi-b_pi))~(1-theta)); 
//Production and market clearing: 
b_y = z+(b_k(-l)*alpha)+(b_l*(1-alpha))-log(b_pd);
b_pd = (l-eta)/exp(b_pstar*theta)+eta*((exp(b_pi-sspi))~theta)*b_pd(-l); 
exp(b_y) = exp(b_c)+exp(b_i);
//Definition of real interset rate and monetary policy: 
b_rb = b_RBi-b_pi;
// RBi = pistar-log(beta)+zetapi*(pi-pistar)+zetay*(y-ystar)+pol;
// RBi = pi(-l)-log(beta);//+zetapi*(pi(-l)-pistar)+zetay*(y-ystar)+pol;
// b_pi = 0.0198;
//Canzoneri:
// RBi = -(1-0.824)*log(beta)+0.824*RBi(-l)+(l-0.824)*2.02*pi+(1-0.824)*0.184 
*(y-ystar)+pol;
//Canzoneri no smoothing:
b_RBi = b_pi-log(beta)+2.02*(b_pi-pistar)+0.184*(b_y-ystar)+pol;
//Trad TR:
// RBi = -log(beta)+pi+0.5*(pi-sspi)+0.5*(y-ystar)+pol;
//Welfare:
b_wd = (1-omega)/(exp(b_wstar*gamma*(1+phi)))+omega*((exp(b_w-b_w(-l))*(exp 
(b_pi-sspi)))“(gamma*(1+phi)))*b_wd(-l); 
b_v = b_c-exp(b_l*(1+phi))*b_wd/(1+phi); 
b_u -  b_v+beta*b_u(+l);
//Further variables for export: 
bf_lambda = b_lambda(+l); 
end;
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initval; 
z = 0.00; 
zq = 0.00; 
zfq = 0.00; 
eps = 0.00; 
eq = 0.00; 
efq = 0.00; 
pol = 0.00;
r_rk = ((1.0-beta)/beta)+delta;
r_rb = -log(beta);
r_pi = pistax;
r_pstar = 0.0;
r_RBi = r_pi-log(beta);
r_mc = r_pstax+log(theta-l.O)-log(theta);
r_w = (r_mc+z+alpha*log(alpha)+(l.0-alpha)*log(l.0-alpha)-(log(r_rk)*alpha)) 
*(1.0/(1.0-alpha)); 
r_wstar = 0.0;
r_k = (log(gamma-1.0)-log(gamma)+r_w-phi*(log(1.0-alpha)-log(alpha)+log
(r_rk)-r_w)-log(exp(z)*(((1.0-alpha)/alpha)*(r_rk/exp(r_w)))“(1.0- 
alpha)-delta))/(1+phi); 
r_l = log(1.0-alpha)-log(alpha)+log(r_rk)+r_k-r_w;
r_c = log(exp(z)*(((1.0-alpha)/alpha)*(r_rk/exp(r_w)))“(1.0-alpha)-delta)+ 
r_k;
r_y = log(exp(r_c)+(delta*exp(r_k))); 
r_i = log(delta)+r_k; 
r_lambda = -r_c;
r_pb = exp(r_lambda+r_mc+r_y)/(l-(eta*beta)); 
r_pa = exp(r_lambda+r_y)/(l-(eta*beta)); 
r_wb = (exp(r_l)“(1+phi))/(l-(omega*beta)); 
r_wa = exp(r_lambda+r_w+r_l)/(l-(omega*beta)); 
r_pd = 1.00000; 
r_mu = r_lambda; 
r_wd = 1.00000;
r_v = r_c-exp(r_l*(l+phi))/(l+phi);
r_u = (l/(1-beta))*r_v;
r_q = log(beta)+log(r_rk)-log(l-beta);
b_rk = r_rk;
b_rb = r_rb;
b_pi = r_pi;
b_pstar = r_pstar;
b_RBi = r_RBi;
b_mc = r_mc;
b_w = r_w;
b_wstar = r_wstar;
b_k = r_k;
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b_l = r_l; 
b_c = r_c; 
b_y = r_y; 
b_i = r_i;
b_lambda = r_lambda; 
b_pb = r_pb; 
b_pa = r_pa; 
b_wb = r_wb; 
b_wa = r_wa; 
b_pd = r_pd; 
b_mu = r_mu; 
b_wd = r_wd; 
b_v = r_v; 
b_u = r_u; 
b_q = r_q; 
end; 
steady; 
check; 
shocks;
var eps = sigma 2^; 
var eq = (l*sigma)~2; 
var efq = (l*sigma)~2; 
vax pol = sigma~2; 
end;
stoch_simul(periods=2100, irf=40) r_c b_c r_y b_y r_k b_k r_l b_l r_rk b_rk 
rf_rk bf_rk r_q b_q rf_q bf_q;
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B.4. The Behavioural Sub-model: Equation listing
Ec,t {qt) = (1 + Xc) Qt-i + XcEct-i (ft-i) -  %XcQt-2
Ec,t {qt+1 ) =  (1 +  Xc) Ec,t {qt) ~  Xc i1 + Xc) Ec,t-i {qt-i) +  XcEc,t-i {qt) ~ Xc {1 ~ Xc) qt-i 
E f,t {qt) =  (l -  Xf) qt- 1  +  XfQt where \qt- i  -q*t \ > C
Ef,t {qt+i) =  (1 -  Xf) E f,t {qt) +  X f i  where \EU {qt) -  q*t \ > C
&c,t =  [qt-1 -  q t- 2 ( l  +  rt?i)\ ■s i9n lEc,t- 2 ( f t - 2 )  -  f t - 2 ]
f y , *  =  [qt-1 -  % - 2  ( 1  +  r j f j ) ]  . s i # r c  [ E / i t _ 2  ( f t - 2 ) -  q t-2]
exp(t;ficf)
=   —     !————-
exp(uS2/ft) +  exp(i;S2Cjt) 
w f t = 1 -  wct
qt =  Wc'tEct {qt ) +  Wf j Ef j  {qt )
E b,tqt+i =  w cj E Cit {qt+1 ) +  Wf j Ef j  {qt+i)
where \qt- i  -  ql\ < C
EU {qt) where \EU {qt) -  q*\ ^ C
(3 E t \ t + 1
Eb,tqt+ 1
— Ebjtqt+i
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B.5. T he M ATLA B code
'/.Run dynare model 
'/.dynare d;
t = 40;
for i=l:endo_nbr;
varlist(i,:)=lgy_(dr_.order_var(i), ;
end;
'/(Save steady state values to first column of X matrix (re-ordered) 
for i=l:endo_nbr
X(i,l) = ys_(dr_.order_var(i));
end
'/.Second order approximation is given by:
/(y(t) = ys + A yh(t-l) + B u(t) + 0.5C(yh(t-l)(kron*)yh(t-l)) +
'/. 0.5D(u(t)(kron*)u(t)) + E(yh(t-1) (kron*)u(t))
/(where ys is the steady state value of y and yh(t)=y (t)-ys.
'/.A, B, C, D, E from dynare:
A = [zeros(endo_nbr,dr_.nstatic) dr_.ghx zeros(endo_nbr,dr_.nfwrd)] ;
B = dr_.ghu;
C = zeros(endo_nbr,(dr_.nstatic*(endo_nbr+l))); 
for i=l:dr_.npred;
C = [C dr_.ghxx(:,(i-l)*dr_.npred+1:i*dr_.npred)... 
zeros(endo_nbr,dr_.nstatic + dr_.nfwrd)];
end
C = [C zeros(endo_nbr,dr_.nfwrd*endo_nbr-dr_.nstatic)];
D = dr_.ghuu;
E = [zeros(endo_nbr,exo_nbr*dr_.nstatic) dr_.ghxu zeros(endo_nbr,exo_nbr*dr_.nfwrd)];
'/.RATIONAL MODEL:
' / . = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
'/.Single technology shock in period 1 (NB productivity shock in 1st row,
'/, policy response/monetary shock in 2nd, wedge in 3rd): 
shock = zeros(exo_nbr,t);
'/.SINGLE ONE SE PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK 
'/.shock (2,1) = 0.0086;
'/.MULTIPLE RANDOM PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS ~N(0,0.01) 
shock(2,:) = reps;
/.time periods to calculate 
/(reordered variable list
•/Calculate responses to one period technology shock in rational model 
for i=2:t+l;
X(:,i) = X(: ,1)+A*(X(: ,i-l)-X(: ,1))+B*shock(: ,i-l) + . . . 
0.5*C*kron(X(: ,i-l)-X(: ,1) ,X(:,i-l)-X(:,1))+. . .
0.5*D*kron(shock(:,i-l),shockC:,i-l))+...
E*kron(X(:,i-l)-X(:,1),shock(:,i-1));
end;
'/.BEHAVIOURAL MODEL:
%==================
chif = 0.5; 
chic = 0.99/1.99;
*/,zetaq = 0.5;
’/.Single technology shock in period 1: 
bshock = shock;
’/.causes repeated q shocks in future periods 
‘/.steady state values
BM1(:,1) = X(:,l); ‘/.variables from dynare model
ssq = X(strmatch(’r_q’, varlist, ’exact’),1); 
ssrk = X(strmatch( ’r_rk’, varlist, ’exact’),1);
BM2 = [ssq;ssq;ssq;ssq;ssq;ssq;ssq;ssq;0.5;0.5;ssrk;0;0;0;0;ssq;ssq] ; 
'/.these are the behavioural variables:
behvars = {’bf_q’;’b_q’;’q(t-l)’;’q(t-2)’;’c_q’;’cf_q’;’f_q’;’ff_q’;. 
•/. 1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8
’wc’;’wf ’;’bf_rk’;’zq’;’eq’;’zfq’;’efq’;’cf_q(t-l)’;’ff_q(t-l)
*/. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
'I, 1-8,14,15 in logs; 9,10 in levels; 11-13 log of the gross rate
for i=2:t+l
•/.Policy response to previous period asset mispricing: 
if i>2;
*/, bshock(4,i-l) = zetaq*(BM2(2,i-l)-ssq) ;
*/, pol = zetaq*(q(t-l)-qss) 
bshock(4,i-l) = zetaq*(BM2(2,i-l)-...
Y(strmatch(’r_q’, varlist, ’exact’),i-2));
*/, pol = zetaq*(q(t-l)-qstar(t-l))
'/, bshock(4,i-l) = zetaq*(BM2(2,i-l)-zetaq*(BM2(3,i-l))) ;
*/, pol = zetaq*(q(t-l)-qstar(t-2))
end;
’/.first solve rationally to get qstar, rfrk, lambda and lambda(+1) 
BM1(:,i) = BM1(:,1)+A*(BM1(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1))+B*bshock(:,i-l)+...
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0.5*C*kron(BMl(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1),BM1(:,i-1)-BM1(:,1))+...
0.5*D*kron(bshock(:,i-l),bshock(:,i-l))+...
E*kron(BMl(:,i-1)-BM1(:,1),bshock(:,i-1));
'/, bshock(4,i-l) = zetaq*(BM2(2,i-l)-BMl(strmatch(’r_q’, varlist, ’exact’),i));
*/, '/, pol = zetaq*(q(t-l)-qstar(t))
'/.
’/, '/.first solve rationally to get qstar, rfrk, lambda and lambda(+l) :
'/. BM1 (: , i) = BM1 ( : , 1)+A*(BM1 (: , i-l)-BMl ( : , 1))+B*bshock(: , i-l) + . . .
'/. 0.5*C*kron(BMl(: ,i-l)-BMl(: ,1) ,BM1 ( : ,i-l)-BMl( : , 1) ) +. . .
*/, 0.5*D*kron(bshock( : ,i-l) ,bshock(: ,i-l)) + . . .
'/. E*kron(BMl(: ,i-l)-BMl ( : , 1) ,bshock(: , i-1) ) ;
Y(:,i-l)=BMl(:,i);
’/.now solve behavioural model to get bfrk and wdg:
BM2(3,i) = BM2(2,i-l); '/. q(t-l)
BM2(4,i) = BM2(3,i-l); '/. q(t-2)
BM2(16,i) = BM2(6,i-1) ; '/. cf_q(t-l)
BM2(17,i) = BM2(8,i-1) ; '/. ff_q(t-l)
BM2(5,i) = log(exp(BM2(3,i))*(l+chic)+exp(BM2(5,i-l))*chic-2*chic*... 
exp(BM2(4,i)));
'/. c_q = q(t-l)*(l+chic)+c_q(t-l)*chic-2*chic*q(t-2)
BM2(6,i) = log(exp(BM2(5,i))*(l+chic)-exp(BM2(5,i-l))*chic*(l+chic)+... 
chic*(exp(BM2(6,i-1))-(1-chic)*exp(BM2(3,i))));
'/, cf_q = c_q*(l+chic)-c_q(t-l)*chic*(l+chic)+chic*(cf_q(t-l)-(l-chic)*q(t-l)) 
BM2(7,i) = log(exp(BM2(3,i))*(l-chif)+...
exp(BMl(strmatch(’r_q’, varlist, ’exact’),i))*chif);
'/, f_q = q(t-l)*(l-chif)+r_q*chif 
BM2(8,i) = log(exp(BM2(7,i))*(l-chif)+...
exp(BMl(strmatch(’rf_q’, varlist, ’exact’),i))*chif);
% ff_q = f_q*(l-chif)+rf_q*chif 
'/. BM2(9,i) = 0.5;
if i==2; BM2(9,i) = 0.5;
else if BM2(5,i-2)==BM2(7,i-2); BM2(9,i) = 0.5;
else profit(i) = (exp(BM2(2,i-l))-exp(BM2(2,i-2))*exp(BMl(strmatch(’b_rb’,... 
varlist, ’exact’),i-2)));
c_profit(i) = profit(i)*sign(BM2(5,i-2)-BM2(4,i)); 
f_profit(i) = profit(i)*sign(BM2(7,i-2)-BM2(4,i));
BM2(9,i) = exp(3.75*c_profit(i))/(exp(3.75*c_profit(i))+exp(3.75*f_profit(i)))
end;
'/. [q(t-l)-q(t-2)*(l+rb(t-l))]
'/, cleair profit c_profit f.profit; 
end;
BM2(10,i) = 1-BM2(9,i);
*/, wc/wf = wc(-l)/wf(-l)*exp(ff2(-2)-q(-l))“2/exp(cf2(-2)-q(-l))~2 
V, wc+wf = 1
BM2(l,i) = log(BM2(9,i)*exp(BM2(6,i))+BM2(10,i)*exp(BM2(8,i))) ;
’/. bf_q = wc*cf_q+wf*ff_q;
BM2(2,i) = log(BM2(9,i)*exp(BM2( 5, i ) )+BM2(10,i)*exp(BM2(7,i)));
V, q = wc*c_q+wf*f_q;
BM2(ll,i) = exp(BM2(2,i)+BMl(strmatch(’r_lambda’, varlist, ’exact’),i)~ 
BMl(strmatch(’rf_lambda’, varlist, ’exact’),i))/beta-exp(BM2(l,i)); 
'/, bf_rk = q*lambda/(beta*lambda(+l)) - bf_q 
BM2(12,i) = BM2(2,i)-BMl(strmatch(’r_q’, vairlist, ’exact’),i);
'/. zq = log(b_q/r_q)
BM2(13,i) = BM2(12,i)-rhoq*BM2(12,i-l) ;
V, eq = zq - rhoq*zq(-l)
BM2(14,i) = BM2(l,i)-BMl(strmatch(’rf_q’, varlist, ’exact’),i);
'/, zfq = log(bf_q/rf_q) ;
BM2(15,i) = BM2(14,i)-rhofq*BM2(14,i-1);
'/, efq = zfq - rhofq*zfq(-l)
‘/.Add eq aaid efq ’shocks’ into dynare model and resolve: 
bshock(3,i-l) = BM2(13,i); 
bshock(l,i-l) = BM2(15,i);
BM1(:,i) = BM1(:,1)+A*(BM1(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1))+B*bshock(:,i-l)+... 
0.5*C*kron(BMl(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1),BM1(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1))+... 
0.5*D*kron(bshock(:,i-l),bshock(:,i-l))+...
E*kron(BMl(:,i-l)-BMl(:,1),bshock(:,i-l));
'/.Finally, put actual values into initial conditions for next period: 
actv = {’c’;’i’;’k ’;’l’;’lambda’;’me’;’mu’;’pa’;’pb’;’pd’;’pi’;...
’pstar’;’q’;’rb’;’RBi’;’rk’;’u ’;’v ’;’w ’;’wa’;’wb’;’wd’;’wstar’;’y ’} 
for j=l:size(actv,1);
BMl(strmatch(strcat(’r_’,actv(j,:)), varlist, ’exact’),i) = ... 
BMl(strmatch(strcat(’b_’,actv(j,:)), varlist, ’exact’),i);
end;
end;
'/.Check consistency of bf_q, q, q(t-l) , q(t-2), zq, zfq,
’/.across different matrices 
temp = {’bf_q’;’b_q’;’zq’;’zfq’}; 
for i=l:size(temp,1);
if max(abs((BMl(strmatch(temp(i,:), varlist, ’exact’),:)-BM2(strmatch.. 
(temp(i,:), behvars, ’exact’),:))))>.000001; 
warning(’inconsistency across matrices’); 
disp(temp(i));
end;
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end;
if max(abs((BMl(strmatch(3b_q3, varlist, ’exact3),l:t)-BM2(strmatch...
(’q(t-l)’, behvars, 3exact3),2:t+1))))>.000001; 
warning(3q(t-l) inconsistent across matrices3);
end;
if max(abs((BMl(strmatch(3b_q3, varlist, ’exact3),1:t-l)-BM2(strmatch...
(3q(t-2)3, behvars, ’exact3),3:t+l))))>.000001; 
warning(’q(t-2) inconsistent across matrices’);
end;
/(Compare utility 
ratutility = 0.0; 
for i=l:t-l;
ratutility = ratutility+((beta“(i-1))*X(strmatch(3r_v3, varlist, ’exact3),i+l));
end;
ratutility = ratutility+((beta-(t-1))*X(strmatch(3r_u3, varlist, ’exact3),t+l)); 
’/.ratutility = (ratutility-X(strmatch(3r_u3, varlist, ’exact3), 1))*100;
}(disp( [’utility in the rational model is equivalent to a ’...
’/. num2str(ratutility) ’’/, one-off change in consumption3]);
behavutility = 0.0; 
for i=l:t-l;
behavutility = behavutility+((beta~(i-l))*BMl(strmatch(’b_v3, varlist, 3exact3),i+1));
end;
behavutility = behavutility+((beta~(t-l))*BMl(strmatch(3b_u3, varlist, 3exact3),t+1)); 
’/.behavutility = (behavutility-X(strmatch(3r_u3, varlist, ’exact3) ,1))*100;
'/,disp( [’utility in the behavioural model is equivalent to a ’...
'/. num2str(behavutility) ’’/, one-off change in consumption3]);
/•
'/. ’/.Print IRFs 
’/. '/.Asset price
’/. figure (’papertype3, 3A43, ’PaperUnits3, ’centimeters’, ’PaperPosition3,. . .
’/. [0.5 0.5 20.5 27]);
’/. hold on;
’/, qplot = X(strmatch(’r_q3, varlist, ’exact3) ,2:t+l)-X(strmatch(’r_q3,.. .
’/, varlist,3 exact3) , 1) ;
'/, plot (qplot,3 LineStyle3,3 — 3,3 color3,3 k 3 ) ;
'/, qplot = Y(strmatch(3r_q3,varlist, ’exact3) ,l:t)-BMl(strmatch(’r_q3,. ..
'/. varlist,’exact3) ,1) ;
'/. plot (qplot,’color3, 3g 3);
'/, qplot = BM2(strmatch(’c_q3 .behvars,’exact3) ,2:t+l)-BM2(strmatch(’c_q3,.. .
’/, behvars,3 exact3) , 1) ;
'/, plot (qplot,’color3, 3b 3) ;
'/. qplot = BM2(strmatch(’f_q3 .behvars,’exact3) ,2:t+l)-BM2(strmatch(’f_q3,.. .
’/, behvars,3 exact3) , 1) ;
'/, plot (qplot,’color3, 3c3) ;
qplot = BM1 (strmatch(’b_q’.varlist,’exact’),2:t+1)-BM1(strmatch(’b_q’ .
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’color’,’r ’);
legend({’Rational Model’,’"Rational expectation"’,...
’"Chartist expectation"’,’"Fundamentalist expectation"’,... 
’Actual’});
title({’Asset Price’},’FontSize’,10,’FontWeight’,’bold’); 
hold off;
print -dpdf IRFl.pdf;
‘/.Expectations of next period’s asset price
figure (’papertype’,’A4’,’PaperUnits’,’centimeters’,’PaperPosition’,...
[0.5 0.5 20.5 27]); 
hold on;
qplot = X(strmatch(’rf_q’,varlist,’exact’),2:t+l)-X(strmatch(’rf_q’,...
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’LineStyle’,’ —  ’,’color’,’ k ’ );
qplot = BMl(strmatch(’rf_q’.varlist,’exact’),2:t+l)-BMl(strmatch(’rf_q’, 
varlist, ’ exact ’), 1) ; 
plot (qplot,’color’,’g ’);
qplot = BM2(strmatch(’cf_q’.behvars,’exact’),2:t+l)-BM2(strmatch(’cf_q’, 
behvars,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’color’,’b ’);
qplot = BM2(strmatch(’ff_q’.behvars,’exact’),2:t+l)-BM2(strmatch(’ff_q’, 
behvars,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’color’,’c’);
qplot = BMl(strmatch(’bf_q’.varlist,’exact’),2:t+l)-BMl(strmatch(’bf_q’, 
varlist, ’ exact ’) , 1) ; 
plot (qplot,’color’,’r ’);
legend({’Rational Model’,’"Rational expectation"’,...
’"Chartist expectation"’,’"Fundamentalist expectation"’,...
’Weighted average expectation’}); 
title({’Expectations of the next period asset price’},’FontSize’,10,...
’FontWeight’,’bold’); 
hold off;
print -dpdf IRF2.pdf;
'/.Expectations of next period’s return on capital
figure (’papertype’,’A4’,’PaperUnits’,’centimeters’,’PaperPosition’,...
[0.5 0.5 20.5 27]); 
hold on;
qplot = X(strmatch(’rf_rk’.varlist,’exact’),2:t+l)-X(strmatch(’rf_rk’,..
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’LineStyle’,’— ’,’color’,’k ’);
qplot = BM1(strmatch(’rf_rk’.varlist,’exact’),2:t+l)-BMl(strmatch(’rf_rk 
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’color’,’g ’);
qplot = BM1(strmatch(’bf_rk’ .varlist, ’exact’) ,2:t+l)-BMl(strmatch(’bf_rk 
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (qplot,’color*,’r ’);
legend({’Rational Model’,’"Rational expectation"’,...
’"Behavioural expectation"’}); 
title({’Expectations of the next period return on capital’},’FontSize’,.
10,’FontWeight’,’bold’); 
hold off;
print -dpdf IRF3.pdf;
’/.Actual variables - rational model vs behavioural
temp = {’c’;’i’;’k ’;’1’;’y ’;’lambda’;’me’;’mu’;’pd’;’pi’ .
’pstar’; ’rb’ ; ’RBi’; ’rk’; ’w ’; ’wd’; ’wstar’}; 
for i=l:2;
figure (’papertype’,’A4’,’PaperUnits’,’centimeters’,’PaperPosition’, 
[0.5 0.5 20.5 27]); 
for j=1:9;
subplot(3,3,j); 
hold on;
if i*j==18; break; end;
title(strcat(temp(9*(i-l)+j,:),’_t’),’FontSize’,10,...
’FontWeight’,’bold’); 
ratplot = X(strmatch(strcat(’r_’,temp(9*(i-l)+j,:)).varlist,... 
’exact’),2:t+l)-X(strmatch(strcat(’r_’,temp(9*(i-l)+j,:)),.. 
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (ratplot,’LineStyle’,’— ’,’color’,’k ’);
behplot = BMl(strmatch(strcat(’b_’,temp(9*(i-l)+j,:)).varlist,.. 
’exact’),2:t+l)-BMl(strmatch(strcat(’b_’,temp(9*(i-l)+j,:)), 
varlist,’exact’),1); 
plot (behplot,’color’,’r ’); 
hold off;
end;
if i*j==18;
title(’Weights (chartist dark)’,’FontSize’,10,...
’FontWeight’,’bold’); 
plot (BM2(9,2:t+l),’LineStyle’,’— ’,’color’,’b ’); 
plot (BM2(10,2:t+l),’color’,’c’); 
hold off;
end;
eval([’print -dpdf IRF’ int2str(i+3) ’.pdf’]);
end;
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B.6. Robustness Tests
Table B.l. Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with no 
switching between forecasting rules
Difference compared to benchmark model: v =  0
U tility  cost versus Performance
Cq rational model relative to  =  0
(%age permanent consumption) (%age bias corrected)
0.00 -0.184 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.197 % -6.6 %
-0.05 -0.173 % 6.2 %
0.10 -0.211 % -14.6 %
-0.10 -0.163 % 11.8 %
0.50 -0.412 % -123.2 %
-0.50 -0.111 % 39.9 %
1.00 -1.642 % -790.5 %
-1.00 -0.101 % 45.5 %
Table B.2. Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with 
rapid switching between forecasting rules
Difference compared to benchmark model: v =  100
U tility  cost versus Performance
Cq rational model relative to (q = 0
(%age permanent consumption) (%age bias corrected)
0.00 -0.233 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.186 % 20.2 %
-0.05 -0.293 % -25.6 %
0.10 -0.165 % 29.5 %
-0.10 -0.358 % -53.4 %
0.50 -3.815 % -1534.4 %
-0.50 -0.595 % -154.9 %
1.00 NA % NA %
-1.00 -0.895 % -283.6 %
Table B.3. Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with a 
percent uncertainty bound around the fundamentalist forecast
Difference compared to benchmark model: C  =  0.01
U tility  cost versus Perform ance
Cq ra tio n a l m odel re la tive  to  ( q = 0
(%age permanent consumption) (%age bias corrected)
0.00 -0.163 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.176 % -7.9 %
-0.05 -0.153 % 6.4 %
0.10 -0.190 % -16.3 %
-0.10 -0.143 % 12.5 %
0.50 -0.373 % -129.1 %
-0.50 -0.097 % 40.2 %
1.00 NA % NA %
-1.00 -0.114 % 30.3 %
Table B.4. Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with 
10 percent uncertainty bound around the fundamentalist forecast
Difference compared to benchmark model: C  — 0.1
U tility  cost versus Performance
Cq rationed model relative to  ( q  =  0
(%age permanent consumption) (%age bias corrected)
0.00 -0.130 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.190 % -46.0 %
-0.05 -0.090 % 30.5 %
0.10 -0.285 % -119.2 %
-0.10 -0.063 % 51.5 %
0.50 N A  % N A  %
-0.50 -0.004 % 97.0 %
1.00 N A  % N A  %
-1.00 -0.059 % 54.4 %
